marked lanes violation in Ohio

2017State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177 , 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988), paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶16} Appellee contends that appellant committed a marked lanes violation by driving his vehicle off the side of the roadway after first passing Deputy Flahive and that the traffic stop was justified by such violation.

2017State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177 , 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988), paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶16} Appellee contends that appellant committed a marked lanes violation by driving his vehicle off the side of the roadway after first passing Deputy Flahive and that the traffic stop was justified by such violation.

2020The Twelfth District certified the issue in conflict as follows: SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Does an officer have reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of a motor vehicle for a marked lanes violation under R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) when the officer observes the tires of a vehicle driving on, but not across a marked lane line? 157 Ohio St.3d 1544 , 2020-Ohio-94 , 137 N.E.3d 1225 . {¶ 2} We conclude upon review of the certified question that when an officer believes a traffic law has been violated, the focus of the inquiry is whether the officer had “probable cause to believe that a

2020The Twelfth District certified the issue in conflict as follows: SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Does an officer have reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of a motor vehicle for a marked lanes violation under R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) when the officer observes the tires of a vehicle driving on, but not across a marked lane line? 157 Ohio St.3d 1544 , 2020-Ohio-94 , 137 N.E.3d 1225 . {¶ 2} We conclude upon review of the certified question that when an officer believes a traffic law has been violated, the focus of the inquiry is whether the officer had “probable cause to believe that a

2026See State v. Alexander-Lindsey, 2016-Ohio-3033, ¶ 11 (4th Dist.). {¶24} Trooper Lewis’s stop of the rental vehicle was a marked lanes violation.

2022See State v. Alexander-Lindsey, 2016-Ohio-3033 , 65 N.E.3d 129 , ¶ 11.

2022C- 050860, C-050861, C-050878, and C-050879, 2006-Ohio-5265, ¶ 2-3, 6 (deferring to trial court's finding that officer's testimony that she observed a marked lanes violation at a particular intersection was credible even though the video footage did not show the violation due to the camera angle, the officer's report did not mention the violation, the officer only cited the driver for weaving at a different intersection, and the video footage did not reflect that the driver had been weaving at that location).

2020C-050860, C-050861, C-050878, C-050879, 2006-Ohio-5265, ¶ 2-3, 6 (deferring to trial court’s finding that officer’s testimony that she observed a marked lanes violation at a particular intersection was credible even though the video footage did not show the violation due to the camera angle, the officer’s report did not mention the violation, the officer only cited the driver for weaving at a different intersection, and the video footage did not reflect that the driver had been weaving at that location). {¶20} The trial court’s finding that Trooper Lewis observed a signal violation is supporte

2015See State v. Miller, 117 Ohio App.3d 750, 761 , 691 N.E.2d 703 (11th Dist. 1997); State v. Brandenburg, 41 Ohio App.3d 109, 111 , 534 N.E.2d 906 (7th Dist. 1987). {¶22} In the case sub judice, appellant was observed committing a marked lanes violation at 3:30 a.m.

2015See State v. Miller, 117 Ohio App.3d 750, 761 , 691 N.E.2d 703 (11th Dist. 1997); State v. Brandenburg, 41 Ohio App.3d 109, 111 , 534 N.E.2d 906 (7th Dist. 1987). {¶22} In the case sub judice, appellant was observed committing a marked lanes violation at 3:30 a.m.

2022Lorain No. 15CA010826, 2016-Ohio-5190, ¶ 6 , quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). “[T]he propriety of an investigative stop by a police officer must be viewed in light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances.” Mays at ¶ 7, quoting State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291 (1980), at paragraph one of the syllabus. “[I]f an officer’s decision to stop a motorist for a criminal violation, 4 including a traffic violation, is prompted by a reasonable and articulable suspicion considering all the circumstances, then the stop is constitutionally valid.” Id. at ¶ 8. {¶7} According to Troope

2013Burnside at ¶ 8. {¶18} At the outset, we note that the only issue before us is whether Trooper Sisco had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe Shaffer committed -7- Case No. 11-13-02 a marked lanes violation in order to legally effectuate the traffic stop.3 The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined “reasonable articulable suspicion” as “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion [upon an individual’s freedom of movement].” State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178 (1988), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 ,

2024Portage No. 2005-P-0077, 2006-Ohio-3424, ¶ 23 , citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). 6 Case No. 2023-P-0041 {¶23} The trial court believed Deputy Moore observed a marked lanes violation and the trial court is in the best position to evaluate her credibility.

2024Portage No. 2005-P-0077, 2006-Ohio-3424, ¶ 23 , citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). 6 Case No. 2023-P-0041 {¶23} The trial court believed Deputy Moore observed a marked lanes violation and the trial court is in the best position to evaluate her credibility.

