bias claim in Colorado

2025See A.P., ¶ 32 (“[A]dverse legal rulings by a judge are unlikely to provide grounds for a bias claim, as they are proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal.” (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994))). ¶ 39 Relatedly, Sandra asserts that the magistrate exhibited bias by disallowing her hearsay testimony while allowing hearsay testimony in response to questions by Matthew’s counsel.

2025Nor was the judge’s statement that to disallow the evidence would “excuse[] that behavior.” Cf. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56 (“[J]udicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases,” and “expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger” ordinarily don’t support a bias challenge.); Dobler, ¶ 12 (no actual bias when “the judge’s statements that he would be ‘haunt[ed]’ by his decision to grant probation showed the judge was affected by his prior decision to be lenient with defendant”); Peo

2026“Bare assertions and speculative statements are insufficient to satisfy the burden of proof.” Id. ¶ 28 “[A]dverse legal rulings by a judge are unlikely to provide grounds for a bias claim, as they are proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal.” Id. at ¶ 32, 526 P.3d at 184. “[R]ulings of a judge, although erroneous, numerous and continuous, are not sufficient in themselves to show bias or prejudice.” Id. (quoting Schupper v. People, 157 P.3d 516 , 521 n.5 (Colo. 2007)). ¶ 29 In October 2024, Salter filed a motion for a change of judge under C.R.C.P. 97, which says that “a judge shall be disqu

2025See People in Interest of A.P., 2022 CO 24 , ¶ 32, 526 P.3d 177 , 184 (“[A]dverse legal rulings by a judge are unlikely to provide grounds for a bias claim, as they are proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal.”); see also Schupper v. People, 157 P.3d 516 , 521 n.5 (Colo. 2007) (“[R]ulings of a judge, although erroneous, numerous and continuous, are not sufficient in themselves to show bias or prejudice.” (quoting Saucerman v. Saucerman, 461 P.2d 18, 22 (Colo. 1969))). ¶ 20 Accordingly, we, like the postconviction court, conclude that Richardson failed to set forth allegations that, if prove

2026In short, “[a]ctual bias exists if ‘a judge has a bias or prejudice that in all probability will prevent him . . . from dealing fairly with a party.’” Bocian, ¶ 14, 482 P.3d at 509 (quoting People v. Julien, 47 P.3d 1194, 1197 (Colo. 2002)). ¶ 48 A party may waive a perceived basis claim but not an actual bias claim.

2026People in Interest of A.G., 262 P.3d at 650 ; see Jones, ¶ 34, 571 P.3d at 955 (When “defense counsel doesn’t move for disqualification, the defendant waives any argument that the judge should have disqualified himself based on an appearance of impropriety, and [the appellate court] review[s] only for actual 21 bias.”); Rea, ¶ 22, 272 P.3d at 1147 (“Disqualification for an appearance of impropriety must be distinguished from disqualification for actual bias.

2025See People in Interest of A.P., 2022 CO 24 , ¶ 32, 526 P.3d 177 , 184 (“[A]dverse legal rulings by a judge are unlikely to provide grounds for a bias claim, as they are proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal.”); see also Schupper v. People, 157 P.3d 516 , 521 n.5 (Colo. 2007) (“[R]ulings of a judge, although erroneous, numerous and continuous, are not sufficient in themselves to show bias or prejudice.” (quoting Saucerman v. Saucerman, 461 P.2d 18, 22 (Colo. 1969))). ¶ 20 Accordingly, we, like the postconviction court, conclude that Richardson failed to set forth allegations that, if prove

2025Nor was the judge’s statement that to disallow the evidence would “excuse[] that behavior.” Cf. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56 (“[J]udicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases,” and “expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger” ordinarily don’t support a bias challenge.); Dobler, ¶ 12 (no actual bias when “the judge’s statements that he would be ‘haunt[ed]’ by his decision to grant probation showed the judge was affected by his prior decision to be lenient with defendant”); Peo

2024See Black v. Black , 2020 COA 6 4M, ¶ 131 (declining to disqualify judge on remand). ¶ 21 For a bias claim to be viable, “a judge must show ‘deep -seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.’” People in Interest of A.P. , 2022 CO 24 , ¶ 31 (quoting Liteky v. United States , 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)).