bindover hearing in Ohio

2023Third, “the resolution of the conflicting theories of the evidence, both of which were credible, is a matter for a trier of fact at a trial on the merits of the case, not a matter for exercise of judicial discretion at a bindover hearing in the juvenile court.” Id. at ¶ 64, citing State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 96 , 2001- Ohio 1292, 752 N.E.2d 937 (2001).

2023Third, “the resolution of the conflicting theories of the evidence, both of which were credible, is a matter for a trier of fact at a trial on the merits of the case, not a matter for exercise of judicial discretion at a bindover hearing in the juvenile court.” Id. at ¶ 64, citing State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 96 , 2001- Ohio 1292, 752 N.E.2d 937 (2001).

2017See, e.g. , Breed v. Jones , 421 U.S. 519 , 95 S.Ct. 1779 , 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975), fn. 18 (a simple hearing to determine if there is probable cause for the offense charged in order to transfer a juvenile to another court to be tried as an adult is not an adjudication; if the bindover hearing required proof of guilt, it would be adjudicatory and further criminal proceedings could not thereafter occur due to double jeopardy); State v. Carmichael , 35 Ohio St.2d 1 , 7-8, 298 N.E.2d 568 (1973) (amenability decision where hearing proceeded simultaneously with probable cause hearing in a pre-rules c

2017See, e.g. , Breed v. Jones , 421 U.S. 519 , 95 S.Ct. 1779 , 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975), fn. 18 (a simple hearing to determine if there is probable cause for the offense charged in order to transfer a juvenile to another court to be tried as an adult is not an adjudication; if the bindover hearing required proof of guilt, it would be adjudicatory and further criminal proceedings could not thereafter occur due to double jeopardy); State v. Carmichael , 35 Ohio St.2d 1 , 7-8, 298 N.E.2d 568 (1973) (amenability decision where hearing proceeded simultaneously with probable cause hearing in a pre-rules c

2020This court distinguished between “merely challenging the accuracy of the bindover entry” and “challenging the propriety of her bindover.” Id. {¶ 44} We adhered to both Gaskins and Timmerman-Cooper in Johnson v. Sloan, 154 Ohio St.3d 476 , 2018-Ohio-2120 , 116 N.E.3d 91, ¶ 14 , in which we explained that “[i]f the juvenile court fails to comply with the mandatory requirements of the bindover statute, its purported transfer to adult court is ineffective and any judgment issued by the adult court is void.” {¶ 45} And in Turner v. Hooks, 152 Ohio St.3d 559 , 2018-Ohio-556 , 99 N.E.3d 354 , we revi

2002See, also, Johnson v. Timmerman-Cooper (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 614 , 615 . {¶ 38} The common link in both Johnson and Hanning was that the juveniles were erroneously bound over to adult court under the mandatory provision of R.C. 2151.26 (B)(4)(b) even though the evidence presented at the bindover hearing showed that the juveniles did not personally have a firearm.

2026Further, “[a] probable-cause hearing is a preliminary, non- adjudicatory proceeding wherein the court’s function is not to determine guilt, but rather whether there is probable cause to believe the juvenile committed the alleged acts.” In re B.A.T., 2023-Ohio-3366, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), citing In re J.R., 2021-Ohio- 2272, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.).

2025“We do not apply a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review,” however, because “the Ohio Supreme Court [has] explained that it is not possible to conduct a manifest-weight review of the evidence presented during the probable-cause portion of a juvenile-bindover hearing because the state is not required to marshal all of its evidence at the probable-cause phase of the proceedings.” In re B.A.T., 2023-Ohio-3366, at ¶ 19 (8th Dist.), citing Martin, 2022-Ohio-4175, at ¶ 30 . “[T]he juvenile court’s role in the bindover hearing is that of a gatekeeper as opposed to the ultimate trier of f

2023However, “while the juvenile court has a duty to assess the credibility of the evidence and to determine whether the state has presented credible evidence going to each element of the charged offense, it is not permitted to exceed the limited scope of the bindover hearing or to assume the role of the ultimate fact-finder.” In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185 , 2008-Ohio- 5307, 897 N.E.2d 629, ¶ 44 ; In re D.M., 140 Ohio St.3d 309 , 2014-Ohio-3628 , 18 N.E.3d 404 , at ¶ 10.

2023However, “while the juvenile court has a duty to assess the credibility of the evidence and to determine whether the state has presented credible evidence going to each element of the charged offense, it is not permitted to exceed the limited scope of the bindover hearing or to assume the role of the ultimate fact-finder.” In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185 , 2008-Ohio- 5307, 897 N.E.2d 629, ¶ 44 ; In re D.M., 140 Ohio St.3d 309 , 2014-Ohio-3628 , 18 N.E.3d 404 , at ¶ 10.

