8 Colorado opinions name it 1 courts 2000–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Staffordgreen1 sentence2026See Stafford, 890 P.2d at 248 (reversing for failure to give a lesser included instruction when the record contained evidence supporting a rational basis to acquit of the greater offense and to convict of the lesser). ¶ 50 Accordingly, the jury could have rationally believed that Montoya did not intend to commit a crime against a person or property when he unlawfully entered the house. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2020See Brown v. People, 239 P.3d 764, 767-69 (Colo. 2010) (explaining a party’s theory of the case is not determinative of whether a lesser included instruction should be given, but rather the inquiry focuses on whether there “is a rational basis for the instruction in the evidentiary record”). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Maddengreen1 sentence2013See supra Part V.A; Madden, 111 P.3d at 460 (holding that "patronizing a prostituted child" requires some record evidence that the defendant "attempted to give anything of value ... in exchange for sex"). 185 Here, because the uncontrovert-ed evidence that sixteen-year-old A.J. agreed to perform sexual acts in exchange for money promised her by defendant established the required elements of the crime, giving a lesser-included instruction. would have been improper. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pricegreen1 sentence2013See People v. Price, 969 P.2d 766, 768 (Colo.App.1998) (holding that, when the prosecution presented evidence that the defendant stole at least $44,000, defendant failed to present any evidence that the amount she stole was less than $15,000, the minimum threshold required by the charged crime, "the jury was not provided with any rational basis to acquit her of the offense charged, but conviet her of one of the lesser included offenses"); Graham v. People, 199 Colo. 439, 441 , 610 P.2d 494, 495 (1980) ("[The defendant's own testimony constituted an admission of guilt of the offense of simple r | 1 | 1 |
Graham v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2013See People v. Price, 969 P.2d 766, 768 (Colo.App.1998) (holding that, when the prosecution presented evidence that the defendant stole at least $44,000, defendant failed to present any evidence that the amount she stole was less than $15,000, the minimum threshold required by the charged crime, "the jury was not provided with any rational basis to acquit her of the offense charged, but conviet her of one of the lesser included offenses"); Graham v. People, 199 Colo. 439, 441 , 610 P.2d 494, 495 (1980) ("[The defendant's own testimony constituted an admission of guilt of the offense of simple r 2013See People v. Price, 969 P.2d 766, 768 (Colo.App.1998) (holding that, when the prosecution presented evidence that the defendant stole at least $44,000, defendant failed to present any evidence that the amount she stole was less than $15,000, the minimum threshold required by the charged crime, "the jury was not provided with any rational basis to acquit her of the offense charged, but conviet her of one of the lesser included offenses"); Graham v. People, 199 Colo. 439, 441 , 610 P.2d 494, 495 (1980) ("[The defendant's own testimony constituted an admission of guilt of the offense of simple r | 1 | 1 |
Dockins v. Hinesgreen1 sentence2009But there is no constitutional right to a lesser included instruction in a non-capital case, see United States v. Eddy, 523 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir.2008) (citing Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir.2004)), much less to a lesser non-included offense instruction. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Eddygreen1 sentence2009But there is no constitutional right to a lesser included instruction in a non-capital case, see United States v. Eddy, 523 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir.2008) (citing Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir.2004)), much less to a lesser non-included offense instruction. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jimenezgreen1 sentence2009See People v. Jimenez, 217 P.3d 841, 870 (Colo.App. 2008) (citing federal appellate cases). | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences2002See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)(establishing harmless error standard where constitutional right has been violated). 2002See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)(establishing harmless error standard where constitutional right has been violated). