law venue privilege in Florida

2004It also allows for a "uniformity of interpretation" and "prevents conflicting judicial rulings in different jurisdictions." Id.; see also Carlile, 354 So.2d at 364 ("Such a rule promotes orderly and uniform handling of state litigation and helps to minimize expenditure of public funds and manpower."); Triple "A" Enters., 387 So.2d at 943 ("The common law venue privilege allows for uniform interpretation by one court, thus promoting efficient and uniform rulings, and minimizing expenditure of effort and public funds.").

1982The common law venue privilege provides that, absent waiver or exception, “venue in civil actions brought against the state or one of its subdivisions properly lies in the county where the state, agency, or subdivision, maintains its principal headquarters.” Carlile , at 366.

2005We need not decide whether obiter dicta in Lottinger-Serraes v. Serraes, 774 So.2d 959, 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), adopting the Fourth District's view in " Kalodish v. South Fla. State Hosp., 536 So.2d 287, 288 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (affirming transfer of venue back to Leon County based on the common law venue privilege of a state agency to be sued in Leon County)" should be given effect in the present case.

2001See Kalodish v. South Fla. State Hosp., 536 So.2d 287, 288 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (affirming transfer of venue back to Leon County based on the common law venue privilege of a state agency to be sued in Leon County); Southeastern Office Supply and Furniture Co. v. Barley, 427 So.2d 1139, 1141 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) ("Presumably, the purposes of prohibiting the transferee court from changing venue back to the transferor court are to prevent a case from being shuttled back and forth and to prevent coordinate courts from effectively overruling each other.").

2004It also allows for a "uniformity of interpretation" and "prevents conflicting judicial rulings in different jurisdictions." Id.; see also Carlile, 354 So.2d at 364 ("Such a rule promotes orderly and uniform handling of state litigation and helps to minimize expenditure of public funds and manpower."); Triple "A" Enters., 387 So.2d at 943 ("The common law venue privilege allows for uniform interpretation by one court, thus promoting efficient and uniform rulings, and minimizing expenditure of effort and public funds.").

1983Florida Public Service Commission v. Triple "A" Enterprises, Inc., 387 So.2d 940 (Fla. 1980).

2005We need not decide whether obiter dicta in Lottinger-Serraes v. Serraes, 774 So.2d 959, 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), adopting the Fourth District's view in " Kalodish v. South Fla. State Hosp., 536 So.2d 287, 288 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (affirming transfer of venue back to Leon County based on the common law venue privilege of a state agency to be sued in Leon County)" should be given effect in the present case.

2005Our decision today rests squarely and exclusively on "the statutory prohibition against this sort of judicial ping pong." 774 So.2d at 961 .

2001See Kalodish v. South Fla. State Hosp., 536 So.2d 287, 288 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (affirming transfer of venue back to Leon County based on the common law venue privilege of a state agency to be sued in Leon County); Southeastern Office Supply and Furniture Co. v. Barley, 427 So.2d 1139, 1141 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) ("Presumably, the purposes of prohibiting the transferee court from changing venue back to the transferor court are to prevent a case from being shuttled back and forth and to prevent coordinate courts from effectively overruling each other.").

1988The order granting defendants’ motion to change venue sets forth the following chronology of events: Ms. Kalodish was injured in May 1981; her administrative claim pursuant to section 768.28, Florida Statutes, was denied in November 1981; the present actions were originally filed in Dade County and transferred to Leon County based on the common law venue privilege of a state agency; Kalodish then moved for and was granted transfer back to Broward on the authority of Keith v. Dykes, 430 So.2d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Keith was overruled in Department of Transportation v. Soldovere, 519 So.2d 61

1980In Department of Revenue v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Fort Myers, 256 So.2d 524, 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971), the court stated: The question to be answered in these cases may be said to be whether the state is the initial sword-wielder in the matter and whether the plaintiff's action is in the nature of a shield against the state's thrust.