8 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Olds v. Stategreen2 sentences2023See Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 69-76 (2) (786 SE2d 633) (2016) (clarifying previous case law to explain that while intent was always technically at issue when a defendant pleads not guilty, that does not mean that intent is an important issue in every such case). 2023See Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 69-76 (2) (786 SE2d 633) (2016) (clarifying previous case law to explain that while intent was always technically at issue when a defendant pleads not guilty, that does not mean that intent is an important issue in every such case). | 1 | 1 |
Garay v. Stategreen1 sentence2023See Garay, 314 Ga. at 21 (2). 23 Therefore, Greene’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of both constitutional due process and Georgia statutory law fails. 2. | 1 | 1 |
American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Zehgreen1 sentence2022See RCO Legal, P.S., Inc. v. Johnson, 347 Ga. App. 661, 672 (2) (c) (ii) ( 820 SE2d 491 ) (2018) (recognizing that questions of conditional privilege are generally reserved for a jury); Bryant v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., 311 Ga. App. 230, 235 (III) ( 715 SE2d 458 ) (2011) (noting that whether a statement is one of pure opinion is decided by a court only where it “is so unambiguous so as to bear only one reasonable interpretation”) (citation and quotation omitted). 6 This analysis also requires the trial court to resolve EPM’s “status as a ‘private’ or ‘public’ figure [to] determine[] the level o | 1 | 1 |
RCO LEGAL, P.S., INC. Et Al. v. JOHNSON.green2 sentences2022See RCO Legal, P.S., Inc. v. Johnson, 347 Ga. App. 661, 672 (2) (c) (ii) ( 820 SE2d 491 ) (2018) (recognizing that questions of conditional privilege are generally reserved for a jury); Bryant v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., 311 Ga. App. 230, 235 (III) ( 715 SE2d 458 ) (2011) (noting that whether a statement is one of pure opinion is decided by a court only where it “is so unambiguous so as to bear only one reasonable interpretation”) (citation and quotation omitted). 6 This analysis also requires the trial court to resolve EPM’s “status as a ‘private’ or ‘public’ figure [to] determine[] the level o 2022See RCO Legal, P.S., Inc. v. Johnson, 347 Ga. App. 661, 672 (2) (c) (ii) ( 820 SE2d 491 ) (2018) (recognizing that questions of conditional privilege are generally reserved for a jury); Bryant v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., 311 Ga. App. 230, 235 (III) ( 715 SE2d 458 ) (2011) (noting that whether a statement is one of pure opinion is decided by a court only where it “is so unambiguous so as to bear only one reasonable interpretation”) (citation and quotation omitted). 6 This analysis also requires the trial court to resolve EPM’s “status as a ‘private’ or ‘public’ figure [to] determine[] the level o | 1 | 1 |
Bryant v. Cox Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences2022See RCO Legal, P.S., Inc. v. Johnson, 347 Ga. App. 661, 672 (2) (c) (ii) ( 820 SE2d 491 ) (2018) (recognizing that questions of conditional privilege are generally reserved for a jury); Bryant v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., 311 Ga. App. 230, 235 (III) ( 715 SE2d 458 ) (2011) (noting that whether a statement is one of pure opinion is decided by a court only where it “is so unambiguous so as to bear only one reasonable interpretation”) (citation and quotation omitted). 6 This analysis also requires the trial court to resolve EPM’s “status as a ‘private’ or ‘public’ figure [to] determine[] the level o 2022See RCO Legal, P.S., Inc. v. Johnson, 347 Ga. App. 661, 672 (2) (c) (ii) ( 820 SE2d 491 ) (2018) (recognizing that questions of conditional privilege are generally reserved for a jury); Bryant v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., 311 Ga. App. 230, 235 (III) ( 715 SE2d 458 ) (2011) (noting that whether a statement is one of pure opinion is decided by a court only where it “is so unambiguous so as to bear only one reasonable interpretation”) (citation and quotation omitted). 6 This analysis also requires the trial court to resolve EPM’s “status as a ‘private’ or ‘public’ figure [to] determine[] the level o | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Jacksongreen1 sentence2009Anthony, supra, 282 Ga. at 459 (2). (d) Equally spurious is Greene’s assertion that trial counsel should have objected to the hearsay testimony of the emergency room physician who treated the victim. | 1 | 1 |
