8 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1988–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bernard v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1990The government's case must therefore stand or fall on a theory of constructive possession, and the trial court based his finding of guilt squarely on that elusive concept. [4] In Bernard v. United States, 575 A.2d 1191, 1195 (D.C.1990), we recently had occasion to summarize as follows the basic principles applicable to the doctrine of constructive possession: No proof of actual possession of cocaine having been offered, the government's case against both men must rest on the theory that they constructively possessed this drug. 1990The government’s case must therefore stand or fall on a theory of constructive possession, and the trial court based his finding of guilt squarely on that elusive concept. 4 In Bernard v. United States, 575 A.2d 1191, 1195 (D.C.1990), we recently had occasion to summarize as follows the basic principles applicable to the doctrine of constructive possession: No proof of actual possession of cocaine having been offered, the government’s case against both men must rest on the theory that they constructively possessed this drug. | 2 | 3 |
Duvall v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2022The jury instructions explained that possession may be proven via constructive possession—i.e., that he had “the power and the intent at any given time to control the property.” This constructive possession instruction, together with the Smith also points out, correctly, that “a positive field test, standing alone, 8 cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance was [a controlled substance].” Duvall v. United States, 975 A.2d 839, 846 (D.C. 2009) (citation omitted). 22 facts adduced at trial, permitted jurors to find that Smith possessed the vials that were found inside the otter b 2022The jury instructions explained that possession may be proven via constructive possession—i.e., that he had “the power and the intent at any given time to control the property.” This constructive possession instruction, together with the Smith also points out, correctly, that “a positive field test, standing alone, 8 cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance was [a controlled substance].” Duvall v. United States, 975 A.2d 839, 846 (D.C. 2009) (citation omitted). 22 facts adduced at trial, permitted jurors to find that Smith possessed the vials that were found inside the otter b | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2012In R.G., we recognized that the constructive possession doctrine should not automatically be applied “to impose liability on a person who simply fails to dissociate from, or has mere knowledge of, the presence of contraband.” Id. at 651 (quoting Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125, 145 (D.C.2001) (en banc) (Ruiz, J., concurring)). 7 We also reiterated, however, that where contraband (as here) is not in plain view, but where “the element of knowledge cannot be significantly disputed,” the “additional evidence necessary to prove the intent element of constructive possession is comparatively min | 1 | 1 |
Rivas v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2012In R.G., we recognized that the constructive possession doctrine should not automatically be applied “to impose liability on a person who simply fails to dissociate from, or has mere knowledge of, the presence of contraband.” Id. at 651 (quoting Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125, 145 (D.C.2001) (en banc) (Ruiz, J., concurring)). 7 We also reiterated, however, that where contraband (as here) is not in plain view, but where “the element of knowledge cannot be significantly disputed,” the “additional evidence necessary to prove the intent element of constructive possession is comparatively min 2012In R.G., we recognized that the constructive possession doctrine should not automatically be applied “to impose liability on a person who simply fails to dissociate from, or has mere knowledge of, the presence of contraband.” Id. at 651 (quoting Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125, 145 (D.C.2001) (en banc) (Ruiz, J., concurring)). 7 We also reiterated, however, that where contraband (as here) is not in plain view, but where “the element of knowledge cannot be significantly disputed,” the “additional evidence necessary to prove the intent element of constructive possession is comparatively min | 1 | 1 |
Curry v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1988The majority has allowed the doctrine of constructive possession "to cast too wide a net." Id. at 264 . 1988Curry , which was decided after Logan but did not cite or attempt to distinguish Logan , could be read as adding a new dimension to a constructive possession analysis since it seemingly requires the government to prove that the defendant "exercised a right to dominion or control over the loaded weapon that [he] had some appreciable ability to guide its destiny." Id. at 264. | 1 | 1 |
