Fifth Amendment due process clause in District of Columbia

8 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1981–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

Case	Followed	Cited
Bolling v. Sharpegreen scotus · 1954 · cited in 3 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1983–1997 2 sentences 1997Under Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 , 74 S.Ct. 693 , 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954), the equal protection guarantee, as it pertains to the District of Columbia, is found in the Fifth Amendment due process clause. 1997Under Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 , 74 S.Ct. 693 , 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954), the equal protection guarantee, as it pertains to the District of Columbia, is found in the Fifth Amendment due process clause.	1	3
Raymond v. United Statesgreen dc · 1979 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 2 sentences 2020Code § 23-1327 (b) instructs that “[a]ny failure to appear after notice of the appearance date shall be prima facie evidence that such failure to appear is wilful [sic].” In the face of a Fifth Amendment due process challenge, we interpreted that statutory provision as permitting, but not requiring, the fact finder to infer that a defendant’s failure to appear was willful in 3 Trice v. United States, 525 A.2d 176, 179 (D.C. 1987) (quoting Raymond v. United States, 396 A.2d 975, 976 (D.C. 1979)). 4 Id. at 181. 7 the situations described by § 23-1327(b). 5 After the government makes a showing su 2020Although, as we discuss below, we believe the trial judge did not give sufficient consideration to appellant’s personal circumstances in making his finding of willfulness, 8 nothing compelled the judge to 5 Raymond, 396 A.2d at 977 . 6 Id. 7 Id. at 978 . 8 Past decisions of this court confirm the relevance of personal circumstances such as those appellant described in determining whether a failure to appear in court was willful.	1	1
Trice v. United Statesgreen dc · 1987 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 1 sentence 2020Code § 23-1327 (b) instructs that “[a]ny failure to appear after notice of the appearance date shall be prima facie evidence that such failure to appear is wilful [sic].” In the face of a Fifth Amendment due process challenge, we interpreted that statutory provision as permitting, but not requiring, the fact finder to infer that a defendant’s failure to appear was willful in 3 Trice v. United States, 525 A.2d 176, 179 (D.C. 1987) (quoting Raymond v. United States, 396 A.2d 975, 976 (D.C. 1979)). 4 Id. at 181. 7 the situations described by § 23-1327(b). 5 After the government makes a showing su	1	1
Kleinbart v. United Statesgreen dc · 1992 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 2 sentences 1997See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, - U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2107 , 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995). . “[P]retrial detention orders ... are open to periodic review and modification.” Kleinbart, supra, 604 A.2d at 866 . 1997See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, - U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2107 , 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995). . “[P]retrial detention orders ... are open to periodic review and modification.” Kleinbart, supra, 604 A.2d at 866 .	1	1
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Penagreen scotus · 1995 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 2 sentences 1997See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, - U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2107 , 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995). . “[P]retrial detention orders ... are open to periodic review and modification.” Kleinbart, supra, 604 A.2d at 866 . 1997See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, - U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2107 , 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995). . “[P]retrial detention orders ... are open to periodic review and modification.” Kleinbart, supra, 604 A.2d at 866 .	1	1
Jefferson v. United Statesgreen dc · 1978 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981 2 sentences 1981A Fifth Amendment Due Process claim based on pre-indictment delay is made “concrete and ripe for adjudication” not by a mere lapse of time, but by “proof of actual prejudice.” United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 , 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2048 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977); 1 Jefferson v. United States, 382 A.2d 1030, 1033 (D.C.App.1978). 1981A Fifth Amendment Due Process claim based on pre-indictment delay is made "concrete and ripe for adjudication" not by a mere lapse of time, but by "proof of actual prejudice." United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 , 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2048 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977);1 Jefferson v. United States, 382 A.2d 1030, 1033 (D.C.App.1978).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

Case	Cited	Years
Jackson v. United States green dc · 1979 2 sentences 1987Indeed, in Jackson, supra, this court, sitting en banc, reaffirmed the Duddles standard in the context of a challenge to the admissibility of identification evidence which was made, presumably, on due process grounds. 420 A.2d at 1205-06 . 1987Indeed, in Jackson, supra, this court, sitting en banc, reaffirmed the Duddles standard in the context of a challenge to the admissibility of identification evidence which was made, presumably, on due process grounds. 420 A.2d at 1205-06 .	2	1987–1987
Morrissey v. Brewer green scotus · 1972 2 sentences 1982The question remains what process was due. “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 , 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). 1982The question remains what process was due. “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 , 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).	1	1982–1982
United States v. Lovasco green scotus · 1977 2 sentences 1981A Fifth Amendment Due Process claim based on pre-indictment delay is made “concrete and ripe for adjudication” not by a mere lapse of time, but by “proof of actual prejudice.” United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 , 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2048 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977); 1 Jefferson v. United States, 382 A.2d 1030, 1033 (D.C.App.1978). 1981A Fifth Amendment Due Process claim based on pre-indictment delay is made “concrete and ripe for adjudication” not by a mere lapse of time, but by “proof of actual prejudice.” United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 , 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2048 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977); 1 Jefferson v. United States, 382 A.2d 1030, 1033 (D.C.App.1978).	1	1981–1981

Where else courts name it

DC 8 (1981–2020) CA 8 (1980–2016) TX 6 (1994–2023) CT 5 (2001–2001) IL 5 (1988–2022) WA 5 (2001–2018) WV 4 (1987–2009) IA 3 (2001–2023) AK 3 (1984–2017) FL 3 (1989–2012) MO 3 (1993–2012) TN 3 (2005–2023) NJ 2 (1971–1987) MA 2 (1980–2011) MS 2 (2006–2010) PA 2 (2011–2016) MN 2 (1977–1991) WI 2 (2002–2015) GA 2 (1985–2023)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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