clearly-erroneous standard in Georgia

2025See Norton v. State, 293 Ga. 332, 335 (2) n.4 ( 745 SE2d 630 ) (2013) (construing the trial court’s written order together with its oral pronouncement in determining that the court applied the proper standard in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress); Sherod v. State, 334 Ga. App. 314, 315 ( 779 SE2d 94 ) (2015) (explaining that the trial court made no written findings of fact in its order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress but that the court orally announced its factual findings at the conclusion of the hearing on the motion, and determining that review of those oral findings und

2025See Norton v. State, 293 Ga. 332, 335 (2) n.4 ( 745 SE2d 630 ) (2013) (construing the trial court’s written order together with its oral pronouncement in determining that the court applied the proper standard in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress); Sherod v. State, 334 Ga. App. 314, 315 ( 779 SE2d 94 ) (2015) (explaining that the trial court made no written findings of fact in its order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress but that the court orally announced its factual findings at the conclusion of the hearing on the motion, and determining that review of those oral findings und

2024Whether Georgia courts have correctly interpreted that statutory text in civil cases is not the subject of this concurrence. 32 231 Ga. 695, 695 (203 SE2d 860) (1974) (in a civil case, referencing the “clearly erroneous” language from Code § 81A-152 and then applying some version of an any-evidence standard); Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 586 (242 SE2d 101) (1978) (in reviewing an administrative proceeding, construing the clearly-erroneous standard of review in the predecessor to OCGA § 45-20-9 (m) 14 as equivalent to an any-evidence standard and relying in part on Brook Forest to do so).

2024Whether Georgia courts have correctly interpreted that statutory text in civil cases is not the subject of this concurrence. 32 231 Ga. 695, 695 (203 SE2d 860) (1974) (in a civil case, referencing the “clearly erroneous” language from Code § 81A-152 and then applying some version of an any-evidence standard); Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 586 (242 SE2d 101) (1978) (in reviewing an administrative proceeding, construing the clearly-erroneous standard of review in the predecessor to OCGA § 45-20-9 (m) 14 as equivalent to an any-evidence standard and relying in part on Brook Forest to do so).

2014(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) God’s Hope Builders v. Mount Zion Baptist Church of Oxford, Ga., 321 Ga. App. 435, 439 ( 741 SE2d 185 ) (2013).

2014(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) God’s Hope Builders v. Mount Zion Baptist Church of Oxford, Ga., 321 Ga. App. 435, 439 ( 741 SE2d 185 ) (2013).

2024Georgia law is thus clear—at least at present, and in the criminal context—that we “accept a trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous” and “[t]he clearly erroneous standard is 33 equivalent to the highly deferential ‘any evidence’ standard, which means we will not reverse a trial court’s factual findings if there is any evidence in the record to support them.” Morrell, 313 Ga. at 251 .

2024Georgia law is thus clear—at least at present, and in the criminal context—that we “accept a trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous” and “[t]he clearly erroneous standard is 35 equivalent to the highly deferential ‘any evidence’ standard, which means we will not reverse a trial court’s factual findings if there is any evidence in the record to support them.” Morrell, 313 Ga. at 251.

2025See Norton v. State, 293 Ga. 332, 335 (2) n.4 ( 745 SE2d 630 ) (2013) (construing the trial court’s written order together with its oral pronouncement in determining that the court applied the proper standard in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress); Sherod v. State, 334 Ga. App. 314, 315 ( 779 SE2d 94 ) (2015) (explaining that the trial court made no written findings of fact in its order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress but that the court orally announced its factual findings at the conclusion of the hearing on the motion, and determining that review of those oral findings und

2025See Norton v. State, 293 Ga. 332, 335 (2) n.4 ( 745 SE2d 630 ) (2013) (construing the trial court’s written order together with its oral pronouncement in determining that the court applied the proper standard in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress); Sherod v. State, 334 Ga. App. 314, 315 ( 779 SE2d 94 ) (2015) (explaining that the trial court made no written findings of fact in its order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress but that the court orally announced its factual findings at the conclusion of the hearing on the motion, and determining that review of those oral findings und

