provocation instruction in District of Columbia

2019If jurors believed appellant's account, and if what prevented them from acquitting him on the ground of self-defense was that they thought his grabbing of Campbell's shoulder or pushing of Campbell was provocation that caused him to forfeit his self-defense claim, they presumably would have convicted him of the lesser-included ADW offense and not of AWIKWA (firearm). 15 For that reason, too, we conclude that the court's giving of the provocation instruction, if error, was harmless; that is, we are satisfied that "the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to t

2019Stated differently, only upon a " 'bizarre reconstruction' of the evidence," Tyree v. United States , 942 A.2d 629 , 639 (D.C. 2008), could jurors have thought that appellant acted to ward off imminent harm to himself by shooting at Campbell but was not entitled to a self-defense claim because of the earlier shoulder-grab or push and the rule set out in the provocation instruction.

2019We know that the purpose of this right is to benefit the accused, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979), and that the right is at least as protective as the press and the public’s First Amendment right to public trial, Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984).

2019We know that the purpose of this right is to benefit the accused, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979), and that the right is at least as protective as the press and the public’s First Amendment right to public trial, Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984).

2019We know that the purpose of this right is to benefit the accused, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979), and that the right is at least as protective as the press and the public’s First Amendment right to public trial, Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984).

2019We know that the purpose of this right is to benefit the accused, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979), and that the right is at least as protective as the press and the public’s First Amendment right to public trial, Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984).

2019Appellant's final argument is that the trial court committed reversible error by giving, without a sufficient evidentiary basis, a provocation instruction that told the jury that "[o]ne who deliberately puts himself in a position where he has reason to believe that his presence will provoke trouble cannot claim self-defense." The court additionally instructed the jury that "if one, who is the aggressor or provokes a conflict, later withdraws from it in good faith and communicate[s] that withdrawal by words or actions, he may use deadly force to save himself from imminent danger or death or ser

2019Appellant’s final argument is that the trial court committed reversible error by giving, without a sufficient evidentiary basis, a provocation instruction that told the jury that “[o]ne who deliberately puts himself in a position where he has reason to believe that his presence will provoke trouble cannot claim self-defense.” The court additionally instructed the jury that “if one, who is the aggressor or provokes a conflict, later withdraws from it in good faith and communicate[s] that 14 The jury was instructed that one of the elements of AWIKWA, “which the [g]overnment must prove beyond a r

2022Amicus argues, however, that the provocation instruction the court gave, as well as this court’s case law on which it was based, strayed from what PDS and The video evidence that appellant reloaded his gun only after returning 10 momentarily to his car was evidence from which the jury could infer that the car was where appellant kept his weapon and his ammunition. 13 appellant assert are the controlling precedents: Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550 (1895) 11; Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271, 277, 283 (1894); and Wallace v. United States, 18 App. D.C. 152 (D.C.

2022Amicus argues, however, that the provocation instruction the court gave, as well as this court’s case law on which it was based, strayed from what PDS and The video evidence that appellant reloaded his gun only after returning 10 momentarily to his car was evidence from which the jury could infer that the car was where appellant kept his weapon and his ammunition. 13 appellant assert are the controlling precedents: Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550 (1895) 11; Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271, 277, 283 (1894); and Wallace v. United States, 18 App. D.C. 152 (D.C.

2022But we regard the provocation standard itself, articulated in Laney, as a valid extension of the “long . . . accepted” principle “that one cannot support a claim of self-defense by a self-generated necessity to [use potentially lethal force].” United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1231 (D.C.

2022But we regard the provocation standard itself, articulated in Laney, as a valid extension of the “long . . . accepted” principle “that one cannot support a claim of self-defense by a self-generated necessity to [use potentially lethal force].” United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1231 (D.C.

2016Even then, we will not reverse unless the defendant makes the additional showing of “either a miscarriage of justice, that is, actual innocence; or that the trial court’s error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” Mozee v. United States, 963 A.2d 151, 159 (D.C. 2009).

2015See, e.g., State v. Hawkins, 19 Conn. App. 609, 563 A.2d 745, 749 (1989) (holding that the provocation exception to the right to use force in self-defense "carries with it the requirement that the actor act with the specific intent to elicit the use of physical force by another person in order to cause physical injury or death to that person by, for example, retaliating with force against that person”); Model Penal Code § 3.04(2)(b)(i) (use of deadly force not justifiable when the defendant, "with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily injury, provoked the use of force against himself

2015See, e.g., State v. Hawkins, 19 Conn. App. 609, 563 A.2d 745, 749 (1989) (holding that the provocation exception to the right to use force in self-defense "carries with it the requirement that the actor act with the specific intent to elicit the use of physical force by another person in order to cause physical injury or death to that person by, for example, retaliating with force against that person”); Model Penal Code § 3.04(2)(b)(i) (use of deadly force not justifiable when the defendant, "with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily injury, provoked the use of force against himself

2014See Howard, 656 A.2d at 1118 (appellant’s single statement that the victim had shot at him in the past was “so cryptic [and] so devoid of details” that appellant was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to present a provocation defense).

1993See also Wilson v. United States, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 135, 136 , 198 F.2d 299, 300 (1952) (referring to “the exigencies of the occasion,” giving rise to entitlement to a self-defense instruction).

1993See also Wilson v. United States, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 135, 136 , 198 F.2d 299, 300 (1952) (referring to “the exigencies of the occasion,” giving rise to entitlement to a self-defense instruction).

1992"If it [charging on lesser included offense] is not requested by counsel, it is properly omitted by the trial judge....’’ Id.; see also United States v. Cooper, 812 F.2d 1283, 1288 (10th Cir.1987) ("In some limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for a trial court to give instructions sua sponte even though the choice as to instructions should ordinarily lie with the parties”); United States v. Seijo, 537 F.2d 694 , 698-99 n. 5 (2d Cir.1976) ("If the defense counsel does not request such a charge, its omission is not error”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1043 , 97 S.Ct. 745 , 50 L.Ed.2d 756 (19