Porter v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1988Here the government must “prove that appellant had control of the revolver, i.e., that the weapon was ‘in such proximity to ... [appellant] as to be convenient of access and within reach.’ ” Porter v. United States, 282 A.2d 559, 560 (D.C.1971) (citations omitted). 1988Here the government must "prove that appellant had control of the revolver, i.e., that the weapon was `in such proximity to ... [appellant] as to be convenient of access and within reach.'" Porter v. United States, 282 A.2d 559, 560 (D.C.1971) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Matter of TM
green
2 sentences1999In 1990, the Bernard and In re T.M. cases firmly established the intent element of the constructive possession test as part of our jurisprudence; [4] however, *662 neither case dealt with contraband located in a vehicle. [5] In In re T.M., this court recognized the distinction, stating "[t]his is not a case such as Brown, supra, 546 A.2d at 396-97 , or Waterstaat, supra, 252 A.2d at 509 , in which it was held that the requisite inferences may be drawn from the location of weapons in plain view and substantially within a defendant's reach in the closer confines of an automobile." 577 A.2d at 11 1999In 1990, the Bernard and In re T.M. cases firmly established the intent element of the constructive possession test as part of our jurisprudence; 4 however, neither case dealt with contraband located in a vehicle. 5 In In re T.M., this court recognized the distinction, stating “[t]his is not a case such as Brown, supra, 546 A.2d at 396-97 , or Waterstaat, supra, 252 A.2d at 509 , in which it was held that the requisite inferences may be drawn from the location of weapons in plain view and substantially within a defendant’s reach in the closer confines of an automobile.” 577 A.2d at 1154 n. 12. | 2 | 1991–1999 |
In Re RG
green
1 sentence2012In R.G., we recognized that the constructive possession doctrine should not automatically be applied “to impose liability on a person who simply fails to dissociate from, or has mere knowledge of, the presence of contraband.” Id. at 651 (quoting Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125, 145 (D.C.2001) (en banc) (Ruiz, J., concurring)). 7 We also reiterated, however, that where contraband (as here) is not in plain view, but where “the element of knowledge cannot be significantly disputed,” the “additional evidence necessary to prove the intent element of constructive possession is comparatively min | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Waterstaat v. United States
green
2 sentences1999In 1990, the Bernard and In re T.M. cases firmly established the intent element of the constructive possession test as part of our jurisprudence; 4 however, neither case dealt with contraband located in a vehicle. 5 In In re T.M., this court recognized the distinction, stating “[t]his is not a case such as Brown, supra, 546 A.2d at 396-97 , or Waterstaat, supra, 252 A.2d at 509 , in which it was held that the requisite inferences may be drawn from the location of weapons in plain view and substantially within a defendant’s reach in the closer confines of an automobile.” 577 A.2d at 1154 n. 12. 1999In 1990, the Bernard and In re T.M. cases firmly established the intent element of the constructive possession test as part of our jurisprudence; 4 however, neither case dealt with contraband located in a vehicle. 5 In In re T.M., this court recognized the distinction, stating “[t]his is not a case such as Brown, supra, 546 A.2d at 396-97 , or Waterstaat, supra, 252 A.2d at 509 , in which it was held that the requisite inferences may be drawn from the location of weapons in plain view and substantially within a defendant’s reach in the closer confines of an automobile.” 577 A.2d at 1154 n. 12. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Brown v. United States
green
2 sentences1999In 1990, the Bernard and In re T.M. cases firmly established the intent element of the constructive possession test as part of our jurisprudence; 4 however, neither case dealt with contraband located in a vehicle. 5 In In re T.M., this court recognized the distinction, stating “[t]his is not a case such as Brown, supra, 546 A.2d at 396-97 , or Waterstaat, supra, 252 A.2d at 509 , in which it was held that the requisite inferences may be drawn from the location of weapons in plain view and substantially within a defendant’s reach in the closer confines of an automobile.” 577 A.2d at 1154 n. 12. 1999In 1990, the Bernard and In re T.M. cases firmly established the intent element of the constructive possession test as part of our jurisprudence; 4 however, neither case dealt with contraband located in a vehicle. 5 In In re T.M., this court recognized the distinction, stating “[t]his is not a case such as Brown, supra, 546 A.2d at 396-97 , or Waterstaat, supra, 252 A.2d at 509 , in which it was held that the requisite inferences may be drawn from the location of weapons in plain view and substantially within a defendant’s reach in the closer confines of an automobile.” 577 A.2d at 1154 n. 12. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.