conducting hearing in Pennsylvania

1960The rule is firmly established that the judge of the orphans’ court conducting the hearing on an appeal for the granting of an issue d.v.n. is not to constitute himself the jury, that is, to decide the case as he would if acting in the capacity of an ultimate fact-finding tribunal; his function is to determine whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact . . .”: Lewis Estate, 364 Pa. 225, 232 ; Molden Will, 387 Pa. 484, 501 ; Kerr v. O’Donovan, 389 Pa. 614, 621 .

1953“The rule is firmly established that the judge of the orphans’ court conducting the hearing on an appeal for the granting of an issue d.v.n. is not to constitute himself the jury, that is, to decide the case as he would if acting in the capacity of an ultimate factfinding tribunal; his function is to determine whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact, and such a dispute exists if a verdict that might be reached by a jury, even if at variance with his own opinion, would not have to be set aside as judicially untenable because contrary to the weight of the evidence”:

1960His function is to decide whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact, and such a dispute exists if a verdict that might be reached by a jury, even if at variance with his own opinion, would not have to be set aside as judicially untenable because contrary to the weight of the evidence”: DeLaurentiis’ Estate, 323 Pa. 70, 79 , (1936).

1950The rule is firmly established that the judge of the orphans’ court conducting the hearing on an appeal for the granting of an issue d.v.n. is not to constitute himself the jury, that is, to decide the case as he would if acting in the capacity of an ultimate fact-finding tribunal; his function is to determine whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact, and such a dispute exists if a verdict that might be reached by a jury, even if at variance with his own opinion, would not have to be set aside as judicially untenable because contrary to the weight of the evidence:

2015Did the Lower Court err in finding the case of In re Keyes, 83 A.3d 1016, 1024 , prevented the Court from conducting a hearing on Appellant’s Petition to Expunge the 302 under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1(g)(2) even though appellant's involuntary commitment was outpatient, while Keyes involved an inpatient commitment, and both 50 P.S. § 7303 and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(c)(4) preclude firearm possession only to those persons involuntarily committed to a mental institution for inpatient care and treatment under §§ 302, 303 or 304 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Act?

2007Id. at 225 (quoting Dambacher by Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa.Super. 22 , 485 A.2d 408 , 423 n. 5 (1984), abrogated on unrelated grounds as recognized by Moroney v. General Motors Corp., 850 A.2d 629, 634-35 (Pa.Super.2004)).

2007Id. at 225 (quoting Dambacher by Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa.Super. 22 , 485 A.2d 408 , 423 n. 5 (1984), abrogated on unrelated grounds as recognized by Moroney v. General Motors Corp., 850 A.2d 629, 634-35 (Pa.Super.2004)).

2007Id. at 225 (quoting Dambacher by Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa.Super. 22 , 485 A.2d 408 , 423 n. 5 (1984), abrogated on unrelated grounds as recognized by Moroney v. General Motors Corp., 850 A.2d 629, 634-35 (Pa.Super.2004)).

2002As noted in Morgan I, “[i]t is the rare preliminary injunction that can correctly be denied without a hearing.” 759 A.2d at 932 ; see also Pa.R.Civ.P. 1531(a)(“A court shall issue a preliminary or special injunction only after written notice and hearing unless ... irreparable injury will be sustained before notice can be given or a hearing held ....”) The criteria looked at in assessing whether to grant an injunction has been oft-stated; namely: 1) is the injunction necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm not compensable by damages; 2) would greater harm result from denying the inj

1996Two important factors identified by the Court in conducting this inquiry are “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.... ” Id.

1960The rule is firmly established that the judge of the orphans’ court conducting the hearing on an appeal for the granting of an issue d.v.n. is not to constitute himself the jury, that is, to decide the case as he would if acting in the capacity of an ultimate fact-finding tribunal; his function is to determine whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact . . .”: Lewis Estate, 364 Pa. 225, 232 ; Molden Will, 387 Pa. 484, 501 ; Kerr v. O’Donovan, 389 Pa. 614, 621 .

1957His function is to decide whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact, and such a dispute exists if a verdict that might be reached by a jury, even if at variance with his own opinion, would not have to be set aside as judicially untenable because contrary to the weight of the evidence. . . .’We have repeatedly reaffirmed this principle: Kline’s Estate, 322 Pa. 374, 378 , 186 A. 364 ; Hunter’s Estate, 328 Pa. 484, 492 , 196 A. 35 ; Noble’s Estate, 338 Pa. 490, 492 , 13 A. 2d 422 ; Porter’s Estate, 341 Pa. 476, 482 , 19 A. 2d 731 ; De Silver, Admrs., v. Pa. Trust Co.,