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Romerogreen2 sentences2002In People v. Romero, 694 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Colo.1985) the supreme court also treated the defendant's failure to request a lesser included offense instruction as a waiver, stating: "[I]t may reasonably be assumed that he elected to take his chance on an outright acquittal or conviction of the principal charge rather than to provide the jury with an opportunity to convict on a lesser offense." Because courts indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); People v. Curtis, 681 P.2 2002In People v. Romero, 694 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Colo.1985) the supreme court also treated the defendant’s failure to request a lesser included offense instruction as a waiver, stating: “[I]t may reasonably be assumed that he elected to take his chance on an outright acquittal or conviction of the principal charge rather than to provide the jury with an opportunity to convict on a lesser offense.” Because courts indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); People v. Curtis, 681 P.2 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Horrocksgreen2 sentences2000See People v. Horrocks, 190 Colo. 501 , 549 P.2d 400 (1976); People v. Martin 670 P2d 22, 24 (Colo.App.1983) ("once the defendant has been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the issue of whether there was probable cause to bind him over after a preliminary hearing becomes moot"). *704 IV. 2000See People v. Horrocks, 190 Colo. 501 , 549 P.2d 400 (1976); People v. Martin 670 P2d 22, 24 (Colo.App.1983) ("once the defendant has been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the issue of whether there was probable cause to bind him over after a preliminary hearing becomes moot"). *704 IV. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Martingreen1 sentence2000See People v. Horrocks, 190 Colo. 501 , 549 P.2d 400 (1976); People v. Martin 670 P2d 22, 24 (Colo.App.1983) ("once the defendant has been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the issue of whether there was probable cause to bind him over after a preliminary hearing becomes moot"). *704 IV. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Cooke
green
2 sentences2020Notice and the Cooke Test ¶ 14 Because the prosecutor requested the lesser included instruction, and the trial court granted the request over Abdulla’s counsel’s objection, the People argue that the test employed in Cooke, 186 Colo. at 48 , 525 P.2d at 428-29 , governs. 2020Notice and the Cooke Test ¶ 14 Because the prosecutor requested the lesser included instruction, and the trial court granted the request over Abdulla’s counsel’s objection, the People argue that the test employed in Cooke, 186 Colo. at 48 , 525 P.2d at 428-29 , governs. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Rubio
green
1 sentence2012Rubio, 222 P.3d at 361 . 1 51 We recognize that the jury in Tryjillo was instructed on lesser nonincluded offenses, as opposed to the lesser included offense instructions given here. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
King v. State
green
1 sentence2011Id. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Mullins
green
2 sentences2002In so holding, we acknowledge that Gallegos v. People, 136 Colo. 321 , 316 P.2d 884 (1957), suggests the failure to give a lesser included instruction implicates a constitutional right, but Gallegos was decided before Chapman v. California, supra. Further, the supreme court did not mention Chapman or the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard when addressing the alleged instructional errors in People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235 (Colo.1983); People v. Shaw, 646 P.2d 375 (Colo.1982); People v. Favors, 192 Colo. 136 , 556 P.2d 72 (1976); and People v. Mullins, 188 Colo. 23 , 532 P.2d 733 ( 2002In so holding, we acknowledge that Gallegos v. People, 136 Colo. 321 , 316 P.2d 884 (1957), suggests the failure to give a lesser included instruction implicates a constitutional right, but Gallegos was decided before Chapman v. California, supra. Further, the supreme court did not mention Chapman or the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard when addressing the alleged instructional errors in People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235 (Colo.1983); People v. Shaw, 646 P.2d 375 (Colo.1982); People v. Favors, 192 Colo. 136 , 556 P.2d 72 (1976); and People v. Mullins, 188 Colo. 23 , 532 P.2d 733 ( | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Curtis
green
2 sentences2002In People v. Romero, 694 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Colo.1985) the supreme court also treated the defendant's failure to request a lesser included offense instruction as a waiver, stating: "[I]t may reasonably be assumed that he elected to take his chance on an outright acquittal or conviction of the principal charge rather than to provide the jury with an opportunity to convict on a lesser offense." Because courts indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); People v. Curtis, 681 P.2 2002In People v. Romero, 694 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Colo.1985) the supreme court also treated the defendant’s failure to request a lesser included offense instruction as a waiver, stating: “[I]t may reasonably be assumed that he elected to take his chance on an outright acquittal or conviction of the principal charge rather than to provide the jury with an opportunity to convict on a lesser offense.” Because courts indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); People v. Curtis, 681 P.2 | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences2002In People v. Romero, 694 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Colo.1985) the