9 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 2001–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
cluster 389220green2 sentences2006As part of its burden under the general duty clause, L & I "must specify the particular steps the employer should have taken to avoid the citation . . . [and] must demonstrate the feasibility and likely utility of those measures." Id. at 782 , 48 P.3d 324 (citing Donovan v. Royal Logging Co., 645 F.2d 822, 829 (9th Cir.1981)). 2006As part of its burden under the general duty clause, L&I “must specify the particular steps the employer should have taken to avoid the citation [and] must demonstrate the feasibility and likely utility of those measures.” Id. at 782 (citing Donovan v. Royal Logging Co., 645 F.2d 822, 829 (9th Cir. 1981)). | 2 | 4 |
D.A. Collins Construction Co., Inc. v. Secretary of Laborgreen2 sentences2006Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 117 F.3d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1997)). [7] ¶ 21 Further, state and federal courts have delineated other major differences between enforcement under the general duty clause and enforcement under a specific, promulgated rule. [8] First, if the violation concerns a specific standard, it is not necessary to even prove that a hazard exists, just that the specific standard was violated. 2006Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 117 F.3d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1997)). 7 ¶21 Further, state and federal courts have delineated other major differences between enforcement under the general duty clause and enforcement under a specific, promulgated rule. 8 First, if the violation concerns a specific standard, it is not necessary to even prove that a hazard exists, just that the specific standard was violated. | 2 | 2 |
Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Secretary of Laborgreen2 sentences2006Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 511 F.2d 864, 869 (10th Cir.1975). 2006Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 511 F.2d 864, 869 (10th Cir. 1975). | 2 | 2 |
Department of Labor & Industries v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.green2 sentences2017See SuperValu, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 158 Wn.2d 422, 433 , 144 P.3d 1160 (2006)("As part of its burden under the general duty clause, L & I 'must specify the particular steps the employer should have taken to avoid the citation. ..[and] must demonstrate the feasibility and likely utility of those measures.' This is the same burden that OSH Act's general duty clause requires.")(quoting Kaiser Aluminum, 111 Wn. 2017App.)(holding crossing the middle line in a road and driving the wrong way into traffic constituted a recognized hazard). 34 See Tri-State Roofing, 685 F.2d at 880-81 ("Where a hazard is obvious and glaring, the [Occupational Safety and Health] Commission may determine that the hazard is recognized for purposes of the general duty clause, 29 U.S.C. s 654 (a)(1), without reference to industry practice or safety expert testimony."). 35 CP at 378(emphasis added); see CP at 328 (regarding how he determined this was a recognized hazard even though it may have been an isolated incident, the Departme | 1 | 3 |
Tri-State Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commissiongreen1 sentence2017App.)(holding crossing the middle line in a road and driving the wrong way into traffic constituted a recognized hazard). 34 See Tri-State Roofing, 685 F.2d at 880-81 ("Where a hazard is obvious and glaring, the [Occupational Safety and Health] Commission may determine that the hazard is recognized for purposes of the general duty clause, 29 U.S.C. s 654 (a)(1), without reference to industry practice or safety expert testimony."). 35 CP at 378(emphasis added); see CP at 328 (regarding how he determined this was a recognized hazard even though it may have been an isolated incident, the Departme | 1 | 1 |
SuperValu, Inc. v. Department of Laborgreen1 sentence2017See SuperValu, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 158 Wn.2d 422, 433 , 144 P.3d 1160 (2006)("As part of its burden under the general duty clause, L & I 'must specify the particular steps the employer should have taken to avoid the citation. ..[and] must demonstrate the feasibility and likely utility of those measures.' This is the same burden that OSH Act's general duty clause requires.")(quoting Kaiser Aluminum, 111 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
SuperValu, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industriesgreen1 sentence2017See SuperValu, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 158 Wn.2d 422, 433 , 144 P.3d 1160 (2006)("As part of its burden under the general duty clause, L & I 'must specify the particular steps the employer should have taken to avoid the citation. ..[and] must demonstrate the feasibility and likely utility of those measures.' This is the same burden that OSH Act's general duty clause requires.")(quoting Kaiser Aluminum, 111 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McGowan v. State
green
2 sentences2006McGowan v. State, 148 Wash.2d 278, 288 , 60 P.3d 67 (2002). ¶ 13 The question before us is whether the voters intended to repeal only the specific ergonomics regulations promulgated in 2000 or both the regulations and L & I's authority to enforce the general duty clause, RCW 49.17.060(1), with respect to serious ergonomics-related hazards. [5] To answer this question, we must first look to the plain text of I-841 to see if the voters' intent can be *1164 determined. 2006McGowan v. State, 148 Wn.2d 278, 288 , 60 P.3d 67 (2002). ¶13 The question before us is whether the voters intended to repeal only the specific ergonomics regulations promulgated in 2000 or both the regulations and L&I’s authority to enforce the general duty clause, RCW 49.17-.060(1), with respect to serious ergonomics-related hazards. 5 To answer this question, we must first look to the plain text of 1-841 to see if the voters’ intent can be determined. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