1957His function is to decide whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact, and such a dispute exists if a verdict that might be reached by a jury, even if at variance with his own opinion, would not have to be set aside as judicially untenable because contrary to the weight of the evidence. . . .’We have repeatedly reaffirmed this principle: Kline’s Estate, 322 Pa. 374, 378 , 186 A. 364 ; Hunter’s Estate, 328 Pa. 484, 492 , 196 A. 35 ; Noble’s Estate, 338 Pa. 490, 492 , 13 A. 2d 422 ; Porter’s Estate, 341 Pa. 476, 482 , 19 A. 2d 731 ; De Silver, Admrs., v. Pa. Trust Co.,

1957His function is to decide whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact, and such a dispute exists if a verdict that might be reached by a jury, even if at variance with his own opinion, would not have to be set aside as judicially untenable because contrary to the weight of the evidence. . . .’We have repeatedly reaffirmed this principle: Kline’s Estate, 322 Pa. 374, 378 , 186 A. 364 ; Hunter’s Estate, 328 Pa. 484, 492 , 196 A. 35 ; Noble’s Estate, 338 Pa. 490, 492 , 13 A. 2d 422 ; Porter’s Estate, 341 Pa. 476, 482 , 19 A. 2d 731 ; De Silver, Admrs., v. Pa. Trust Co.,

1957His function is to decide whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact, and such a dispute exists if a verdict that might be reached by a jury, even if at variance with his own opinion, would not have to be set aside as judicially untenable because contrary to the weight of the evidence. . . .’We have repeatedly reaffirmed this principle: Kline’s Estate, 322 Pa. 374, 378 , 186 A. 364 ; Hunter’s Estate, 328 Pa. 484, 492 , 196 A. 35 ; Noble’s Estate, 338 Pa. 490, 492 , 13 A. 2d 422 ; Porter’s Estate, 341 Pa. 476, 482 , 19 A. 2d 731 ; De Silver, Admrs., v. Pa. Trust Co.,

1957His function is to decide whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact, and such a dispute exists if a verdict that might be reached by a jury, even if at variance with his own opinion, would not have to be set aside as judicially untenable because contrary to the weight of the evidence. . . .’We have repeatedly reaffirmed this principle: Kline’s Estate, 322 Pa. 374, 378 , 186 A. 364 ; Hunter’s Estate, 328 Pa. 484, 492 , 196 A. 35 ; Noble’s Estate, 338 Pa. 490, 492 , 13 A. 2d 422 ; Porter’s Estate, 341 Pa. 476, 482 , 19 A. 2d 731 ; De Silver, Admrs., v. Pa. Trust Co.,

1957His function is to decide whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact, and such a dispute exists if a verdict that might be reached by a jury, even if at variance with his own opinion, would not have to be set aside as judicially untenable because contrary to the weight of the evidence. . . .’We have repeatedly reaffirmed this principle: Kline’s Estate, 322 Pa. 374, 378 , 186 A. 364 ; Hunter’s Estate, 328 Pa. 484, 492 , 196 A. 35 ; Noble’s Estate, 338 Pa. 490, 492 , 13 A. 2d 422 ; Porter’s Estate, 341 Pa. 476, 482 , 19 A. 2d 731 ; De Silver, Admrs., v. Pa. Trust Co.,

1957His function is to decide whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact, and such a dispute exists if a verdict that might be reached by a jury, even if at variance with his own opinion, would not have to be set aside as judicially untenable because contrary to the weight of the evidence. . . .’We have repeatedly reaffirmed this principle: Kline’s Estate, 322 Pa. 374, 378 , 186 A. 364 ; Hunter’s Estate, 328 Pa. 484, 492 , 196 A. 35 ; Noble’s Estate, 338 Pa. 490, 492 , 13 A. 2d 422 ; Porter’s Estate, 341 Pa. 476, 482 , 19 A. 2d 731 ; De Silver, Admrs., v. Pa. Trust Co.,

1957His function is to decide whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact, and such a dispute exists if a verdict that might be reached by a jury, even if at variance with his own opinion, would not have to be set aside as judicially untenable because contrary to the weight of the evidence. . . .’We have repeatedly reaffirmed this principle: Kline’s Estate, 322 Pa. 374, 378 , 186 A. 364 ; Hunter’s Estate, 328 Pa. 484, 492 , 196 A. 35 ; Noble’s Estate, 338 Pa. 490, 492 , 13 A. 2d 422 ; Porter’s Estate, 341 Pa. 476, 482 , 19 A. 2d 731 ; De Silver, Admrs., v. Pa. Trust Co.,

1957His function is to decide whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact, and such a dispute exists if a verdict that might be reached by a jury, even if at variance with his own opinion, would not have to be set aside as judicially untenable because contrary to the weight of the evidence. . . .’We have repeatedly reaffirmed this principle: Kline’s Estate, 322 Pa. 374, 378 , 186 A. 364 ; Hunter’s Estate, 328 Pa. 484, 492 , 196 A. 35 ; Noble’s Estate, 338 Pa. 490, 492 , 13 A. 2d 422 ; Porter’s Estate, 341 Pa. 476, 482 , 19 A. 2d 731 ; De Silver, Admrs., v. Pa. Trust Co.,

