admission of the blood test in New York

2014Given the foregoing evidence of defendant’s intoxication, the admission of the blood test results was harmless error with respect to her reckless driving conviction, “inasmuch as there is ‘no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to defendant’s conviction’ ” on that count (People v Freeman, 46 AD3d at 1377 , quoting People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]; see People v Isaac, 224 AD2d at 994 ).

2014Given the foregoing evidence of defendant’s intoxication, the admission of the blood test results was harmless error with respect to her reckless driving conviction, “inasmuch as there is ‘no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to defendant’s conviction’ ” on that count (People v Freeman, 46 AD3d at 1377 , quoting People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]; see People v Isaac, 224 AD2d at 994 ).

2002The Chain of Custody Rule In view of the fungible nature of a blood sample, the proponent of the admission of the blood test results has the burden of establishing the chain of custody (see, People v Connelly, 35 NY2d 171, 174-175 ) and the failure to do so may be excused only where the circumstances provide reasonable assurances of the identity and unchanged condition of the sample (see, Amaro v City of New York, 40 NY2d 30, 35 , citing People v Porter, 46 AD2d 307 ).

2002The Chain of Custody Rule In view of the fungible nature of a blood sample, the proponent of the admission of the blood test results has the burden of establishing the chain of custody (see, People v Connelly, 35 NY2d 171, 174-175 ) and the failure to do so may be excused only where the circumstances provide reasonable assurances of the identity and unchanged condition of the sample (see, Amaro v City of New York, 40 NY2d 30, 35 , citing People v Porter, 46 AD2d 307 ).

2002The Chain of Custody Rule In view of the fungible nature of a blood sample, the proponent of the admission of the blood test results has the burden of establishing the chain of custody (see, People v Connelly, 35 NY2d 171, 174-175 ) and the failure to do so may be excused only where the circumstances provide reasonable assurances of the identity and unchanged condition of the sample (see, Amaro v City of New York, 40 NY2d 30, 35 , citing People v Porter, 46 AD2d 307 ).

2001Contrary to the further contention of defendant, the People established an adequate foundation for the admission of the blood test result in evidence at trial (see, People v Julian, 41 NY2d 340 , 342-343; People v Parker, 217 AD2d 946 , Iv denied 87 NY2d 849 ).

2001“Any deficiency in the chain of custody went to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility” (People v Hooks, 258 AD2d 954 , Iv denied 93 NY2d 972 ; see, People v Daniels, supra, at 910).

1995Respondent, having failed to object to the admission of the blood test results on grounds other than the refusal of Family Court to order petitioner to pay the expense of a third blood test desired by respondent, cannot now challenge the adequacy of the test’s foundation (see, Matter of Helen NN. v Daniel OO., 187 AD2d 860 ; Matter of Clovsky v Stanley VV., 176 AD2d 419 , lv denied 79 NY2d 753 ).

1995Respondent, having failed to object to the admission of the blood test results on grounds other than the refusal of Family Court to order petitioner to pay the expense of a third blood test desired by respondent, cannot now challenge the adequacy of the test’s foundation (see, Matter of Helen NN. v Daniel OO., 187 AD2d 860 ; Matter of Clovsky v Stanley VV., 176 AD2d 419 , lv denied 79 NY2d 753 ).

1995In any event, we reject respondent’s argument that the test records were not properly certified in accordance with CPLR 4518 (c) (see, Matter of Stone [ChilinskiJ v llardo, 191 AD2d 965 ).

1989Although People v Kates ( 53 NY2d 591 ) predated the enactment of CPL 240.40, the Moselle court made no mention of the case in rendering its decision, thereby buttressing the conclusion that its determination was not intended to affect the Kates rationale concerning the seizure of blood from an unconscious motorist based upon implied consent.

1989Furthermore, in People v Casadei ( 66 NY2d 846 ), the Court of Appeals rejected the converse of the result achieved by the hearing court at bar, i.e., the court concluded that the People’s exclusive reliance upon CPL 240.40 in obtaining blood samples where violations of the Vehicle and Traffic Law and Penal Law were charged, did not preclude the admission of the blood test results in respect to the Vehicle and Traffic Law offenses merely because a Vehicle and Traffic Law methodology was not employed to obtain the samples. .

1985Finally, we find that the foundation for the admission of the blood test evidence was sufficiently established (People v Julian, 41 NY2d 340 ; People v Scalzi, 102 AD2d 952 ), which, together with other proof of defendant’s intoxication, was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

1985Nonetheless, even without the admission of the blood test results, petitioner sustained her burden of establishing paternity (see, Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. v Philip De G., 59 NY2d 137, 141-142 ).