2024Specifically, in Johnson v. State, 233 Ga. 58, 58 ( 209 SE2d 629 ) (1974), in reviewing a trial court’s factual findings regarding an “alleged confession made . . . during an in-custody interrogation by a law enforcement officer,” we stated: “Factual and credibility determinations of this sort made by a trial judge after a suppression hearing must be accepted by appellate courts unless such determinations are clearly erroneous.”5 of fact, and to determine the truth when the evidence is conflicting; this court will not disturb their finding, which was approved by the trial judge, if there is an

2024Specifically, in Johnson v. State, 233 Ga. 58, 58 (209 SE2d 629) (1974), in reviewing a trial court’s factual findings regarding an “alleged confession made . . . during an in-custody interrogation by a law enforcement officer,” we stated: “Factual and credibility determinations of this sort made by a trial judge after a suppression hearing must be accepted by verdict, and we will not, in such a case, disturb the judgment of the court below.”); Mathews v. State, 104 Ga. 497 (30 SE 727) (1898) (explaining, where the defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial on the

2024See, e.g., Mondy v. Magnolia Advanced Materials, 303 Ga. 764, 772 ( 815 SE2d 70 ) (2018). 15 the trial court made no written findings of fact in its order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress but that the court orally announced its factual findings at the conclusion of the hearing on the motion, and determining that review of those oral findings under a clearly-erroneous standard was appropriate).

2024See, e.g., Mondy v. Magnolia Advanced Materials, Inc., 303 Ga. 764, 772 (815 SE2d 70) (2018). 15 standard in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress); Sherod v. State, 334 Ga. App. 314, 315 (779 SE2d 94) (2015) (explaining that the trial court made no written findings of fact in its order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress but that the court orally announced its factual findings at the conclusion of the hearing on the motion, and determining that review of those oral findings under a clearly-erroneous standard was appropriate).

2024See, e.g., Mondy v. Magnolia Advanced Materials, 303 Ga. 764, 772 ( 815 SE2d 70 ) (2018). 15 the trial court made no written findings of fact in its order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress but that the court orally announced its factual findings at the conclusion of the hearing on the motion, and determining that review of those oral findings under a clearly-erroneous standard was appropriate).

2024See, e.g., Mondy v. Magnolia Advanced Materials, Inc., 303 Ga. 764, 772 (815 SE2d 70) (2018). 15 standard in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress); Sherod v. State, 334 Ga. App. 314, 315 (779 SE2d 94) (2015) (explaining that the trial court made no written findings of fact in its order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress but that the court orally announced its factual findings at the conclusion of the hearing on the motion, and determining that review of those oral findings under a clearly-erroneous standard was appropriate).

2024But it had been enacted for almost five years by the time we decided Johnson, and it is curious that in setting out a “clearly erroneous” standard of review in that case, we did not even take note of the existence of the clearly-erroneous standard that already existed for civil cases in Georgia. 22 relating to the admissibility of a confession will be upheld on appeal.”) (citing Watson, 469 F2d at 365; Johnson, 233 Ga. at 58; and High v. State, 233 Ga. 153 (210 SE2d 673) (1974)); Crawford v. State, 245 Ga. 89, 90-91 (263 SE2d 131) (1980) (“Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court’s findings as

2024But it had been enacted for almost five years by the time we decided Johnson, and it is curious that in setting out a “clearly erroneous” standard of review in that case, we did not even take note of the existence of the clearly-erroneous standard that already existed for civil cases in Georgia. 22 relating to the admissibility of a confession will be upheld on appeal.”) (citing Watson, 469 F2d at 365; Johnson, 233 Ga. at 58; and High v. State, 233 Ga. 153 (210 SE2d 673) (1974)); Crawford v. State, 245 Ga. 89, 90-91 (263 SE2d 131) (1980) (“Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court’s findings as