2013To determine whether a police officer had probable cause to arrest an individual for operating under the influence, we consider whether, under the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest at the moment of arrest, the officer “had sufficient information, derived from a reasonably trustworthy source of facts and circumstances, sufficient to cause a prudent person to believe that the suspect was driving under the influence.” State v. Homan, 89 Ohio St.3d 421, 427 (2000), superceded on other grounds by statute as recognized in State v., Schmitt, 101 Ohio St.3d 79 , 2004-Ohio-

2003The second issue is whether the trial court erred when it denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence of field sobriety tests that formed a basis for Defendant's subsequent arrest on a DUI charge because the trial court failed to follow the strict compliance rule of State v. Homan, 89 Ohio St.3d 421 , 2000-Ohio-212 . {¶ 2} We find no error in the trial court's decision that the stop of Defendant's vehicle was justified.

2019“Where a police officer stops a vehicle based on probable cause that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the stop is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution even if the officer had some ulterior motive for making the stop, such as a suspicion that the violator was engaging in more nefarious criminal activity.” Erickson, supra, at syllabus, applying and following United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 388 (6th Cir.1993). {¶8} At the suppression hearing, the arresting officer, Don Swindell, testified that appellant was stopped for three traffi

2007Erickson , citing United State v. Ferguson (C.A.6, 1993), 8 F.3d 385 . {¶ 7} Appellant argues that the marked lanes violation could not have provided a basis to stop her because the conduct described by Trooper Milligan does not constitute a marked lanes violation.

2019Defiance No. 4-17-06, 2017-Ohio- 7363, ¶ 14, citing Anthony, 2009-Ohio-6717, at ¶ 12 , quoting Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406 , 2008-Ohio-4539 , at ¶ 25. {¶15} As to Parsons’s secondary argument (that the dashboard-camera recording is not competent, credible evidence that Parsons committed a marked- lanes violation based on this court’s decision in Shaffer), we determine such argument to be without merit.

2017However, we need not reach Williamson’s argument under Shaffer because the trial court concluded that Trooper Gardner had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe Williamson committed a marked-lanes violation based on -10- Case Nos. 4-17-06, 4-17-07 Trooper Gardner’s testimony that he witnessed her vehicle cross the centerline by a tire width and the white fog line by a tire width.2 See Anthony, 2009-Ohio-6717, at ¶ 12 (“‘[A] traffic stop is constitutionally valid when a law-enforcement officer witnesses a motorist drift over the lane markings in violation of R.C. 4511.33, even without f

2026The Supreme Court of Ohio has recently explained that although driving on or touching the white fog line does not constitute a marked lanes violation, the plain language of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) “ ‘discourages or prohibits’ a driver from crossing it.” State v. Turner, 2020-Ohio-6773 , ¶ 37. {¶27} “ ‘Counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel.’ ” State v. Woodfork, at ¶ 79, quoting State v. Thompkins, 2024-Ohio-4927, ¶ 66 (4th), citing State v. Walters, 2013- Ohio-772, ¶ 20 (4th Dist.), in turn citing State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389 (20

2026The Supreme Court of Ohio has recently explained that although driving on or touching the white fog line does not constitute a marked lanes violation, the plain language of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) “ ‘discourages or prohibits’ a driver from crossing it.” State v. Turner, 2020-Ohio-6773 , ¶ 37. {¶27} “ ‘Counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel.’ ” State v. Woodfork, at ¶ 79, quoting State v. Thompkins, 2024-Ohio-4927, ¶ 66 (4th), citing State v. Walters, 2013- Ohio-772, ¶ 20 (4th Dist.), in turn citing State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389 (20

2025Under Crim.R. 36, "[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record, and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission, may be corrected by the court at any time." "'The purpose of a nunc pro tunc entry under Crim.R. 36 is to record actions that actually were taken but not correctly recorded.'" State v. Rodriguez, 2024-Ohio-5632, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Baker, 2023-Ohio-1699, ¶ 32 (12th Dist.).

2025See State v. Thompson, 2025-Ohio-2427, ¶ 10 (5th Dist.) (quoting the same trial judge’s views that “an allegation of a traffic violation without visible corroboration when a video has been ma[d]e is insufficient to establish that an offense has been committed”).

2025Under Crim.R. 36, "[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record, and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission, may be corrected by the court at any time." "'The purpose of a nunc pro tunc entry under Crim.R. 36 is to record actions that actually were taken but not correctly recorded.'" State v. Rodriguez, 2024-Ohio-5632, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Baker, 2023-Ohio-1699, ¶ 32 (12th Dist.).

2024State v. Watkins, 2021-Ohio-1443, ¶ 26 (6th Dist.); State v. Martorana, 2023- Ohio-662, ¶ 34 (6th Dist.). {¶31} In this case, Trooper Miller observed Pierce’s erratic driving and initiated the traffic stop based on a marked lanes violation while driving on Vocational Road, a curvy road.

2024See Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 at paragraph two of the syllabus.

2024In applying that statute, this Court has held that, to establish a marked lanes violation, “the State 8 must present evidence ‘that the driver of a vehicle moving either between lanes of traffic or completely out of a lane of traffic failed to ascertain the safety of such movement prior to making the movement.’” State v. Ross, 2013-Ohio-1488, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Barner, 2004- Ohio-5950, ¶ 14. {¶18} Officer Warren Spragg testified that he and his partner began working a double shift on the afternoon of July 6, 2022.