supreme court also treated the defendant's failure to request a lesser included offense instruction as a waiver, stating: "[I]t may reasonably be assumed that he elected to take his chance on an outright acquittal or conviction of the principal charge rather than to provide the jury with an opportunity to convict on a lesser offense." Because courts indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); People v. Curtis, 681 P.2 2002In People v. Romero, 694 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Colo.1985) the supreme court also treated the defendant's failure to request a lesser included offense instruction as a waiver, stating: "[I]t may reasonably be assumed that he elected to take his chance on an outright acquittal or conviction of the principal charge rather than to provide the jury with an opportunity to convict on a lesser offense." Because courts indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); People v. Curtis, 681 P.2 | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Shaw
green
2 sentences2002Further, the supreme court did not mention Chapman or the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard when addressing the alleged instructional errors in People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235 (Colo.1983); People v. Shaw, 646 P.2d 375 (Colo.1982); People v. Favors, 192 Colo. 136 , 556 P.2d 72 (1976); and People v. Mullins, 188 Colo. 23 , 532 P.2d 733 (1975). 2002In so holding, we acknowledge that Gallegos v. People, 136 Colo. 321 , 316 P.2d 884 (1957), suggests the failure to give a lesser included instruction implicates a constitutional right, but Gallegos was decided before Chapman v. California, supra. Further, the supreme court did not mention Chapman or the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard when addressing the alleged instructional errors in People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235 (Colo.1983); People v. Shaw, 646 P.2d 375 (Colo.1982); People v. Favors, 192 Colo. 136 , 556 P.2d 72 (1976); and People v. Mullins, 188 Colo. 23 , 532 P.2d 733 ( | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Bartowsheski
green
2 sentences2002Further, the supreme court did not mention Chapman or the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard when addressing the alleged instructional errors in People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235 (Colo.1983); People v. Shaw, 646 P.2d 375 (Colo.1982); People v. Favors, 192 Colo. 136 , 556 P.2d 72 (1976); and People v. Mullins, 188 Colo. 23 , 532 P.2d 733 (1975). 2002In so holding, we acknowledge that Gallegos v. People, 136 Colo. 321 , 316 P.2d 884 (1957), suggests the failure to give a lesser included instruction implicates a constitutional right, but Gallegos was decided before Chapman v. California, supra. Further, the supreme court did not mention Chapman or the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard when addressing the alleged instructional errors in People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235 (Colo.1983); People v. Shaw, 646 P.2d 375 (Colo.1982); People v. Favors, 192 Colo. 136 , 556 P.2d 72 (1976); and People v. Mullins, 188 Colo. 23 , 532 P.2d 733 ( | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Favors
green
2 sentences2002In so holding, we acknowledge that Gallegos v. People, 136 Colo. 321 , 316 P.2d 884 (1957), suggests the failure to give a lesser included instruction implicates a constitutional right, but Gallegos was decided before Chapman v. California, supra. Further, the supreme court did not mention Chapman or the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard when addressing the alleged instructional errors in People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235 (Colo.1983); People v. Shaw, 646 P.2d 375 (Colo.1982); People v. Favors, 192 Colo. 136 , 556 P.2d 72 (1976); and People v. Mullins, 188 Colo. 23 , 532 P.2d 733 ( 2002In so holding, we acknowledge that Gallegos v. People, 136 Colo. 321 , 316 P.2d 884 (1957), suggests the failure to give a lesser included instruction implicates a constitutional right, but Gallegos was decided before Chapman v. California, supra. Further, the supreme court did not mention Chapman or the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard when addressing the alleged instructional errors in People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235 (Colo.1983); People v. Shaw, 646 P.2d 375 (Colo.1982); People v. Favors, 192 Colo. 136 , 556 P.2d 72 (1976); and People v. Mullins, 188 Colo. 23 , 532 P.2d 733 ( | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Gallegos v. People
green
2 sentences2002In so holding, we acknowledge that Gallegos v. People, 136 Colo. 321 , 316 P.2d 884 (1957), suggests the failure to give a lesser included instruction implicates a constitutional right, but Gallegos was decided before Chapman v. California, supra . 2002In so holding, we acknowledge that Gallegos v. People, 136 Colo. 321 , 316 P.2d 884 (1957), suggests the failure to give a lesser included instruction implicates a constitutional right, but Gallegos was decided before Chapman v. California, supra . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.