2021Nonetheless, we expressly limited the court's review of the evidence presented at the bindover hearing, stating: “Determination of the merits of the competing prosecution and defense theories, both of which [are] credible, ultimately [is] a matter for the factfinder at trial.” (Emphasis added.) Id. * * * Thus, while the juvenile court has a duty to assess the credibility of the evidence and to determine whether the state has presented credible evidence going to each element of the charged offense, it is not permitted to exceed the limited scope of the bindover hearing or to assume the role of

2020Consequently, the sixth amendment does not provide a confrontation right at a preliminary hearing.”); U.S. v. Harris, 458 F.2d 670, 677 (5th Cir.1972) (“There is no Sixth Amendment requirement that [defendants] also be allowed to confront [witnesses] at a preliminary hearing prior to trial.”). {¶ 21} Nonetheless, appellant argues that the right to confront the witnesses against him should be extended to the bindover hearing because it is a “critically important proceeding,” Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 560 , 86 S.Ct. 1045 (1966), that potentially means “the difference between five years’ confin

2023However, “while the juvenile court has a duty to assess the credibility of the evidence and to determine whether the state has presented credible evidence going to each element of the charged offense, it is not permitted to exceed the limited scope of the bindover hearing or to assume the role of the ultimate fact-finder.” In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185 , 2008-Ohio- 5307, 897 N.E.2d 629, ¶ 44 ; In re D.M., 140 Ohio St.3d 309 , 2014-Ohio-3628 , 18 N.E.3d 404 , at ¶ 10.

2023However, “while the juvenile court has a duty to assess the credibility of the evidence and to determine whether the state has presented credible evidence going to each element of the charged offense, it is not permitted to exceed the limited scope of the bindover hearing or to assume the role of the ultimate fact-finder.” In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185 , 2008-Ohio- 5307, 897 N.E.2d 629, ¶ 44 ; In re D.M., 140 Ohio St.3d 309 , 2014-Ohio-3628 , 18 N.E.3d 404 , at ¶ 10.

2006It simply finds the existence of probable cause to so believe,” quoting State v. Whiteside (1982), 6 Ohio App.3d 30, 36 [6 OBR 140, 452 N.E.2d 332 ].

2006It simply finds the existence of probable cause to so believe,” quoting State v. Whiteside (1982), 6 Ohio App.3d 30, 36 [6 OBR 140, 452 N.E.2d 332 ].

2020Under this “actual prejudice” prong, the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 . {¶56} Appellant argues that Doe’s allegedly unreliable in-court identification at the bindover hearing should have alerted defense counsel to the necessity of filing a motion to suppress, although appellant does not specify what the basis for such a motion would have been.

2016See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ; Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , 538 N.E.2d 373 , at paragraph three of the syllabus. 1 Dr. Davis’s reports were finally filed on November 21, 2014, in support of Barker’s second postconviction petition and his Civ.R. 60(B) motion seeking relief from the June 30 judgment denying his first petition.

2017See, e.g. , Breed v. Jones , 421 U.S. 519 , 95 S.Ct. 1779 , 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975), fn. 18 (a simple hearing to determine if there is probable cause for the offense charged in order to transfer a juvenile to another court to be tried as an adult is not an adjudication; if the bindover hearing required proof of guilt, it would be adjudicatory and further criminal proceedings could not thereafter occur due to double jeopardy); State v. Carmichael , 35 Ohio St.2d 1 , 7-8, 298 N.E.2d 568 (1973) (amenability decision where hearing proceeded simultaneously with probable cause hearing in a pre-rules c

2017See, e.g. , Breed v. Jones , 421 U.S. 519 , 95 S.Ct. 1779 , 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975), fn. 18 (a simple hearing to determine if there is probable cause for the offense charged in order to transfer a juvenile to another court to be tried as an adult is not an adjudication; if the bindover hearing required proof of guilt, it would be adjudicatory and further criminal proceedings could not thereafter occur due to double jeopardy); State v. Carmichael , 35 Ohio St.2d 1 , 7-8, 298 N.E.2d 568 (1973) (amenability decision where hearing proceeded simultaneously with probable cause hearing in a pre-rules c

2020The court noted that the witness “made her identification under oath, in court, and presumably was subject to cross-examination,” which the court found could be “used ‘to test [an] identification before it harden[s].’” Id. at ¶ 56, quoting Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 230 , 98 S.Ct. 458 , 54 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), fn. 5.