McGowan v. State
green
2 sentences2006McGowan v. State, 148 Wash.2d 278, 288 , 60 P.3d 67 (2002). ¶ 13 The question before us is whether the voters intended to repeal only the specific ergonomics regulations promulgated in 2000 or both the regulations and L & I's authority to enforce the general duty clause, RCW 49.17.060(1), with respect to serious ergonomics-related hazards. [5] To answer this question, we must first look to the plain text of I-841 to see if the voters' intent can be *1164 determined. 2006McGowan v. State, 148 Wn.2d 278, 288 , 60 P.3d 67 (2002). ¶13 The question before us is whether the voters intended to repeal only the specific ergonomics regulations promulgated in 2000 or both the regulations and L&I’s authority to enforce the general duty clause, RCW 49.17-.060(1), with respect to serious ergonomics-related hazards. 5 To answer this question, we must first look to the plain text of 1-841 to see if the voters’ intent can be determined. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State
green
2 sentences2006By sanctioning the indirect enforcement of the repealed rules under a different, albeit more stringent, evidentiary standard, the majority undermines the "collective intent of the voters." Amalgamated, 142 Wash.2d at 205 , 11 P.3d 762 . 2006By sanctioning the indirect enforcement of the repealed rules under a different, albeit more stringent, evidentiary standard, the majority undermines the “collective intent of the voters.” Amalgamated, 142 Wn.2d at 205 . | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Maleng v. King County Corrections Guild
green
2 sentences2006Guild, 150 Wash.2d 325, 334 , 76 P.3d 727 (2003). 2006Guild, 150 Wn.2d 325, 334 , 76 P.3d 727 (2003). | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Berrocal v. Fernandez
green
2 sentences2006Berrocal v. Fernandez, 155 Wash.2d 585, 590 , 121 P.3d 82 (2005). ¶ 28 L & I argues I-841 did not eliminate its power to investigate and enforce "recognized" ergonomics hazards "causing or likely to cause serious injury or death" under the general duty clause of RCW 49.17.060(1). 2006Berrocal v. Fernandez, 155 Wn.2d 585, 590 , 121 P.3d 82 (2005). ¶29 L&I argues 1-841 did not eliminate its power to investigate and enforce “recognized” ergonomics hazards “causing or likely to cause serious injury or death” under the general duty clause of RCW 49.17.060(1). | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Maleng v. King County Corrections Guild
green
2 sentences2006Guild, 150 Wash.2d 325, 334 , 76 P.3d 727 (2003). 2006Guild, 150 Wn.2d 325, 334 , 76 P.3d 727 (2003). | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Department of Labor v. Kaiser Aluminum
green
2 sentences2006As part of its burden under the general duty clause, L & I "must specify the particular steps the employer should have taken to avoid the citation . . . [and] must demonstrate the feasibility and likely utility of those measures." Id. at 782 , 48 P.3d 324 (citing Donovan v. Royal Logging Co., 645 F.2d 822, 829 (9th Cir.1981)). 2006As part of its burden under the general duty clause, L&I “must specify the particular steps the employer should have taken to avoid the citation [and] must demonstrate the feasibility and likely utility of those measures.” Id. at 782 (citing Donovan v. Royal Logging Co., 645 F.2d 822, 829 (9th Cir. 1981)). | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Berrocal v. Fernandez
green
2 sentences2006Berrocal v. Fernandez, 155 Wash.2d 585, 590 , 121 P.3d 82 (2005). ¶ 28 L & I argues I-841 did not eliminate its power to investigate and enforce "recognized" ergonomics hazards "causing or likely to cause serious injury or death" under the general duty clause of RCW 49.17.060(1). 2006Berrocal v. Fernandez, 155 Wn.2d 585, 590 , 121 P.3d 82 (2005). ¶29 L&I argues 1-841 did not eliminate its power to investigate and enforce “recognized” ergonomics hazards “causing or likely to cause serious injury or death” under the general duty clause of RCW 49.17.060(1). | 2 | 2006–2006 |
cluster 389244
green
2 sentences2001“Ideally the citation should provide the employer with notice of the Secretary’s contentions pertinent to each of the three elements underlying a general duty violation.” Whirlpool Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 645 F.2d 1096 , 1098-99 (D.C. 2001Comm'n, 645 F.2d 1096 , 1098-99 (D.C.Cir. 1981). | 2 | 2001–2001 |
J.E. Dunn Northwest, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industries
green
1 sentence2016Dunn, 139 Wn. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Amalgamated Transit v. State
green
1 sentence2006By sanctioning the indirect enforcement of the repealed rules under a different, albeit more stringent, evidentiary standard, the majority undermines the "collective intent of the voters." Amalgamated, 142 Wash.2d at 205 , 11 P.3d 762 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall
green
2 sentences2001The general duty clause provides that “ ‘[e]ach employer . .. shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.’ ” Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 12-13 , 100 S. Ct. 883 , 63 L. 2001The general duty clause provides that “ ‘[e]ach employer . .. shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.’ ” Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 12-13 , 100 S. Ct. 883 , 63 L. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.