manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard in Illinois

2021In applying the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, “[a] reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the evidence, or the inferences to be drawn.” Best v. Best, 223 Ill. 2d 342, 350 (2006).

2017Under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, “[a] reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the evidence, or the inferences to be drawn.” Best v. Best, 223 Ill. 2d 342, 350-51 (2006).

2022Under a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, a court of review “must not substitute its judgement for that of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the evidence, or the inferences to be drawn.” In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476 , 499 (2002). ¶ 41 Here, in its written order awarding respondent the majority of the parenting time, the trial court made express findings with respect to each of the factors enumerated in section 602.7 of the Marriage Act.

2008When reviewing a trial court’s decision under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, courts of review “give deference to the trial court as the finder of fact because it is in the best position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the parties and the witnesses and has a degree of familiarity with the evidence that a reviewing court cannot possibly obtain.” In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498-99 , 777 N.E.2d 930, 943 (2002).

2015App. 3d 236, 243 (2007)), but notes that the supreme court applied the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard in In re Support of Pearson, 111 Ill. 2d 545, 552 (1986).

2015App. 3d 236, 243 (2007)), but notes that the supreme court applied the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard in In re Support of Pearson, 111 Ill. 2d 545, 552 (1986).

2026In re Marriage of Bates, 212 Ill. 2d 489, 515 (2004). ¶ 35 “A modification of parenting time requires *** ‘changed’ circumstances, while a modification of the parenting plan or allocation judgment requires a ‘substantial change’ in - 11 - circumstances.” Reynolds v. Reynolds, 2025 IL App (2d) 240028, ¶ 33 .

2022In re Marriage of Bates, 212 Ill. 2d 489, 515 (2004).

2025The State responds that the court did not abuse its discretion in terminating the wardship because K.H. and B.H. found much-needed permanency with Kendall. ¶ 56 “A trial court’s determination to terminate wardship is reviewed under the manifest- weight-of-the evidence standard when the court’s weighing of the facts is at issue; otherwise, it is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” In re Aaron R., 387 Ill.

2024Likewise, “[a] trial court’s determination to terminate wardship is reviewed under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard when the court’s weighing of facts is at issue; otherwise, it is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re D.V., 2024 IL App (4th) 240751, ¶ 52 (quoting In re Aaron R., 387 Ill.

2020As discussed, the trial court’s distribution of marital property is reviewed under the abuse-of- discretion standard of review (see Hamilton, 2019 IL App (5th) 170295, ¶ 34 ), and its determination as to the value of marital property is reviewed under the manifest-weight-of-the- evidence standard of review (see Vancura, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 203 ). ¶ 84 Robert sought dismissal of Kendelle’s motion for reimbursement based upon the doctrines of equitable estoppel and laches.

2020While the trial court’s ultimate distribution of marital property is reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion standard of review (see In re Marriage of Hamilton, 2019 IL App (5th) 170295, ¶ 34 ), the trial court’s determination as to the value of marital property is reviewed under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review (see In re Marriage of Vancura, 356 Ill. App. 3d 200, 203 (2005)). ¶ 76 On remand, the trial court determined that the total amount of Kendelle’s post-separation debt appeared to have been improperly rounded to $60,000 in the dissolution judgment.

2014Although the trial court heard extensive evidence and made factual findings, which we would review under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard (K.R.J., 405 Ill. App. 3d at 535 ), the parties do not challenge the court’s factual findings.

2014Although the trial court heard extensive evidence and made factual findings, which we would review under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard (K.R.J., 405 Ill. App. 3d at 535 ), the parties do not challenge the court’s factual findings.

2019We note, however, that even under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, the deference afforded to the decision of the administrative agency is not boundless ( Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board , 226 Ill. 2d 485 , 507, 315 Ill.Dec. 772 , 877 N.E.2d 1101 (2007) ), and a reviewing court should not hesitate to grant relief where the administrative record does not show evidentiary support for the agency's determination ( Bowlin v. Murphysboro Firefighters Pension Board of Trustees , 368 Ill.

2019We note, however, that even under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, the deference afforded to the decision of the administrative agency is not boundless ( Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board , 226 Ill. 2d 485 , 507, 315 Ill.Dec. 772 , 877 N.E.2d 1101 (2007) ), and a reviewing court should not hesitate to grant relief where the administrative record does not show evidentiary support for the agency's determination ( Bowlin v. Murphysboro Firefighters Pension Board of Trustees , 368 Ill.

2025Orsini v. Industrial Comm’n, 117 Ill. 2d 38, 44 (1987).

2025Orsini v. Industrial Comm’n, 117 Ill. 2d 38, 44 (1987).

