366 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2026 37 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Goad v. Stategreen2 sentences2024The prejudice prong of the test is satisfied by showing a reasonable probability, i.e., a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 . - 12 - Courts need not approach the Strickland test in a specific order or even “address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” 466 U.S. at 697 ; see Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (stating that “failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basi 2020The prejudice prong of the test is satisfied by showing a reasonable probability, i.e., a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 . -4- Courts need not approach the Strickland test in a specific order or even “address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” 466 U.S. at 697 ; see also Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (stating that “failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient ba | 95 | 95 |
Overton v. Stategreen2 sentences2012A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 466 U.S. at 694; see also Overton v. State, 874 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn. 1994) (concluding that petitioner failed to establish that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different”). -17- Courts need not approach the Strickland test in a specific order or even “address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” 466 U.S. at 697; see also Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (stating that “failure to pr 2012A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 466 U.S. at 694 ; see also Overton v. State, 874 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn. 1994) (concluding that petitioner failed to establish that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different”). | 58 | 58 |
Vaughn v. Stategreen2 sentences2018To satisfy the prejudice prong of the test, the petitioner “must establish a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Vaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106, 116 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ). 2018To satisfy the prejudice prong of the test, the petitioner “must establish a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Vaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106, 116 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ). | 10 | 10 |
House v. Stategreen2 sentences2009The petitioner must establish “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” House v. State, 44 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996)). -6- As for the prejudice prong of the test, the Strickland Court stated: “The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 2008The petitioner must establish “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” House v. State, 44 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996)). -4- As for the prejudice prong of the test, the Strickland Court stated: “The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. | 5 | 5 |
Hicks v. Stategreen2 sentences2011“In cases involving a guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere, the petitioner must show ‘prejudice’ by demonstrating that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted upon going to trial.” Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tenn. Crim. 2011“In cases involving a guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere, the petitioner must show ‘prejudice’ by demonstrating that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted upon going to trial.” Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tenn. Crim. | 4 | 4 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2026The prejudice prong of the test is satisfied by showing a reasonable probability, i.e., a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 . 2026The prejudice prong of the test is satisfied by showing a reasonable probability, i.e., a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 . | 3 | 361 |
Baxter v. Rosegreen2 sentences2019The deficient performance prong of the test is satisfied by showing that “counsel’s acts or omissions were so serious as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 ; Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)). -8- The prejudice prong of the test is satisfied by showing a reasonable probability, i.e., a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 2017The deficient performance prong of the test is satisfied by showing that “counsel’s acts or omissions were so serious as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 ; Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)). -10- The prejudice prong of the test is satisfied by showing a reasonable probability, i.e., a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have bee | 3 | 3 |
Kimmelman v. Morrisongreen1 sentence2026Phillips v. State, 647 S.W.3d 389 , 403 (Tenn. 2022) (citing Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986)). | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Lockhartgreen1 sentence2015Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); House v. State, 44 S.W.3d 508, 516 (Tenn. 2001). | 1 | 1 |
Campbell v. Stategreen1 sentence2011Campbell v. State, 904 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tenn. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
Henley v. Stategreen1 sentence2011See Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 580 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Burns
green
1 sentence2025The Petitioner points to the post-conviction court’s quotation of Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 463 , in the deficiency-analysis portion of its order and its finding that “[trial counsel’s] failure to renew the inquiry by the trial court of [Juror Nine]’” deprived the Petitioner of a “fair trial and called into question the reliability of the outcome...” It appears that the post-conviction court mistakenly conflated the “reliability of the outcome” aspect of the prejudice prong with its analysis of the deficiency prong. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Momon v. State
green
1 sentence2018Momon, 18 S.W.3d at 157 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Wallace v. State
green
1 sentence2013The court specifically determined that “the prejudice prong of the analysis can [not] be resolved simply by reasoning that [the petitioner] had direct review on the sufficiency of the evidence alone.” Id. at 658 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Honeycutt
green
1 sentence2013Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.