8 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1992–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Covington v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2012To do otherwise would represent the kind of “major expansion of the availability of pretrial detention in witness intimidation situations” that this court sought to avoid with its opinion in Covington, 698 A.2d at 1036 n. 6, and would be inconsistent with the long-held principle that “[i]n our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” Id. at 1037 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)). 2012To do otherwise would represent the kind of “major expansion of the availability of pretrial detention in witness intimidation situations” that this court sought to avoid with its opinion in Covington, 698 A.2d at 1036 n. 6, and would be inconsistent with the long-held principle that “[i]n our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” Id. at 1037 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)). | 2 | 3 |
Foucha v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2021See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 , 81–82 (1992) (noting that the Salerno Court found the Bail Reform Act “constitutionally permissible” because it “was strictly limited in duration”); id. at 83 (“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755 )). 2021See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 , 81–82 (1992) (noting that the Salerno Court found the Bail Reform Act “constitutionally permissible” because it “was strictly limited in duration”); id. at 83 (“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755 )). | 1 | 2 |
Hamdi v. Rumsfeldgreen1 sentence2021“It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
Best v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1997We are reinforced in that conclusion by Chief Justice Rehnquist’s observation for the Court in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 , 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2105 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), that “[i]n our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” See also Best v. United States, 651 A.2d 790, 792 (D.C.1994) (per curiam) (quoting Salerno). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Foucha v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2021See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 , 81–82 (1992) (noting that the Salerno Court found the Bail Reform Act “constitutionally permissible” because it “was strictly limited in duration”); id. at 83 (“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755 )). 2021See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 , 81–82 (1992) (noting that the Salerno Court found the Bail Reform Act “constitutionally permissible” because it “was strictly limited in duration”); id. at 83 (“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755 )). | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Salerno
green
2 sentences2021See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 , 81–82 (1992) (noting that the Salerno Court found the Bail Reform Act “constitutionally permissible” because it “was strictly limited in duration”); id. at 83 (“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755 )). 2012To do otherwise would represent the kind of “major expansion of the availability of pretrial detention in witness intimidation situations” that this court sought to avoid with its opinion in Covington, 698 A.2d at 1036 n. 6, and would be inconsistent with the long-held principle that “[i]n our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” Id. at 1037 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)). | 7 | 1992–2021 |
United States v. Allied Oil Corp.
green
2 sentences2012To do otherwise would represent the kind of “major expansion of the availability of pretrial detention in witness intimidation situations” that this court sought to avoid with its opinion in Covington, 698 A.2d at 1036 n. 6, and would be inconsistent with the long-held principle that “[i]n our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” Id. at 1037 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)). 1999In construing § 23-1825(a), we are guided by Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reminder that “[i]n our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial is the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987); see also Covington v. United States, 698 A.2d 1033, 1037 (D.C.1997) (quoting Salerno). | 6 | 1992–2012 |
United States v. Bass
green
2 sentences1999Preventive detention statutes restrict the liberty of the citizen, and they must be strictly construed to ensure that defendants are not detained without bond “unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should be.” Tyler, supra, 705 A.2d at 279 (concurring opinion) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 , 92 S.Ct. 515 , 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971) (citations omitted)). 1999Preventive detention statutes restrict the liberty of the citizen, and they must be strictly construed to ensure that defendants are not detained without bond “unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should be.” Tyler, supra, 705 A.2d at 279 (concurring opinion) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 , 92 S.Ct. 515 , 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971) (citations omitted)). | 2 | 1997–1999 |
Hazel v. United States
green
2 sentences1994In Hazel we held that the trial court’s “inherent authority” under Carbo and Gilbert no longer existed in light of the enactment of D.C.Code § 23-1322, which we described as the “exclusive source of the court’s power to order pretrial detention.” Hazel, supra, 483 A.2d at 1159 . 1994In Hazel we held that the trial court’s “inherent authority” under Carbo and Gilbert no longer existed in light of the enactment of D.C.Code § 23-1322, which we described as the “exclusive source of the court’s power to order pretrial detention.” Hazel, supra, 483 A.2d at 1159 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.