8 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1973–1995 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Moody v. Corsentinogreen1 sentence1995See Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355 (Colo.1993); People v. Bost, 770 P.2d 1209 (Colo.1989). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Drakegreen2 sentences1993See, e.g., State v. Drake, 259 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1977); State v. Johnson, 363 So.2d 458 (La.1978). 1 There is no need to engage in the ad hoc balancing test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), in a case such as this, where the defendant pled guilty and subsequently fled the jurisdiction prior to sentencing. 1993See, e.g., State v. Drake, 259 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1977); State v. Johnson, 363 So.2d 458 (La.1978). [1] There is no need to engage in the ad hoc balancing test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), in a case such as this, where the defendant pled guilty and subsequently fled the jurisdiction prior to sentencing. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences1993See, e.g., State v. Drake, 259 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1977); State v. Johnson, 363 So.2d 458 (La.1978). [1] There is no need to engage in the ad hoc balancing test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), in a case such as this, where the defendant pled guilty and subsequently fled the jurisdiction prior to sentencing. 1993See, e.g., State v. Drake, 259 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1977); State v. Johnson, 363 So.2d 458 (La.1978). [1] There is no need to engage in the ad hoc balancing test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), in a case such as this, where the defendant pled guilty and subsequently fled the jurisdiction prior to sentencing. | 4 | 1973–1993 |
People v. Spencer
green
2 sentences1989In People v. Small, 631 P.2d 148 (Colo.1981), and People v. Spencer, 182 Colo. 189 , 512 P.2d 260 (1973), we relied on the Barker test to determine the speedy trial issue under the Colorado Constitution. 1989In People v. Small, 631 P.2d 148 (Colo.1981), and People v. Spencer, 182 Colo. 189 , 512 P.2d 260 (1973), we relied on the Barker test to determine the speedy trial issue under the Colorado Constitution. | 3 | 1975–1989 |
People v. Bost
green
2 sentences1995See Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355 (Colo.1993); People v. Bost, 770 P.2d 1209 (Colo.1989). 1993Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); Bost, 770 P.2d at 1216 ; Chavez, 779 P.2d at 376 . | 2 | 1993–1995 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1993See, e.g., State v. Drake, 259 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1977); State v. Johnson, 363 So.2d 458 (La.1978). 1 There is no need to engage in the ad hoc balancing test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), in a case such as this, where the defendant pled guilty and subsequently fled the jurisdiction prior to sentencing. 1993See, e.g., State v. Drake, 259 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1977); State v. Johnson, 363 So.2d 458 (La.1978). [1] There is no need to engage in the ad hoc balancing test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), in a case such as this, where the defendant pled guilty and subsequently fled the jurisdiction prior to sentencing. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
United States v. Ewell
green
2 sentences1993The constitutional right to a speedy trial "is an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself." United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 , 86 S.Ct. 773, 776 , 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966). 1993The constitutional right to a speedy trial "is an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself." United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 , 86 S.Ct. 773, 776 , 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Chavez
green
2 sentences1993Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); Bost, 770 P.2d at 1216 ; Chavez, 779 P.2d at 376 . 1993Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); Bost, 770 P.2d at 1216 ; Chavez, 779 P.2d at 376 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Small
green
2 sentences1989In People v. Small, 631 P.2d 148 (Colo.1981), and People v. Spencer, 182 Colo. 189 , 512 P.2d 260 (1973), we relied on the Barker test to determine the speedy trial issue under the Colorado Constitution. 1989In People v. Small, 631 P.2d 148 (Colo.1981), and People v. Spencer, 182 Colo. 189 , 512 P.2d 260 (1973), we relied on the Barker test to determine the speedy trial issue under the Colorado Constitution. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Roviaro v. United States
green
2 sentences1988Ultimately, it must apply an ad hoc balancing test and weigh the “public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense.” People v. Garcia, supra quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 , 77 S.Ct. 623 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). 1988Ultimately, it must apply an ad hoc balancing test and weigh the “public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense.” People v. Garcia, supra quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 , 77 S.Ct. 623 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
People v. Garcia
green
1 sentence1988Ultimately, it must apply an ad hoc balancing test and weigh the “public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense.” People v. Garcia, supra quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 , 77 S.Ct. 623 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
People v. Arnold
green
2 sentences1982E.g., People v. Langford, 191 Colo. 87 , 550 P.2d 329 (1976); People v. Arnold, 186 Colo. 372 , 527 P.2d 806 (1974). 1982E.g., People v. Langford, 191 Colo. 87 , 550 P.2d 329 (1976); People v. Arnold, 186 Colo. 372 , 527 P.2d 806 (1974). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
People v. Langford
green
2 sentences1982E.g., People v. Langford, 191 Colo. 87 , 550 P.2d 329 (1976); People v. Arnold, 186 Colo. 372 , 527 P.2d 806 (1974). 1982E.g., People v. Langford, 191 Colo. 87 , 550 P.2d 329 (1976); People v. Arnold, 186 Colo. 372 , 527 P.2d 806 (1974). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.