2020The court noted that the witness “made her identification under oath, in court, and presumably was subject to cross-examination,” which the court found could be “used ‘to test [an] identification before it harden[s].’” Id. at ¶ 56, quoting Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 230 , 98 S.Ct. 458 , 54 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), fn. 5.

2019See In re D.T.F., 10th Dist. No. 05AP-03, 2005-Ohio-5245, ¶ 12 .

2007Our court has cited Iacona in reviewing the case of In re D.T.F., Franklin App. No. 05AP-03, 2005-Ohio-5245 , 2005 WL 2403958 , at ¶ 12, stating: In meeting this standard, the state must produce evidence that raises more than a mere suspicion of guilt, but need not provide evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. * * * The state must provide credible evidence of every element of an offense to support a finding that probable cause exists to believe that the child committed the offense. * * * To determine whether probable cause exists, the juvenile court “must evaluate the quality of th

2026See also State v. Buck, 2017-Ohio-8242, ¶ 76 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Widmer, 2013-Ohio-62, ¶ 41 (12th Dist.) (noting that “[m]ere inconsistencies in testimony do not establish the knowing use of false testimony by the prosecutor”). {¶ 33} Appellant claims the prosecutor at Hoskins-Battle’s bindover hearing asked Sims to “confirm that ‘[t]he person you just pointed to’ was the gray-hooded killer.” (Appellant’s Brief at 16-17, citing Hoskins-Battle Hearing at 23.) However, the record demonstrates the prosecutor asked Sims if the “person that came back and was shooting at you . . . [was] he

2026See also State v. Tucker, 2016- Ohio-1033, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Reed, 2008-Ohio-6082, ¶ 48 (10th Dist.) (stating that “ ‘[w]hile identity is an element that must be proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt [at trial], the credibility of witnesses and their degree of certainty in identification are matters affecting the weight of the evidence’ ”). {¶ 29} Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “the resolution of the conflicting theories of the evidence, both of which were credible, is a matter for the trier of fact at a trial on the merits of the case, not a mat

2026See also State v. Buck, 2017-Ohio-8242, ¶ 76 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Widmer, 2013-Ohio-62, ¶ 41 (12th Dist.) (noting that “[m]ere inconsistencies in testimony do not establish the knowing use of false testimony by the prosecutor”). {¶ 33} Appellant claims the prosecutor at Hoskins-Battle’s bindover hearing asked Sims to “confirm that ‘[t]he person you just pointed to’ was the gray-hooded killer.” (Appellant’s Brief at 16-17, citing Hoskins-Battle Hearing at 23.) However, the record demonstrates the prosecutor asked Sims if the “person that came back and was shooting at you . . . [was] he

2026Id. at ¶ 14, quoting State v. Fuell, 2021-Ohio-1627, ¶ 29-30 (12th Dist.), appeal allowed, 2021-Ohio-2923 , and appeal dismissed as improvidently allowed, 2022- Ohio-1607. {¶18} The purpose of the bindover hearing is for the juvenile court to decide whether the statutory criteria for a mandatory bindover has been met and ascertain whether probable cause exists to find that the juvenile committed the act that would constitute a qualifying offense.

2026“In the ordinary course of law,” a plea of guilty “‘“renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction if factual guilt is validly established.”’” Id., quoting State v. Fitzpatrick, 2004-Ohio-3167 , ¶ 78, quoting Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62, fn. 2 (1975). “‘Therefore, a defendant who . . . voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently enters a guilty plea with the assistance of counsel “may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constituti

2026“In the ordinary course of law,” a plea of guilty “‘“renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction if factual guilt is validly established.”’” Id., quoting State v. Fitzpatrick, 2004-Ohio-3167 , ¶ 78, quoting Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62, fn. 2 (1975). “‘Therefore, a defendant who . . . voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently enters a guilty plea with the assistance of counsel “may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constituti

2026“In the ordinary course of law,” a plea of guilty “‘“renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction if factual guilt is validly established.”’” Id., quoting State v. Fitzpatrick, 2004-Ohio-3167 , ¶ 78, quoting Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62, fn. 2 (1975). “‘Therefore, a defendant who . . . voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently enters a guilty plea with the assistance of counsel “may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constituti

2026Conkey asserts that the juvenile court “failed to examine the notification requirements under R.C. 2152.12(G), Juv.R. 30(D) at the bindover hearing—including whether actual service on the mother and father was perfected, and whether the service had occurred at least 3 days before the bindover hearing.” He claims the procedural safeguards attendant to bindover are constitutionally mandated, and given the ”multiple violations of the notice safeguard,” the transfer of his case to adult court “was unconstitutional under Due Process.” {¶12} Conkey waived his notice-related arguments by entering a g