purpose of constitutional analysis in Washington

9 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2018 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

Case	Followed	Cited
State v. Ladsongreen wash · 1999 · cited in 7 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2003–2018 2 sentences 2016See State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002) (“Terry requires a reasonable, articulable suspicion, based on specific, objective facts, that the person seized has committed or is about to commit a crime.” (emphasis omitted) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21)). “[A] traffic stop is a ‘seizure’ for the purpose of constitutional analysis, no matter how brief.” State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 350 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S. Ct. 1391 , 59 L. 2016Ed. 2d 889 (1968). 1 State v. Mecham, No. 90598-3 (Fairhurst, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) based on specific, objective facts, that the person seized has committed or is about to commit a crime." (emphasis omitted) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 )). "[A] traffic stop is a 'seizure' for the purpose of constitutional analysis, no matter how brief." State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 350 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,653 , 99 S. Ct. 1391 , 59 L.	1	7
State v. Ladsongreen wash · 1999 · cited in 7 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2003–2018 2 sentences 2016See State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002) (“Terry requires a reasonable, articulable suspicion, based on specific, objective facts, that the person seized has committed or is about to commit a crime.” (emphasis omitted) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21)). “[A] traffic stop is a ‘seizure’ for the purpose of constitutional analysis, no matter how brief.” State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 350 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S. Ct. 1391 , 59 L. 2016Ed. 2d 889 (1968). 1 State v. Mecham, No. 90598-3 (Fairhurst, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) based on specific, objective facts, that the person seized has committed or is about to commit a crime." (emphasis omitted) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 )). "[A] traffic stop is a 'seizure' for the purpose of constitutional analysis, no matter how brief." State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 350 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,653 , 99 S. Ct. 1391 , 59 L.	1	7
Delaware v. Prousegreen scotus · 1979 · cited in 4 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1999–2016 2 sentences 2016See State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002) (“Terry requires a reasonable, articulable suspicion, based on specific, objective facts, that the person seized has committed or is about to commit a crime.” (emphasis omitted) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21)). “[A] traffic stop is a ‘seizure’ for the purpose of constitutional analysis, no matter how brief.” State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 350 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S. Ct. 1391 , 59 L. 2016See State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002) (“Terry requires a reasonable, articulable suspicion, based on specific, objective facts, that the person seized has committed or is about to commit a crime.” (emphasis omitted) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21)). “[A] traffic stop is a ‘seizure’ for the purpose of constitutional analysis, no matter how brief.” State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 350 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S. Ct. 1391 , 59 L.	1	4
State v. Duncangreen wash · 2002 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 1 sentence 2016See State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002) (“Terry requires a reasonable, articulable suspicion, based on specific, objective facts, that the person seized has committed or is about to commit a crime.” (emphasis omitted) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21)). “[A] traffic stop is a ‘seizure’ for the purpose of constitutional analysis, no matter how brief.” State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 350 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S. Ct. 1391 , 59 L.	1	1
State v. Duncangreen wash · 2002 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 1 sentence 2016See State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172 , 43 P.3d 513 (2002) (“Terry requires a reasonable, articulable suspicion, based on specific, objective facts, that the person seized has committed or is about to commit a crime.” (emphasis omitted) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21)). “[A] traffic stop is a ‘seizure’ for the purpose of constitutional analysis, no matter how brief.” State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 350 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S. Ct. 1391 , 59 L.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (5)

Case	Cited	Years
Whren v. United States green scotus · 1996 2 sentences 2016Ed. 2d 660 (1979); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 , 116 S. Ct. 1769 , 135 L. 2016Ed. 2d 660 (1979); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 , 116 S. Ct. 1769 , 135 L.	3	1999–2016
State v. Mendez red wash · 1999 2 sentences 2003On the other hand, our Supreme Court has reasoned also: “Stopping the car in which [the defendant] was a passenger did not effect a seizure of [the defendant] or the other passengers.” State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 222 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999). 2003On the other hand, our Supreme Court has reasoned also: "Stopping the car in which [the defendant] was a passenger did not effect a seizure of [the defendant] or the other passengers." State v. Mendez, 137 Wash.2d 208, 222 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999).	2	2003–2003
State v. Mendez red wash · 1999 2 sentences 2003On the other hand, our Supreme Court has reasoned also: “Stopping the car in which [the defendant] was a passenger did not effect a seizure of [the defendant] or the other passengers.” State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 222 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999). 2003On the other hand, our Supreme Court has reasoned also: "Stopping the car in which [the defendant] was a passenger did not effect a seizure of [the defendant] or the other passengers." State v. Mendez, 137 Wash.2d 208, 222 , 970 P.2d 722 (1999).	2	2003–2003
Terry v. Ohio green scotus · 1968 1 sentence 2016Ed. 2d 889 (1968). 1 State v. Mecham, No. 90598-3 (Fairhurst, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) based on specific, objective facts, that the person seized has committed or is about to commit a crime." (emphasis omitted) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 )). "[A] traffic stop is a 'seizure' for the purpose of constitutional analysis, no matter how brief." State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 350 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,653 , 99 S. Ct. 1391 , 59 L.	1	2016–2016
City of Seattle v. Mesiani green wash · 1988 2 sentences 1999Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Whren, 517 U.S. at 809-10 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; Mesiani, 110 Wash.2d at 460 , 755 P.2d 775 (Dolliver, J., concurring). 1999Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Whren, 517 U.S. at 809-10 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; Mesiani, 110 Wash.2d at 460 , 755 P.2d 775 (Dolliver, J., concurring).	1	1999–1999

Where else courts name it

WA 9 (1999–2018) TN 3 (1997–2015) MI 3 (1941–1982)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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