Douglas motion in Ohio

2020While the law of the case rule is “a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law,” it is nevertheless necessary “to ensure consistency of results in a case, to avoid endless litigation by settling the issues, and to preserve the structure of superior and inferior courts as designed by the Ohio Constitution.” Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d at 3 , 462 N.E.2d 410 . {¶ 29} Upon due consideration of Douglas’s challenge to the use of K-1 distributions as earnings, therefore, we find the issues raised were either raised or capable of being addressed in the prior appeal, and exceed the scope

2020While the law of the case rule is “a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law,” it is nevertheless necessary “to ensure consistency of results in a case, to avoid endless litigation by settling the issues, and to preserve the structure of superior and inferior courts as designed by the Ohio Constitution.” Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d at 3 , 462 N.E.2d 410 . {¶ 29} Upon due consideration of Douglas’s challenge to the use of K-1 distributions as earnings, therefore, we find the issues raised were either raised or capable of being addressed in the prior appeal, and exceed the scope

2016State v. White, 103 Ohio St.3d 580 , 2004-Ohio-5989 , ¶ 8.

2009State v. Douglas , 2004-Ohio-5726 , ¶ 12 .

2006Apparently conceding that Douglas' stop, made pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, supra, was justified, he contends that Douglas exceeded the scope of a permissible investigative stop by asking him a question after conducting the pat-down search, because he was then in police custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436 .

2006Apparently conceding that Douglas' stop, made pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, supra, was justified, he contends that Douglas exceeded the scope of a permissible investigative stop by asking him a question after conducting the pat-down search, because he was then in police custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436 .

2005Baston, 476 U.S. at 96 .

2005See State v. Filiaggi (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 230, 240 , 714 N.E.2d 867 ; State v. Gonzales, 151 Ohio App.3d 160 , 2002-Ohio-4937 , 783 N.E.2d 903, ¶ 61 ; State v. Leonard (June 21, 2001), Franklin App. No. 00AP-1229, 2001 WL 697999 . {¶ 12} As Judge Burlew notes, the error occurred when he denied Douglas’s motion to suppress her breath-alcohol-test results, which occurred before Douglas entered a plea of no contest to one DUI charge in return for the state’s dismissal of the remaining DUI charge in the criminal case.

2005See State v. Filiaggi (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 230, 240 , 714 N.E.2d 867 ; State v. Gonzales, 151 Ohio App.3d 160 , 2002-Ohio-4937 , 783 N.E.2d 903, ¶ 61 ; State v. Leonard (June 21, 2001), Franklin App. No. 00AP-1229, 2001 WL 697999 . {¶ 12} As Judge Burlew notes, the error occurred when he denied Douglas’s motion to suppress her breath-alcohol-test results, which occurred before Douglas entered a plea of no contest to one DUI charge in return for the state’s dismissal of the remaining DUI charge in the criminal case.

2005State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380 , para. two of the syllabus. {¶ 9} We will first address Douglas' claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

1993I believe that before this court can countenance such an extension of the law as appellant requests, the Supreme Court must first expressly address paragraph two of the syllabus of Westwood v. Thrifty Boy Super Markets, Inc. (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 84 , 58 O.O.2d 154 , 278 N.E.2d 673 , which holds as follows: “Where a frequenter, as defined in R.C. 4101.10(E), voluntarily and with knowledge of an existing danger enters the premises of an employer, as defined in R.C. 4101.01(C), the defense of assumption of risk is available to such employer in an action by the frequenter alleging a violation of

1993I believe that before this court can countenance such an extension of the law as appellant requests, the Supreme Court must first expressly address paragraph two of the syllabus of Westwood v. Thrifty Boy Super Markets, Inc. (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 84 , 58 O.O.2d 154 , 278 N.E.2d 673 , which holds as follows: “Where a frequenter, as defined in R.C. 4101.10(E), voluntarily and with knowledge of an existing danger enters the premises of an employer, as defined in R.C. 4101.01(C), the defense of assumption of risk is available to such employer in an action by the frequenter alleging a violation of