9 Ohio opinions name it 1 courts 2002–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smiddy v. Wedding Party, Inc.green1 sentence2022Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 36 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Bernard v. Cordlegreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., Bernard v. Cordle, 116 Ohio App.3d 116, 120-21 (10th Dist.1996); Johnson v. Am. | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Motorists Mut., Unpublished Decision (8-4-2005)green1 sentence2007See Mitchell , supra, ¶ 18 . {¶ 60} For all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court erred in denying Grange's motion for summary judgment and in granting summary judgment in favor of Citizens and Engler. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lehrner v. Safeco Insurance/American States Insurance
green
2 sentences2022They argue Lori’s negligent distraction caused Athena’s negligent operation, causing the deaths of Sara Riggs and Dusty Wallace and the injuries to Kody McGrath. {¶12} We find Appellants apply too narrow a definition of the phrase “arising out of” to include only “originating from.” In finding an auto exclusion similar to the one in the instant case barred coverage for a negligent supervision claim where the bodily injury was caused by the operation of a motor vehicle, the Second District Court of Appeals concluded the phrase “arising out of” was unambiguous, as “arise” means “[‘t]o originate; 2022They argue Lori’s negligent distraction caused Athena’s negligent operation, causing the deaths of Sara Riggs and Dusty Wallace and the injuries to Kody McGrath. {¶12} We find Appellants apply too narrow a definition of the phrase “arising out of” to include only “originating from.” In finding an auto exclusion similar to the one in the instant case barred coverage for a negligent supervision claim where the bodily injury was caused by the operation of a motor vehicle, the Second District Court of Appeals concluded the phrase “arising out of” was unambiguous, as “arise” means “[‘t]o originate; | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Jenkins
green
1 sentence2013Pons at id. {¶22} I do not think that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Zito and Grange’s motion to stay. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Wuerth
green
2 sentences2013Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Wuerth, 122 Ohio St.3d 594 , 2009-Ohio-3601, ¶ 20 . {¶ 36} Despite Grange's claim that, for insurance coverage purposes, the intentional conduct of Vaughan should be imputed to his employer, WHC, it has been determined that "[o]ne of the most common situations in which courts have found coverage for vicarious liabilities is where an employer is held liable for the intentional No. 13AP-290 12 injuries or damage(s) caused by one of its employees under the theory of respondeat superior." French, Debunking the Myth that Insurance Coverage is Not Available or Allowed for In 2013Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Wuerth, 122 Ohio St.3d 594 , 2009-Ohio-3601, ¶ 20 . {¶ 36} Despite Grange's claim that, for insurance coverage purposes, the intentional conduct of Vaughan should be imputed to his employer, WHC, it has been determined that "[o]ne of the most common situations in which courts have found coverage for vicarious liabilities is where an employer is held liable for the intentional No. 13AP-290 12 injuries or damage(s) caused by one of its employees under the theory of respondeat superior." French, Debunking the Myth that Insurance Coverage is Not Available or Allowed for In | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Ohio Furniture Co. v. Mindala
green
2 sentences2011Therefore, we must overrule Grange’s first assignment of error. {¶ 27} Grange’s second assignment of error provides as follows: “In the alternative, assuming * * * the settlement * * * preserved Grange’s subrogation rights, the trial court violated due process and erred as a matter of law by: 1) sua sponte dismissing Grange’s claim against defendant Marcy with prejudice after substituting Grange for plaintiff Jesenovec as the real-party-in-interest against Marcy; and 2) by not entering judgment against Marcy in the full amount of Grange’s subrogated interest.” {¶ 28} The Ohio Supreme Court has 2011Therefore, we must overrule Grange’s first assignment of error. {¶ 27} Grange’s second assignment of error provides as follows: “In the alternative, assuming * * * the settlement * * * preserved Grange’s subrogation rights, the trial court violated due process and erred as a matter of law by: 1) sua sponte dismissing Grange’s claim against defendant Marcy with prejudice after substituting Grange for plaintiff Jesenovec as the real-party-in-interest against Marcy; and 2) by not entering judgment against Marcy in the full amount of Grange’s subrogated interest.” {¶ 28} The Ohio Supreme Court has | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Temple v. Wean United, Inc.
green
2 sentences2008Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 , 4 O.O.3d 466 , 364 N.E.2d 267 . 2008Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 , 4 O.O.3d 466 , 364 N.E.2d 267 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Blakemore v. Blakemore
green
2 sentences2005"Abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or of judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable." Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217 , 219 , 450 N.E.2d 1140 . {¶ 12} After reviewing the record, we do not find an abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying Grange's motion for a mistrial. 2005"Abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or of judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable." Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217 , 219 , 450 N.E.2d 1140 . {¶ 12} After reviewing the record, we do not find an abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying Grange's motion for a mistrial. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Selander v. Erie Insurance Group
green
1 sentence2003Group (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 541 , 544 which held "[w]here motor vehicle liability coverage is provided, even in limited form, uninsured/underinsured coverage must be provided." In granting Grange's motion for summary judgment, the trial court held that, as a matter of law, the insurance policy is not a motor vehicle liability insurance policy under either the pre or post H.B. 261 version of R.C. 3937.18 . {¶ 11} R.C. 3937.18 pertains to the mandatory offering of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Judd
green
1 sentence2002Corp. v. Judd (1966), 400 S.W.2d 685 , 687 , the Kentucky appellate court found that, so long as the automobile could be put in substantially good physical condition as it was before the accident, the insurer's obligation was to pay the amount reasonably required for that purpose and no more. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.