2024But it had been enacted for almost five years by the time we decided Johnson, and it is curious that in setting out a “clearly erroneous” standard of review in that case, we did not even take note of the existence of the clearly-erroneous standard that already existed for civil cases in Georgia. 20 determinations and credibility relating to the admissibility of a confession will be upheld on appeal.”) (citing Watson, 469 F2d at 365; Johnson, 233 Ga. at 58 ; and High v. State, 233 Ga. 153 ( 210 SE2d 673 ) (1974)); Crawford v. State, 245 Ga. 89, 90-91 ( 263 SE2d 131 ) (1980) (“Unless clearly err

2024But it had been enacted for almost five years by the time we decided Johnson, and it is curious that in setting out a “clearly erroneous” standard of review in that case, we did not even take note of the existence of the clearly-erroneous standard that already existed for civil cases in Georgia. 22 relating to the admissibility of a confession will be upheld on appeal.”) (citing Watson, 469 F2d at 365; Johnson, 233 Ga. at 58; and High v. State, 233 Ga. 153 (210 SE2d 673) (1974)); Crawford v. State, 245 Ga. 89, 90-91 (263 SE2d 131) (1980) (“Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court’s findings as

2024And by expressly overruling Georgia cases “to the extent that [they] implie[d] that, in Georgia, the ‘any evidence’ rule differs from the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard,” Reed, 291 Ga. at 13 , Reed overruled more than just the offending portions of Vickers: it also had the effect of overruling, sub silentio, earlier cases from this Court to the extent such cases purported to apply a federal clearly-erroneous standard to a trial court’s factual findings in criminal cases.12 See Mobley v. State, 307 Ga. 59 , 75 n.20 ( 834 SE2d 785 ) (2019) (explaining how a decision of this Court can “amount to a

2024And by expressly overruling Georgia cases “to the extent that [they] implie[d] that, in Georgia, the ‘any evidence’ rule differs from the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard,” Reed, 291 Ga. at 13, Reed overruled more than just the offending portions of Vickers: it also had the effect of overruling, sub silentio, earlier cases from this Court to the extent such cases purported to apply a federal clearly-erroneous standard to a trial court’s factual findings in criminal cases. 12 See Mobley v. State, 307 Ga. 59, 75 n.20 (834 SE2d 785) (2019) (explaining how a decision of this Court can “amount[] to a s

2024But it had been enacted for almost five years by the time we decided Johnson, and it is curious that in setting out a “clearly erroneous” standard of review in that case, we did not even take note of the existence of the clearly-erroneous standard that already existed for civil cases in Georgia. 22 relating to the admissibility of a confession will be upheld on appeal.”) (citing Watson, 469 F2d at 365; Johnson, 233 Ga. at 58; and High v. State, 233 Ga. 153 (210 SE2d 673) (1974)); Crawford v. State, 245 Ga. 89, 90-91 (263 SE2d 131) (1980) (“Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court’s findings as

2024But it had been enacted for almost five years by the time we decided Johnson, and it is curious that in setting out a “clearly erroneous” standard of review in that case, we did not even take note of the existence of the clearly-erroneous standard that already existed for civil cases in Georgia. 22 relating to the admissibility of a confession will be upheld on appeal.”) (citing Watson, 469 F2d at 365; Johnson, 233 Ga. at 58; and High v. State, 233 Ga. 153 (210 SE2d 673) (1974)); Crawford v. State, 245 Ga. 89, 90-91 (263 SE2d 131) (1980) (“Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court’s findings as

2024But it had been enacted for almost five years by the time we decided Johnson, and it is curious that in setting out a “clearly erroneous” standard of review in that case, we did not even take note of the existence of the clearly-erroneous standard that already existed for civil cases in Georgia. 22 relating to the admissibility of a confession will be upheld on appeal.”) (citing Watson, 469 F2d at 365; Johnson, 233 Ga. at 58; and High v. State, 233 Ga. 153 (210 SE2d 673) (1974)); Crawford v. State, 245 Ga. 89, 90-91 (263 SE2d 131) (1980) (“Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court’s findings as

2024And by expressly overruling Georgia cases “to the extent that [they] implie[d] that, in Georgia, the ‘any evidence’ rule differs from the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard,” Reed, 291 Ga. at 13, Reed overruled more than just the offending portions of Vickers: it also had the effect of overruling, sub silentio, earlier cases from this Court to the extent such cases purported to apply a federal clearly-erroneous standard to a trial court’s factual findings in criminal cases. 12 See Mobley v. State, 307 Ga. 59, 75 n.20 (834 SE2d 785) (2019) (explaining how a decision of this Court can “amount[] to a s

2024We added gloss to—and ultimately sowed confusion about—the standard of review for trial court fact-findings in criminal cases in Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54 (440 SE2d 646) (1994).

