wantonness claim in Alabama

1997Because Flagstar challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the wantonness claim and because the wantonness claim constituted a "bad count" within the meaning of Aspinwall v. Gowens, 405 So.2d 134 (Ala. 1981), we reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [6] REVERSED AND REMANDED. *1143 HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, KENNEDY, and SEE, JJ., concur.

1997Because Flagstar challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the wantonness claim and because the wantonness claim constituted a "bad count" within the meaning of Aspinwall v. Gowens , 405 So.2d 134 (Ala. 1981), we reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 6 REVERSED AND REMANDED. *Page 1143 HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, KENNEDY, and SEE, JJ., concur.

2017With regard to the wantonness claim asserted against WHA, we stated in Lemley v. Wilson , 178 So.3d 834 , 841-42 (Ala. 2015), that, " '[t]o establish wantonness, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant, with reckless indifference to the consequences, consciously and intentionally did some wrongful act or omitted some known duty.' " (Quoting Martin v. Arnold , 643 So.2d 564 , 567 (Ala. 1994).) Aliant has based its wantonness claims on the omission or breach of a known duty; however, we have already determined, supra in Part III, that WHA owed Aliant no duties.

2009NOTES [1] In Martin v. Arnold, 643 So.2d 564 (Ala. 1994), the Alabama Supreme Court stated: "To establish negligence, the plaintiff must prove: (1) a duty to a foreseeable plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) proximate causation; and (4) damage or injury.

2013These facts constituted substantial evidence supporting the wantonness claim; therefore, the issue should have been presented to the jury.” Barker, 747 So.2d at 909 .

2011Therefore, as the court held in Barker , ‘[t]hese facts constitute! ] sub *1260 stantial evidence supporting the wantonness claim; therefore, the issue [should be] presented to the jury.’ Id. at 909 .

2011Burrell v. Essary, [ 992 So.2d 1 (Ala.Civ.App.2006) ].

2007Burrell v. Essary , supra. Specifically, the Court of Civil Appeals held: "Burrell's testimony regarding the circumstances of the collision conflicted with Essary's testimony and tended to prove a set of circumstances from which a jury could draw a `reasonable inference' that Essary knew that the vehicle driven by Burrell was close to the intersection when he accelerated into the intersection despite being aware that his doing so would likely or probably result in injury to the plaintiffs." 992 So.2d at 5 .

2009On appeal, the plaintiff argued that her wantonness claim was an action in trespass, not trespass on the case; that intent should be irrelevant to determining whether the action was subject to the six-year statute of limitations; and that she had presented substantial evidence showing “direct force.” To determine whether the wantonness claim was subject to the six-year limitations period of § 6-2-34(1), this Court stated: “[I]t is not possible to explain our rejection of Lowery v. Densmore, [ 739 So.2d 1115 (Ala.Civ.App.1998),] stated as controlling by the trial court in its order finding the

2009On appeal, the plaintiff argued that her wantonness claim was an action in trespass, not trespass on the case; that intent should be irrelevant to determining whether the action was subject to the six-year statute of limitations; and that she had presented substantial evidence showing "direct force." To determine whether the wantonness claim was subject to the six-year limitations period of § 6-2-34(1), this Court stated: "[I]t is not possible to explain our rejection of Lowery v. Densmore, [ 739 So.2d 1115 (Ala.Civ.App.1998),] stated as controlling by the trial court in its order finding the

2010Logic and the policy of the Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure thus compel us to conclude that this case is not within the sufficiency-of-the-evidence exception expressed in McGough v. Slaughter, 395 So.2d 972 (Ala.1981).

1994Logic and the policy of the Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure thus compel us to conclude that this case is not within the sufficiency-of-the-evidence exception expressed in McGough v. Slaughter , 395 So.2d 972 (Ala. 1981).

2008This Court concluded that the evidence, establishing that the driver proceeded onto the second bridge while continuing her speed at or near the maximum posted speed limit, at a time when she `should have known' that the bridge had been spread with slag in preparation for the bad weather and with knowledge that there was a wide curve that would obstruct her view of any oncoming traffic constituted substantial evidence to support the wantonness claim. 576 So.2d at 175 . *Page 469 "In Scott , Villegas was driving an automobile he had just purchased and that he had driven only one time previously.

2001In Sellers v. Sexton , 576 So.2d 172 , 175 (Ala. 1991), decided under the now applicable substantial evidence rule, this Court reversed a judgment for the defendant entered on a directed verdict on a wantonness claim.

2006In opposition to the landlord's motion on the wantonness claim, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit indicating that, before the plaintiff's fall, the landlord knew "that another elderly lady had [previously] fallen in the same area where the pavement was broken." 514 So.2d at 1350 .

1995We believe that under the facts of this case, there is not a scintilla of evidence of wanton misconduct on the part of any of the defendants; therefore, summary judgment was appropriate as to each defendant on the wantonness claim." Berness, 514 So.2d at 1350 .

2000Thus, we reverse the judgment as to the claim for compensatory damages on the basis of wantonness.” Hamme, 621 So.2d at 283-84 .

1993The engineer, Wood, testified that he did not see Frank Hamme's truck until it moved into sight from around a building, when it was between seven and nine automobile lengths from the crossing, and that he (Wood) did not realize until Hamme reached the crossing that Hamme was not going to stop, at which point Wood placed the train in "emergency." Based on this testimony, I do not find substantial evidence that the defendants "acted with `knowledge of the danger or a consciousness that injury was likely to result from an act or an omission to act,'" 621 So.2d at 283 , quoting in part Burlington

2025Instead, the court affirmed the summary judgment as to that claim because the Paynes had "failed to argue their wantonness claim on appeal." Payne, 12 So. 3d at 82 .

2017In J.K. v. UMS-Wright Corp. , 7 So.3d 300 , 305-06 (Ala. 2008), we considered an argument that a trial court had erred in entering judgment on a wantonness claim where the appellants had similarly failed to support their argument: "Not only do [the appellants] not describe with any specificity conduct of the trustees that they consider to have been wanton, but they also fail to cite any statute or caselaw that defines wantonness, and they do not illustrate how the actions by the members of the board of trustees could satisfy any such definition. ' " 'Where an appellant fails to cite any author

2017In J.K. v. UMS-Wright Corp. , 7 So.3d 300 , 305-06 (Ala. 2008), we considered an argument that a trial court had erred in entering judgment on a wantonness claim where the appellants had similarly failed to support their argument: "Not only do [the appellants] not describe with any specificity conduct of the trustees that they consider to have been wanton, but they also fail to cite any statute or caselaw that defines wantonness, and they do not illustrate how the actions by the members of the board of trustees could satisfy any such definition. ' " 'Where an appellant fails to cite any author

2017In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Thompson , supra, Elizabeth Thompson sued Wal-Mart, alleging negligence and wantonness in connection with personal injuries she sustained when a small cubical footlocker fell from a shelf and struck her.

2017In J.K. v. UMS-Wright Corp. , 7 So.3d 300 , 305-06 (Ala. 2008), we considered an argument that a trial court had erred in entering judgment on a wantonness claim where the appellants had similarly failed to support their argument: "Not only do [the appellants] not describe with any specificity conduct of the trustees that they consider to have been wanton, but they also fail to cite any statute or caselaw that defines wantonness, and they do not illustrate how the actions by the members of the board of trustees could satisfy any such definition. ' " 'Where an appellant fails to cite any author

2017In J.K. v. UMS-Wright Corp. , 7 So.3d 300 , 305-06 (Ala. 2008), we considered an argument that a trial court had erred in entering judgment on a wantonness claim where the appellants had similarly failed to support their argument: "Not only do [the appellants] not describe with any specificity conduct of the trustees that they consider to have been wanton, but they also fail to cite any statute or caselaw that defines wantonness, and they do not illustrate how the actions by the members of the board of trustees could satisfy any such definition. ' " 'Where an appellant fails to cite any author

2017Co. , 200 Ala. 3 , 4, 75 So. 315 , 316 (1917) (rejecting a wantonness claim by a plaintiff who crashed his automobile into a utility pole owned by the defendant and who argued that the defendant was wanton in placing the pole near the road and noting that "[t]here was no evidence that any one else had ever been hurt there").

2017Co. , 200 Ala. 3 , 4, 75 So. 315 , 316 (1917) (rejecting a wantonness claim by a plaintiff who crashed his automobile into a utility pole owned by the defendant and who argued that the defendant was wanton in placing the pole near the road and noting that "[t]here was no evidence that any one else had ever been hurt there").

2017With regard to the wantonness claim asserted against WHA, we stated in Lemley v. Wilson , 178 So.3d 834 , 841-42 (Ala. 2015), that, " '[t]o establish wantonness, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant, with reckless indifference to the consequences, consciously and intentionally did some wrongful act or omitted some known duty.' " (Quoting Martin v. Arnold , 643 So.2d 564 , 567 (Ala. 1994).) Aliant has based its wantonness claims on the omission or breach of a known duty; however, we have already determined, supra in Part III, that WHA owed Aliant no duties.

2015Given the facts presented and the applicable law, I would have dissented from this Court’s decision to reverse “[t]he judgment as, a matter of law entered in favor of the Yamaha defendants on the McMahons’ wantonness claim.” 95 So.3d at 774 .

2012In CIT Financial Services, Inc. v. Bowler, 537 So.2d 4 (Ala. 1988), a case involving facts similar to the present case, our supreme court discussed the defense of ratification and held that, although there was evidence the plaintiff in that case had ratified the forgery of her signature on certain loan documents, such ratification was not a defense to the plaintiffs negligence and wantonness claims against the lending company that had extended the loan.