interpretative rule in Colorado

2010Thus, the majority has distanced itself from our precedent regarding the deference given to the intent of a proposal as expressed by its proponents, see In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause, & Summary for 1999-2000 # 25, 974 P.2d 458, 465 (Colo.1999) (explaining that, in order to "assist potential proponents in implementing their right to initiate laws," deference must be given "to the intent of the proposal as expressed by its proponent"), in favor of an interpretative rule that confines the language setting forth broad rights to the specific application that follows such language.

2010Thus, the majority has distanced itself from our precedent regarding the deference given to the intent of a proposal as expressed by its proponents, see In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause, & Summary for 1999-2000 # 25, 974 P.2d 458, 465 (Colo.1999) (explaining that, in order to "assist potential proponents in implementing their right to initiate laws," deference must be given "to the intent of the proposal as expressed by its proponent"), in favor of an interpretative rule that confines the language setting forth broad rights to the specific application that follows such language.

1988See, e.g., Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Block, 694 F.2d 1205, 1209-10 (9th Cir.1982); 2 K.

1988See, e.g., Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Block, 694 F.2d 1205, 1209-10 (9th Cir.1982); 2 K.

2005See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 , 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2873 , 57 L.Ed.2d 854, 869-70 (1978) (" Morissette can be fairly read as establishing, at least with regard to crimes having their origin in the common law, an interpretative presumption that mens rea is required"); see also People v. Washburn, 197 Colo. 419, 422 , 593 P.2d 962, 964 (1979) ("offenses which have their bases in common law such as provisions concerning theft must be construed to require a culpable mental state").

2005See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 , 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2873 , 57 L.Ed.2d 854, 869-70 (1978) (" Morissette can be fairly read as establishing, at least with regard to crimes having their origin in the common law, an interpretative presumption that mens rea is required"); see also People v. Washburn, 197 Colo. 419, 422 , 593 P.2d 962, 964 (1979) ("offenses which have their bases in common law such as provisions concerning theft must be construed to require a culpable mental state").

2005See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 , 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2873 , 57 L.Ed.2d 854, 869-70 (1978) (" Morissette can be fairly read as establishing, at least with regard to crimes having their origin in the common law, an interpretative presumption that mens rea is required"); see also People v. Washburn, 197 Colo. 419, 422 , 593 P.2d 962, 964 (1979) ("offenses which have their bases in common law such as provisions concerning theft must be construed to require a culpable mental state").

2005See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 , 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2873 , 57 L.Ed.2d 854, 869-70 (1978) (" Morissette can be fairly read as establishing, at least with regard to crimes having their origin in the common law, an interpretative presumption that mens rea is required"); see also People v. Washburn, 197 Colo. 419, 422 , 593 P.2d 962, 964 (1979) ("offenses which have their bases in common law such as provisions concerning theft must be construed to require a culpable mental state").

1988Where, as here, general words follow a particularized enumeration of types, the interpretative rule of ejusdem generis counsels that the general words, at least in the absence of any manifest legislative intent to the contrary, should be construed “as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated.” Martinez v. People, 111 Colo. 52, 57-58 , 137 P.2d 690, 692-93 , (1943); see also Climax Dairy Co. v. Mulder, 78 Colo. 407, 413-14 , 242 P. 666, 669 (1925).

1988Where, as here, general words follow a particularized enumeration of types, the interpretative rule of ejusdem generis counsels that the general words, at least in the absence of any manifest legislative intent to the contrary, should be construed “as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated.” Martinez v. People, 111 Colo. 52, 57-58 , 137 P.2d 690, 692-93 , (1943); see also Climax Dairy Co. v. Mulder, 78 Colo. 407, 413-14 , 242 P. 666, 669 (1925).

1987The New York Court of Appeals held that the interpretative analysis provided in the Report of the State of New York Commission on Uniform Laws "unmistakeably [sic] addresses the common-law doctrine_" 66 N.Y.2d at 329, 488 N.E.2d at 60 , 497 N.Y.S.2d at 314 .

1987The New York Court of Appeals held that the interpretative analysis provided in the Report of the State of New York Commission on Uniform Laws "unmistakeably [sic] addresses the common-law doctrine_" 66 N.Y.2d at 329, 488 N.E.2d at 60 , 497 N.Y.S.2d at 314 .