2018A factual finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence unless " 'the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or the finding is arbitrary, unreasonable, or not based in evidence.' " In re Marriage of Schneeweis , 2016 IL App (2d) 140147 , ¶ 35, 404 Ill.Dec. 426 , 55 N.E.3d 1280 (quoting Samour, Inc. v. Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago , 224 Ill. 2d 530 , 544, 310 Ill.Dec. 326 , 866 N.E.2d 137 (2007) ). ¶ 68 Janet focuses exclusively on section 503(d)(1), which provides that a court in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or declaration of the invalidity of

2018A factual finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence unless " 'the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or the finding is arbitrary, unreasonable, or not based in evidence.' " In re Marriage of Schneeweis , 2016 IL App (2d) 140147 , ¶ 35, 404 Ill.Dec. 426 , 55 N.E.3d 1280 (quoting Samour, Inc. v. Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago , 224 Ill. 2d 530 , 544, 310 Ill.Dec. 326 , 866 N.E.2d 137 (2007) ). ¶ 68 Janet focuses exclusively on section 503(d)(1), which provides that a court in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or declaration of the invalidity of

2010The court then cited to Chicago Investment Corp. v. Dolins, 107 Ill.2d 120, 124 , 89 Ill.Dec. 869 , 481 N.E.2d 712 (1985), for the proposition that the grant or denial of relief after a civil bench trial is traditionally reviewed under a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard.

2010The court then cited to Chicago Investment Corp. v. Dolins, 107 Ill. 2d 120, 124 (1985), for the proposition that the grant or denial of relief after a civil bench trial is traditionally reviewed under a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard.

2026In re Marriage of Wengielnik, 2020 IL App (3d) 180533, ¶ 12 (holding that “[w]hen the trial court finds that no substantial change in circumstances has occurred, we review whether the manifest weight of the evidence supports the finding”).

2022See In re Marriage of Wengielnik, 2020 IL App (3d) 180533, ¶ 12 (holding that “[w]hen the trial court finds that no substantial change in circumstances has occurred, we review whether the manifest weight of the evidence supports the finding” (citing In re Marriage of Barnard, 283 Ill.

2008App. 3d 696, 699-700 , 843 N.E.2d 478, 482-83 (2006) (finding that a trial court's determinations on dissipation and the valuation of marital property should be reviewed under the manifest-weight-of- the-evidence standard of review and that the review of the trial court's determination on the ultimate division of marital property should be conducted under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review; the court noted that "dissipation and the valuation of marital assets are generally factual determinations" while "the circuit court's decision on the ultimate division of marital property depends up

2008App. 3d 696, 699-700 , 843 N.E.2d 478, 482-83 (2006) (finding that a trial court’s determinations on dissipation and the valuation of marital property should be reviewed under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review and that the review of the trial court’s determination on the ultimate division of marital property should be conducted under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review; the court noted that “dissipation and the valuation of marital assets are generally factual determinations” while “the circuit court’s decision on the ultimate division of marital property depends upo

2024People v. Morgan, 2024 IL App (4th) 240103, ¶ 35 (refusing to apply the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard).

2024People v. Morgan, 2024 IL App (4th) 240103, ¶¶ 18-23, 35 (finding the manifest-weight-of-the- evidence standard inappropriate for review of pretrial-detention orders). ¶ 21 We disagree with defendant’s argument the trial court did not explain its reasons for finding the State clearly and convincingly proved no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the threat defendant poses to a person or persons or the community.

2013In that case, this court interpreted dicta contained in People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1 , 17 n.5 (2007), to favor the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard when reviewing such a determination.

2010See Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 17 n.4 (noting that appellate courts have applied an abuse-of-discretion standard and/or a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard in cases where a section 2 — 1401 evidentiary hearing was held).

2026See Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 30 ; Staake, 2022 IL App (4th) 210071, ¶ 28 ; but see Thomas v. County of Cook, 2023 IL App (1st) 211656, ¶ 16 (applying a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review); Edgar County Watchdogs v. Joliet Township, 2023 IL App (3d) 210520, ¶ 31 (same); Rock River Times v. Rockford Public School District 205, 2012 IL App (2d) 110879, ¶ 48 (same). ¶ 47 The Plain Language of Subsection 11(j) of FOIA 17 ¶ 48 As set forth earlier, when interpreting a statute such as FOIA’s subsection 11(j), we must honor the legislature’s intent.

2023“To warrant the imposition of a civil penalty under section 11(j), the public body not only must have intentionally failed to comply with the FOIA but must have done so deliberately, by design, and with a dishonest purpose.” Edgar County Watchdogs v. Joliet Township, 2023 IL App (3d) 210520, ¶ 30 (citing Williams v. Bruscato, 2021 IL App (2d) 190971, ¶ 14 ). ¶ 17 A trial court’s finding that a public body willfully, intentionally, and in bad faith failed to comply with the FOIA is reviewed under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, “regardless of whether the underlying facts are dispu

2026See Marconi v. Chicago Heights Police Pension Board, 225 Ill. 2d 497, 540 (2006) (establishing the Board’s factual findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence is “a very high threshold to surmount.

2025Marconi, 225 Ill. 2d at 532 .

2013“The highly factual nature of the assessment of punitive damages dictates that a great amount of deference should be afforded the determination made at the trial court level, and to reflect that deference and the highly factual nature of the determination, we review the assessment of punitive damages on a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard.” Turner, 363 Ill.

2009“The highly factual nature of the assessment of punitive damages dictates that a great amount of deference should be afforded the determination made at the trial court level, and to reflect that deference and the highly factual nature of the determination, we review the assessment of punitive damages on a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard.” Turner, 363 Ill.

2010Gail F., 365 Ill.

2010Gail F., 365 Ill.

2008Franz v. Calaco Development Corp., 352 Ill.

2008Franz v. Calaco Development Corp., 352 Ill.