1957His function is to decide whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact, and such a dispute exists if a verdict that might be reached by a jury, even if at variance with his own opinion, would not have to be set aside as judicially untenable because contrary to the weight of the evidence. . . .’We have repeatedly reaffirmed this principle: Kline’s Estate, 322 Pa. 374, 378 , 186 A. 364 ; Hunter’s Estate, 328 Pa. 484, 492 , 196 A. 35 ; Noble’s Estate, 338 Pa. 490, 492 , 13 A. 2d 422 ; Porter’s Estate, 341 Pa. 476, 482 , 19 A. 2d 731 ; De Silver, Admrs., v. Pa. Trust Co.,

1957His function is to decide whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact, and such a dispute exists if a verdict that might be reached by a jury, even if at variance with his own opinion, would not have to be set aside as judicially untenable because contrary to the weight of the evidence. . . .’We have repeatedly reaffirmed this principle: Kline’s Estate, 322 Pa. 374, 378 , 186 A. 364 ; Hunter’s Estate, 328 Pa. 484, 492 , 196 A. 35 ; Noble’s Estate, 338 Pa. 490, 492 , 13 A. 2d 422 ; Porter’s Estate, 341 Pa. 476, 482 , 19 A. 2d 731 ; De Silver, Admrs., v. Pa. Trust Co.,

1957His function is to decide whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact, and such a dispute exists if a verdict that might be reached by a jury, even if at variance with his own opinion, would not have to be set aside as judicially untenable because contrary to the weight of the evidence. . . .’We have repeatedly reaffirmed this principle: Kline’s Estate, 322 Pa. 374, 378 , 186 A. 364 ; Hunter’s Estate, 328 Pa. 484, 492 , 196 A. 35 ; Noble’s Estate, 338 Pa. 490, 492 , 13 A. 2d 422 ; Porter’s Estate, 341 Pa. 476, 482 , 19 A. 2d 731 ; De Silver, Admrs., v. Pa. Trust Co.,

1957His function is to decide whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact, and such a dispute exists if a verdict that might be reached by a jury, even if at variance with his own opinion, would not have to be set aside as judicially untenable because contrary to the weight of the evidence. . . .’We have repeatedly reaffirmed this principle: Kline’s Estate, 322 Pa. 374, 378 , 186 A. 364 ; Hunter’s Estate, 328 Pa. 484, 492 , 196 A. 35 ; Noble’s Estate, 338 Pa. 490, 492 , 13 A. 2d 422 ; Porter’s Estate, 341 Pa. 476, 482 , 19 A. 2d 731 ; De Silver, Admrs., v. Pa. Trust Co.,

1957His function is to decide whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact, and such a dispute exists if a verdict that might be reached by a jury, even if at variance with his own opinion, would not have to be set aside as judicially untenable because contrary to the weight of the evidence. . . .’We have repeatedly reaffirmed this principle: Kline’s Estate, 322 Pa. 374, 378 , 186 A. 364 ; Hunter’s Estate, 328 Pa. 484, 492 , 196 A. 35 ; Noble’s Estate, 338 Pa. 490, 492 , 13 A. 2d 422 ; Porter’s Estate, 341 Pa. 476, 482 , 19 A. 2d 731 ; De Silver, Admrs., v. Pa. Trust Co.,

1953“The rule is firmly established that the judge of the orphans’ court conducting the hearing on an appeal for the granting of an issue d.v.n. is not to constitute himself the jury, that is, to decide the case as he would if acting in the capacity of an ultimate factfinding tribunal; his function is to determine whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact, and such a dispute exists if a verdict that might be reached by a jury, even if at variance with his own opinion, would not have to be set aside as judicially untenable because contrary to the weight of the evidence”:

1953“The rule is firmly established that the judge of the orphans’ court conducting the hearing on an appeal for the granting of an issue d.v.n. is not to constitute himself the jury, that is, to decide the case as he would if acting in the capacity of an ultimate factfinding tribunal; his function is to determine whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact, and such a dispute exists if a verdict that might be reached by a jury, even if at variance with his own opinion, would not have to be set aside as judicially untenable because contrary to the weight of the evidence”:

1950The rule is firmly established that the judge of the orphans’ court conducting the hearing on an appeal for the granting of an issue d.v.n. is not to constitute himself the jury, that is, to decide the case as he would if acting in the capacity of an ultimate fact-finding tribunal; his function is to determine whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact, and such a dispute exists if a verdict that might be reached by a jury, even if at variance with his own opinion, would not have to be set aside as judicially untenable because contrary to the weight of the evidence:

1950The rule is firmly established that the judge of the orphans’ court conducting the hearing on an appeal for the granting of an issue d.v.n. is not to constitute himself the jury, that is, to decide the case as he would if acting in the capacity of an ultimate fact-finding tribunal; his function is to determine whether there is a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact, and such a dispute exists if a verdict that might be reached by a jury, even if at variance with his own opinion, would not have to be set aside as judicially untenable because contrary to the weight of the evidence: