Parsons presumption in North Carolina

2022NOAH’S PLAYLOFT PRESCHOOL 2022-NCCOA-290 Opinion of the Court evidence[.]” Id. at 137 , 620 S.E.2d at 293 . ¶ 32 Defendants contend that the testimony given by Dr. Comadoll in his first deposition was enough to rebut the Parsons presumption “that the work injury was not related to the need for surgery[.]” ¶ 33 In his first deposition, Dr. Comadoll offered the following relevant testimony: [Plaintiff’s Counsel:] Okay.

2022NOAH’S PLAYLOFT PRESCHOOL 2022-NCCOA-290 Opinion of the Court evidence[.]” Id. at 137 , 620 S.E.2d at 293 . ¶ 32 Defendants contend that the testimony given by Dr. Comadoll in his first deposition was enough to rebut the Parsons presumption “that the work injury was not related to the need for surgery[.]” ¶ 33 In his first deposition, Dr. Comadoll offered the following relevant testimony: [Plaintiff’s Counsel:] Okay.

2022The claimant is not required to prove causation again to receive compensation for treatment; rather, the defendant-employer must rebut the Parsons presumption by proving “the original finding of compensable injury is unrelated to [the] present discomfort.” Id.

2022The claimant is not required to prove causation again to receive compensation for treatment; rather, the defendant-employer must rebut the Parsons presumption by proving “the original finding of compensable injury is unrelated to [the] present discomfort.” Id.

2017Consequently, when additional medical treatment for the compensable injury is required, a rebuttable presumption arises-the Parsons presumption-"that the treatment is directly related to the original compensable injury and the employer has the burden of producing evidence showing the treatment is not directly related to the compensable injury." Reinninger v. Prestige Fabricators, Inc. , 136 N.C.

2017Consequently, when additional medical treatment for the compensable injury is required, a rebuttable presumption arises-the Parsons presumption-"that the treatment is directly related to the original compensable injury and the employer has the burden of producing evidence showing the treatment is not directly related to the compensable injury." Reinninger v. Prestige Fabricators, Inc. , 136 N.C.

2023App. 514, 519 , 760 S.E.2d 31, 35 (2014) (the Parsons presumption is rebutted by the employer, “the burden of proof shifts back to the plaintiff”); Kluttz-Ellison v. Noah’s Playloft Preschool, 283 N.C.

2023App. 514, 519 , 760 S.E.2d 31, 35 (2014) (the Parsons presumption is rebutted by the employer, “the burden of proof shifts back to the plaintiff”); Kluttz-Ellison v. Noah’s Playloft Preschool, 283 N.C.

2023However, under the Parsons presumption, employee- plaintiffs who receive a favorable opinion and award from the Industrial Commission are afforded the rebuttable “presumption that additional medical treatment is causally related to the original injury.” Gross v. Gene Bennett Co., 209 N.C.

2023However, under the Parsons presumption, employee- plaintiffs who receive a favorable opinion and award from the Industrial Commission are afforded the rebuttable “presumption that additional medical treatment is causally related to the original injury.” Gross v. Gene Bennett Co., 209 N.C.

2015Once the employee meets this initial burden, however, a presumption arises-often referred to as the Parsons presumption-that "additional medical treatment is directly related to the compensable injury." *495 Perez, 174 N.C.App. at 135 , 620 S.E.2d at 292 ; see also Pomeroy v. Tanner Masonry, 151 N.C.App. 171 , 182, 565 S.E.2d 209 , 216-17 (2002) ("When additional medical treatment is required, there is a rebuttable presumption that it is directly related to the original compensable injury and the employer has the burden of producing evidence showing the treatment is not directly related to the

2015Once the employee meets this initial burden, however, a presumption arises-often referred to as the Parsons presumption-that "additional medical treatment is directly related to the compensable injury." *495 Perez, 174 N.C.App. at 135 , 620 S.E.2d at 292 ; see also Pomeroy v. Tanner Masonry, 151 N.C.App. 171 , 182, 565 S.E.2d 209 , 216-17 (2002) ("When additional medical treatment is required, there is a rebuttable presumption that it is directly related to the original compensable injury and the employer has the burden of producing evidence showing the treatment is not directly related to the

2022Defendants challenge Findings of Fact 29, 30, and 31 as being unsupported by competent evidence. ¶ 30 In a workers’ compensation appeal, “[t]he reviewing court’s inquiry is limited to two issues: whether the Commission’s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and whether the Commission’s conclusions of law are justified by its findings of fact.” Hendrix v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 186 , 345 S.E.2d 374, 379 (1986).

2022Defendants challenge Findings of Fact 29, 30, and 31 as being unsupported by competent evidence. ¶ 30 In a workers’ compensation appeal, “[t]he reviewing court’s inquiry is limited to two issues: whether the Commission’s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and whether the Commission’s conclusions of law are justified by its findings of fact.” Hendrix v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 186 , 345 S.E.2d 374, 379 (1986).

2017The court remanded the matter to the Commission to “apply the Parsons presumption and then make a new determination as to whether Plaintiff’s psychological symptoms are causally related to the 21 April 2010 injury.” Id. at _, 777 S.E.2d at 287-88 .

2017The court remanded the matter to the Commission to “apply the Parsons presumption and then make a new determination as to whether Plaintiff’s psychological symptoms are causally related to the 21 April 2010 injury.” Id. at _, 777 S.E.2d at 287-88 .

2015See Reinninger v. Prestige Fabricators, Inc., 136 N.C.App. 255 , 260, 523 S.E.2d 720 , 723-24 (1999) (remanding "this case to the Commission for a new determination of causation" where the Commission's findings indicated that it " failed to give Plaintiff the benefit of the presumption that his medical treatment now sought was causally related to his 1995 compensable injury"); see also Holley v. ACTS, Inc., 357 N.C. 228 , 231, 581 S.E.2d 750 , 752 (2003) ("When the Commission acts under a misapprehension of the law, the award must be set aside and the case remanded for a new determination usin

2015See Reinninger v. Prestige Fabricators, Inc., 136 N.C.App. 255 , 260, 523 S.E.2d 720 , 723-24 (1999) (remanding "this case to the Commission for a new determination of causation" where the Commission's findings indicated that it " failed to give Plaintiff the benefit of the presumption that his medical treatment now sought was causally related to his 1995 compensable injury"); see also Holley v. ACTS, Inc., 357 N.C. 228 , 231, 581 S.E.2d 750 , 752 (2003) ("When the Commission acts under a misapprehension of the law, the award must be set aside and the case remanded for a new determination usin

2017This Court, affirming the Commission's award of medical compensation, held that "[a]though the Commission recited the Parsons presumption, it did not rely on it in finding the [plaintiff's] neck injury compensable." Id. at 156, 720 S.E.2d at 874 .

2017The majority's opinion Carr v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 218 N.C.App. 151 , 720 S.E.2d 869 (2012), and asserts the Commission separately found Plaintiff had met her burden of proof for causation, absent the Parsons presumption and Wilkes .

2023Similarly, we held in McLeod v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. that “[e]ven assuming arguendo that [the expert] testimony . . . was enough to rebut the Parsons presumption, . . . ‘[t]he [F]ull Commission is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence.’ ” 208 N.C.

2023Similarly, we held in McLeod v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. that “[e]ven assuming arguendo that [the expert] testimony . . . was enough to rebut the Parsons presumption, . . . ‘[t]he [F]ull Commission is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence.’ ” 208 N.C.

2018Accordingly, the majority held that the Commission erred in applying the Parsons presumption to plaintiff's conditions that were not listed by defendants in the Form 60 and opined that "[g]enerally, such an error would require a remand to the Commission for the application of the correct legal standard." Id. at ----, 804 S.E.2d at 775 .

2018Accordingly, the majority held that the Commission erred in applying the Parsons presumption to plaintiff's conditions that were not listed by defendants in the Form 60 and opined that "[g]enerally, such an error would require a remand to the Commission for the application of the correct legal standard." Id. at ----, 804 S.E.2d at 775 .

2017I also concur with the majority opinion's conclusion, correctly stating: "Generally, such an error would require a remand to the Commission for the application of the correct legal standard." See Ballenger , 320 N.C. at 158 , 357 S.E.2d at 685 . *781 "When the Commission acts under a misapprehension of the law, the award must be set aside and the case remanded for a new determination using the correct legal standard." Id. at 158 , 357 S.E.2d at 685 (citation omitted).

2017I also concur with the majority opinion's conclusion, correctly stating: "Generally, such an error would require a remand to the Commission for the application of the correct legal standard." See Ballenger , 320 N.C. at 158 , 357 S.E.2d at 685 . *781 "When the Commission acts under a misapprehension of the law, the award must be set aside and the case remanded for a new determination using the correct legal standard." Id. at 158 , 357 S.E.2d at 685 (citation omitted).

2017See Adams , 168 N.C.App. at 475 , 608 S.E.2d at 361 (stating that causation must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence).

2017See Adams , 168 N.C.App. at 475 , 608 S.E.2d at 361 (stating that causation must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence).

2014See McCoy v. Oxford Janitorial Service Co., 122 N.C.