undisputed rule in Pennsylvania

1988Farmers National Bank & Trust Co. v. Berks County Real Estate Co., 333 Pa. 390 , 5 A.2d 94 (1939).

1988Farmers National Bank & Trust Co. v. Berks County Real Estate Co., 333 Pa. 390 , 5 A.2d 94 (1939).

2000As to the other elements, the fact that they have been met seems self-evident, but each is briefly discussed below. (a) The Taxpayer Would Suffer “Irreparable Harm” Without the Preliminary Injunction The requirement that there be “irreparable harm” is made out by the undisputed violation of the pre-existing legislation. “[W]here the right invaded is secured by statute or contract, there is generally no question of the amount of damage, but simply of the right.” Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Israel, 356 Pa. 400 , 52 A.2d 317 (1947), quoting Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh & Connellsville

2000As to the other elements, the fact that they have been met seems self-evident, but each is briefly discussed below. (a) The Taxpayer Would Suffer “Irreparable Harm” Without the Preliminary Injunction The requirement that there be “irreparable harm” is made out by the undisputed violation of the pre-existing legislation. “[W]here the right invaded is secured by statute or contract, there is generally no question of the amount of damage, but simply of the right.” Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Israel, 356 Pa. 400 , 52 A.2d 317 (1947), quoting Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh & Connellsville

1990Commonwealth v. Carter, 502 Pa. 433 , 466 A.2d 1328 (1983) (“unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter instruction must be given only where requested and only where the evidence would reasonably support such a conclusion); Commonwealth v. Frey, 504 Pa. 428 , 475 A.2d 700 (1984) (“there is little or no vitality left to this practice ... ”).

1990Commonwealth v. Carter, 502 Pa. 433 , 466 A.2d 1328 (1983) (“unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter instruction must be given only where requested and only where the evidence would reasonably support such a conclusion); Commonwealth v. Frey, 504 Pa. 428 , 475 A.2d 700 (1984) (“there is little or no vitality left to this practice ... ”).

1990While at one time the undisputed rule in Pennsylvania was that upon request, a defendant charged with homicide is entitled to jury instructions on all the elements of the lesser degrees of homicide regardless of whether there was evidence to support a verdict on a lesser degree of homicide, see e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563 , 319 A.2d 142 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 , 95 S.Ct. 316 , 42 L.Ed.2d 274 (1974), the Supreme Court itself has made inroads on the rule and questioned its continuing validity.

1990While at one time the undisputed rule in Pennsylvania was that upon request, a defendant charged with homicide is entitled to jury instructions on all the elements of the lesser degrees of homicide regardless of whether there was evidence to support a verdict on a lesser degree of homicide, see e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563 , 319 A.2d 142 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 , 95 S.Ct. 316 , 42 L.Ed.2d 274 (1974), the Supreme Court itself has made inroads on the rule and questioned its continuing validity.

1990While at one time the undisputed rule in Pennsylvania was that upon request, a defendant charged with homicide is entitled to jury instructions on all the elements of the lesser degrees of homicide regardless of whether there was evidence to support a verdict on a lesser degree of homicide, see e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563 , 319 A.2d 142 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 , 95 S.Ct. 316 , 42 L.Ed.2d 274 (1974), the Supreme Court itself has made inroads on the rule and questioned its continuing validity.

1990While at one time the undisputed rule in Pennsylvania was that upon request, a defendant charged with homicide is entitled to jury instructions on all the elements of the lesser degrees of homicide regardless of whether there was evidence to support a verdict on a lesser degree of homicide, see e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563 , 319 A.2d 142 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 , 95 S.Ct. 316 , 42 L.Ed.2d 274 (1974), the Supreme Court itself has made inroads on the rule and questioned its continuing validity.

1990While at one time the undisputed rule in Pennsylvania was that upon request, a defendant charged with homicide is entitled to jury instructions on all the elements of the lesser degrees of homicide regardless of whether there was evidence to support a verdict on a lesser degree of homicide, see e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563 , 319 A.2d 142 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 , 95 S.Ct. 316 , 42 L.Ed.2d 274 (1974), the Supreme Court itself has made inroads on the rule and questioned its continuing validity.

1990While at one time the undisputed rule in Pennsylvania was that upon request, a defendant charged with homicide is entitled to jury instructions on all the elements of the lesser degrees of homicide regardless of whether there was evidence to support a verdict on a lesser degree of homicide, see e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563 , 319 A.2d 142 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 , 95 S.Ct. 316 , 42 L.Ed.2d 274 (1974), the Supreme Court itself has made inroads on the rule and questioned its continuing validity.

1990While at one time the undisputed rule in Pennsylvania was that upon request, a defendant charged with homicide is entitled to jury instructions on all the elements of the lesser degrees of homicide regardless of whether there was evidence to support a verdict on a lesser degree of homicide, see e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563 , 319 A.2d 142 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 , 95 S.Ct. 316 , 42 L.Ed.2d 274 (1974), the Supreme Court itself has made inroads on the rule and questioned its continuing validity.

1990While at one time the undisputed rule in Pennsylvania was that upon request, a defendant charged with homicide is entitled to jury instructions on all the elements of the lesser degrees of homicide regardless of whether there was evidence to support a verdict on a lesser degree of homicide, see e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563 , 319 A.2d 142 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 , 95 S.Ct. 316 , 42 L.Ed.2d 274 (1974), the Supreme Court itself has made inroads on the rule and questioned its continuing validity.

1923Clair, 52 Pa. Superior Ct. 98 ; American Warming and Ventilating Co. v. Fayette Lumber Co., 54 Pa. Superior Ct. 211 ; Com. v. Cummins, 155 Pa. 30 .

1923Clair, 52 Pa. Superior Ct. 98 ; American Warming and Ventilating Co. v. Fayette Lumber Co., 54 Pa. Superior Ct. 211 ; Com. v. Cummins, 155 Pa. 30 .

1923Clair, 52 Pa. Superior Ct. 98 ; American Warming and Ventilating Co. v. Fayette Lumber Co., 54 Pa. Superior Ct. 211 ; Com. v. Cummins, 155 Pa. 30 .

1923The rule is that “a partial payment of an undisputed claim cannot.be treated as an accord and satisfaction, and the balance of the debt can be recovered, although there was an actual agreement to receive the amount paid as a complete payment of the debt.” This is a long established rule, and while it has been severely criticised in some jurisdictions, it has never in the State of Pennsylvania been departed from, and, therefore, must control this distribution: Tustin v. Phila. & Reading Coal and Iron Co., 250 Pa. 425 ; Slocum Co. v St.

1917The case on its facts is similar to Zeigler v. McFarland, 147 Pa. 607 , where plaintiff held defendant’s note given for the purchase-money of a- horse, and in paying the note defendant remitted a certain sum in cash and a receipted bill for the use of the horse while in plaintiff’s hands, the two amounts aggregating the face of the note.