operator violation in Pennsylvania

2005Delaware v. Prouse, [ 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 ] (1979). (footnote omitted) “When previously faced with these two competing interests, we held ‘that a stop of a single vehicle is unreasonable where there is no outward sign the vehicle or the operator are in violation of the Vehicle Code[.] [B]efore the government may single out one automobile to stop, there must be specific facts justifying this intrusion.’ Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 551-52 , 668 A.2d 1113 , 1116-17 (1995). (some citations omitted)” Lindblom, 854 A.2d at 607 -608 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mickle

2005I write separately to express my own reasons and concerns in reaching the conclusion to affirm the trial court’s sentence. ¶ 2 In Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113 (1995), our Supreme Court addressed the difference between the standard articulated in prior court decisions (probable cause to believe that there has been a violation of the vehicle code) and the language of the applicable statute (articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of the vehicle code), holding that “the two standards amount to nothing more than a distinction without a difference.” The Co

2005In Garcia , the court derived from the Gleason decision what it identified as the “momentary and minor standard” for determining when erratic driving will justify a traffic stop: “[W]here a vehicle is driven outside the lane of traffic for just a momentary period of time and in a minor manner, a traffic stop is unwarranted.” 859 A.2d at 823 .

2005Delaware v. Prouse, [ 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 ] (1979). (footnote omitted) “When previously faced with these two competing interests, we held ‘that a stop of a single vehicle is unreasonable where there is no outward sign the vehicle or the operator are in violation of the Vehicle Code[.] [B]efore the government may single out one automobile to stop, there must be specific facts justifying this intrusion.’ Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 551-52 , 668 A.2d 1113 , 1116-17 (1995). (some citations omitted)” Lindblom, 854 A.2d at 607 -608 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mickle

2005Delaware v. Prouse, [ 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 ] (1979). (footnote omitted) “When previously faced with these two competing interests, we held ‘that a stop of a single vehicle is unreasonable where there is no outward sign the vehicle or the operator are in violation of the Vehicle Code[.] [B]efore the government may single out one automobile to stop, there must be specific facts justifying this intrusion.’ Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 551-52 , 668 A.2d 1113 , 1116-17 (1995). (some citations omitted)” Lindblom, 854 A.2d at 607 -608 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mickle

2005Delaware v. Prouse, [ 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 ] (1979). (footnote omitted) “When previously faced with these two competing interests, we held ‘that a stop of a single vehicle is unreasonable where there is no outward sign the vehicle or the operator are in violation of the Vehicle Code[.] [B]efore the government may single out one automobile to stop, there must be specific facts justifying this intrusion.’ Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 551-52 , 668 A.2d 1113 , 1116-17 (1995). (some citations omitted)” Lindblom, 854 A.2d at 607 -608 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mickle

2005Delaware v. Prouse, [ 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 ] (1979). (footnote omitted) “When previously faced with these two competing interests, we held ‘that a stop of a single vehicle is unreasonable where there is no outward sign the vehicle or the operator are in violation of the Vehicle Code[.] [B]efore the government may single out one automobile to stop, there must be specific facts justifying this intrusion.’ Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 551-52 , 668 A.2d 1113 , 1116-17 (1995). (some citations omitted)” Lindblom, 854 A.2d at 607 -608 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mickle

2004The legislature has vested police officers with the authority to stop vehicles whenever they have “reasonable and articulable grounds to suspect a violation of the Vehicle Code.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b). 2 The statutory standard of “articulable and reasonable grounds” is the same as “probable cause.” Battaglia, 802 A.2d at 665 . ¶ 8 In the instant case, as noted by the trial court, “[t]he [Appellant] had driven erratically for seven miles.

1999Id. at 58-59, 331 A.2d at 416 -17 (citing Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 115 , 307 A.2d 875, 879 (1973))(footnote omitted). . * * * * When previously faced with these two competing interests, we held “that a stop of a single vehicle is unreasonable where there is no outward sign the vehicle or the operator are in violation of The Vehicle Code.... [B]efore the government may single out one automobile to stop, there must be specific facts justifying this intrusion.” Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. at 112 , 307 A.2d at 878 .

1999Id. at 58-59, 331 A.2d at 416 -17 (citing Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 115 , 307 A.2d 875, 879 (1973))(footnote omitted). * * * * When previously faced with these two competing interests, we held "that a stop of a single vehicle is unreasonable where there is no outward sign the vehicle or the operator are in violation of The Vehicle Code.... [B]efore the government may single out one automobile to stop, there must be specific facts justifying this intrusion." Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. at 112 , 307 A.2d at 878 .

1984B&M Coal Corp. v. Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, 699 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1983) ; John Walters Coal Co. v. Watt, 553 F. Supp. 838 (E.D.

1984B&M Coal Corp. v. Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, 699 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1983) ; John Walters Coal Co. v. Watt, 553 F. Supp. 838 (E.D.