2024We added gloss to—and ultimately sowed confusion about—the standard of review for trial court fact-findings in criminal cases in Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54 (440 SE2d 646) (1994).

2024And by expressly overruling Georgia cases “to the extent that [they] implie[d] that, in Georgia, the ‘any evidence’ rule differs from the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard,” Reed, 291 Ga. at 13 , Reed overruled more than just the offending portions of Vickers: it also had the effect of overruling, sub silentio, earlier cases from this Court to the extent such cases purported to apply a federal clearly-erroneous standard to a trial court’s factual findings in criminal cases.12 See Mobley v. State, 307 Ga. 59 , 75 n.20 ( 834 SE2d 785 ) (2019) (explaining how a decision of this Court can “amount to a

2024And by expressly overruling Georgia cases “to the extent that [they] implie[d] that, in Georgia, the ‘any evidence’ rule differs from the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard,” Reed, 291 Ga. at 13, Reed overruled more than just the offending portions of Vickers: it also had the effect of overruling, sub silentio, earlier cases from this Court to the extent such cases purported to apply a federal clearly-erroneous standard to a trial court’s factual findings in criminal cases. 12 See Mobley v. State, 307 Ga. 59, 75 n.20 (834 SE2d 785) (2019) (explaining how a decision of this Court can “amount[] to a s

2024But it had been enacted for almost five years by the time we decided Johnson, and it is curious that in setting out a “clearly erroneous” standard of review in that case, we did not even take note of the existence of the clearly-erroneous standard that already existed for civil cases in Georgia. 22 relating to the admissibility of a confession will be upheld on appeal.”) (citing Watson, 469 F2d at 365; Johnson, 233 Ga. at 58; and High v. State, 233 Ga. 153 (210 SE2d 673) (1974)); Crawford v. State, 245 Ga. 89, 90-91 (263 SE2d 131) (1980) (“Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court’s findings as

2024But it had been enacted for almost five years by the time we decided Johnson, and it is curious that in setting out a “clearly erroneous” standard of review in that case, we did not even take note of the existence of the clearly-erroneous standard that already existed for civil cases in Georgia. 22 relating to the admissibility of a confession will be upheld on appeal.”) (citing Watson, 469 F2d at 365; Johnson, 233 Ga. at 58; and High v. State, 233 Ga. 153 (210 SE2d 673) (1974)); Crawford v. State, 245 Ga. 89, 90-91 (263 SE2d 131) (1980) (“Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court’s findings as

2024Whether Georgia courts have correctly interpreted that statutory text in civil cases is not the subject of this concurrence. 32 231 Ga. 695, 695 (203 SE2d 860) (1974) (in a civil case, referencing the “clearly erroneous” language from Code § 81A-152 and then applying some version of an any-evidence standard); Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 586 (242 SE2d 101) (1978) (in reviewing an administrative proceeding, construing the clearly-erroneous standard of review in the predecessor to OCGA § 45-20-9 (m) 14 as equivalent to an any-evidence standard and relying in part on Brook Forest to do so).

2024Whether Georgia courts have correctly interpreted that statutory text in civil cases is not the subject of this concurrence. 32 231 Ga. 695, 695 (203 SE2d 860) (1974) (in a civil case, referencing the “clearly erroneous” language from Code § 81A-152 and then applying some version of an any-evidence standard); Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 586 (242 SE2d 101) (1978) (in reviewing an administrative proceeding, construing the clearly-erroneous standard of review in the predecessor to OCGA § 45-20-9 (m) 14 as equivalent to an any-evidence standard and relying in part on Brook Forest to do so).