Ellis v. Stategreen2 sentences2006(Footnote omitted; emphasis in original.) Ellis v. State, 275 Ga. App. 881, 882 (1) ( 622 SE2d 89 ) (2005). 2006(Footnote omitted; emphasis in original.) Ellis v. State, 275 Ga. App. 881, 882 (1) ( 622 SE2d 89 ) (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Rogers v. Stategreen2 sentences1996See Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 725 (13), 386 S.E.2d 316 (1989); Rogers v. State, 256 Ga. 139, 145 (8), 344 S.E.2d 644 (1986). *134 Likewise, Greene also failed to make a threshold showing that his mental health would be an issue in either phase of trial. 1996See Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 725 (13), 386 S.E.2d 316 (1989); Rogers v. State, 256 Ga. 139, 145 (8), 344 S.E.2d 644 (1986). *134 Likewise, Greene also failed to make a threshold showing that his mental health would be an issue in either phase of trial. | 1 | 1 |
Isaacs v. Stategreen2 sentences1996See Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 725 (13), 386 S.E.2d 316 (1989); Rogers v. State, 256 Ga. 139, 145 (8), 344 S.E.2d 644 (1986). *134 Likewise, Greene also failed to make a threshold showing that his mental health would be an issue in either phase of trial. 1996See Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 725 (13), 386 S.E.2d 316 (1989); Rogers v. State, 256 Ga. 139, 145 (8), 344 S.E.2d 644 (1986). *134 Likewise, Greene also failed to make a threshold showing that his mental health would be an issue in either phase of trial. | 1 | 1 |
Finney v. Stategreen2 sentences1996See Finney v. State, 253 Ga. 346, 348 (5), 320 S.E.2d 147 (1984). 1996See Finney v. State, 253 Ga. 346, 348 (5), 320 S.E.2d 147 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cannongreen2 sentences1996State of Ga. v. Cannon, 214 Ga. App. 897, 899 ( 449 SE2d 519 ). 1996State of Ga. v. Cannon, 214 Ga. App. 897, 899 ( 449 SE2d 519 ). | 1 | 1 |
Foster v. Stategreen2 sentences1996See Foster v. State, 248 Ga. 409, 410 (3), 283 S.E.2d 873 (1981). 1996See Foster v. State, 248 Ga. 409, 410 (3), 283 S.E.2d 873 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Santobello v. New Yorkgreen1 sentence1995Furthermore, after Greene pled guilty and testified against his co-defendants, the State did not effectuate its part of the plea agreement, but rather failed to provide Greene with the opportunity to do that which would have ensured that his sentence be reduced. “[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257, 262 (92 SC 495, 30 LE2d 427) (1971). 2. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hough v. State
green
2 sentences2006But we note that after the trial court ruled on Greene’s motion, In Hough v. State, [ 279 Ga. 711 ( 620 SE2d 380 ) (2005),] the Supreme Court of Georgia held that where an individual has been involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities and there is probable cause to believe that the individual was driving under the influence of alcohol or other drugs, the constitutional infirmities at play in Cooper are no longer present, and the ensuing chemical testing is both warranted and constitutional. 2006But we note that after the trial court ruled on Greene’s motion, In Hough v. State, [ 279 Ga. 711 ( 620 SE2d 380 ) (2005),] the Supreme Court of Georgia held that where an individual has been involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities and there is probable cause to believe that the individual was driving under the influence of alcohol or other drugs, the constitutional infirmities at play in Cooper are no longer present, and the ensuing chemical testing is both warranted and constitutional. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Cooper v. State
green
2 sentences2006J., and Phipps, J., concur. 1 Greene’s motion to suppress the results of a blood alcohol test was granted by the trial court on the basis of Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282 ( 587 SE2d 605 ) (2003). 2006J., and Phipps, J., concur. 1 Greene’s motion to suppress the results of a blood alcohol test was granted by the trial court on the basis of Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282 ( 587 SE2d 605 ) (2003). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Cotton v. Toole
green
2 sentences1997Cotton v. Toole, 183 Ga. App. 547 ( 359 SE2d 368 ) (1987) (physical precedent only) (no evidence that entruster had actual knowledge of entrustee’s state of intoxication at time of entrustment). 1997Cotton v. Toole, 183 Ga. App. 547 ( 359 SE2d 368 ) (1987) (physical precedent only) (no evidence that entruster had actual knowledge of entrustee’s state of intoxication at time of entrustment). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.