8 Georgia opinions name it 1 courts 1997–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
TROP, INC. Et Al. v. CITY OF BROOKHAVEN Et Al.green2 sentences2024See also Maxim Cabaret, 304 Ga. at 193 (“The City’s prohibition of alcohol in nude dancing establishments thus meets the first prong of the Paramount Pictures test because it furthers the important government interests of attempting to preserve the quality of urban life, and reduc[ing] criminal activity and prevent[ing] the deterioration of neighborhoods.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Oasis Goodtime Emporium, 297 Ga. at 525 (addressing a challenge under the Georgia Constitution to a regulation prohibiting alcohol in sexually oriented businesses which the City enacted “minimize and cont 2024See also Maxim Cabaret, 304 Ga. at 193 (“The City’s prohibition of alcohol in nude dancing establishments thus meets the first prong of the Paramount Pictures test because it furthers the important government interests of attempting to preserve the quality of urban life, and reduc[ing] criminal activity and prevent[ing] the deterioration of neighborhoods.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Oasis Goodtime Emporium, 297 Ga. at 525 (addressing a challenge under the Georgia Constitution to a regulation prohibiting alcohol in sexually oriented businesses which the City enacted “minimize and cont | 5 | 6 |
Goldrush II v. City of Mariettagreen2 sentences2024See Goldrush II, 267 Ga. at 690 (3) (explaining, before applying the Paramount Pictures test to a challenge under both the United States and Georgia Constitutions, that the “application of our tripartite Paramount Pictures test or the First Amendment analytical framework from which it is derived remains appropriate for content-neutral legislation”); see also id. at 690 (3) n.8 (“The Paramount Pictures three-pronged study of statutes and ordinances to determine whether the free expression guaranty of the Georgia Constitution has been violated is derived from the analytical framework applied by 2024See Goldrush II, 267 Ga. at 690 (3) (explaining, before applying the Paramount Pictures test to a challenge under both the United States and Georgia Constitutions, that the “application of our tripartite Paramount Pictures test or the First Amendment analytical framework from which it is derived remains appropriate for content-neutral legislation”); see also id. at 690 (3) n.8 (“The Paramount Pictures three-pronged study of statutes and ordinances to determine whether the free expression guaranty of the Georgia Constitution has been violated is derived from the analytical framework applied by | 4 | 5 |
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Busbeegreen2 sentences2015The Paramount Pictures test requires that an incidental restriction of protected speech be no greater than essential to further the important government interest, not no lesser. *529 See 250 Ga. at 256 . 2015The Paramount Pictures test requires that an incidental restriction of protected speech be no greater than essential to further the important government interest, not no lesser. *529 See 250 Ga. at 256 . | 3 | 3 |
Combs v. TEXAS ENTERTAINMENT ASSOCIATION, INC.green2 sentences2024See Combs, 347 SW3d at 288 (concluding that the State’s interest in “reducing the secondary effects of adult businesses” by creating a “disincentive” on the combination of nude dancing and alcohol was “unrelated to the suppression of free expression”); Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, 297 Ga. at 525 (3) (c) (1) (concluding that an ordinance prohibiting the combination of even semi-nude dancing and alcohol satisfied the second and third prongs of the Paramount Pictures test). 2024See Combs, 347 SW3d at 288 (concluding that the State’s interest in “reducing the secondary effects of adult businesses” by creating a “disincentive” on the combination of nude dancing and alcohol was “unrelated to the suppression of free expression”); Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, 297 Ga. at 525 (3) (c) (1) (concluding that an ordinance prohibiting the combination of even semi-nude dancing and alcohol satisfied the second and third prongs of the Paramount Pictures test). | 2 | 2 |
Chambers v. Peach County, Ga.green2 sentences2024See also Maxim Cabaret, 304 Ga. at 193 (“The City’s prohibition of alcohol in nude dancing establishments thus meets the first prong of the Paramount Pictures test because it furthers the important government interests of attempting to preserve the quality of urban life, and reduc[ing] criminal activity and prevent[ing] the deterioration of neighborhoods.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Oasis Goodtime Emporium, 297 Ga. at 525 (addressing a challenge under the Georgia Constitution to a regulation prohibiting alcohol in sexually oriented businesses which the City enacted “minimize and cont 2024See also Maxim Cabaret, 304 Ga. at 193 (“The City’s prohibition of alcohol in nude dancing establishments thus meets the first prong of the Paramount Pictures test because it furthers the important government interests of attempting to preserve the quality of urban life, and reduc[ing] criminal activity and prevent[ing] the deterioration of neighborhoods.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Oasis Goodtime Emporium, 297 Ga. at 525 (addressing a challenge under the Georgia Constitution to a regulation prohibiting alcohol in sexually oriented businesses which the City enacted “minimize and cont | 2 | 2 |
Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, Inc., D/B/A Oasis v. City of Doravillegreen2 sentences2024See Combs, 347 SW3d at 288 (concluding that the State’s interest in “reducing the secondary effects of adult businesses” by creating a “disincentive” on the combination of nude dancing and alcohol was “unrelated to the suppression of free expression”); Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, 297 Ga. at 525 (3) (c) (1) (concluding that an ordinance prohibiting the combination of even semi-nude dancing and alcohol satisfied the second and third prongs of the Paramount Pictures test). 2024See Combs, 347 SW3d at 288 (concluding that the State’s interest in “reducing the secondary effects of adult businesses” by creating a “disincentive” on the combination of nude dancing and alcohol was “unrelated to the suppression of free expression”); Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, 297 Ga. at 525 (3) (c) (1) (concluding that an ordinance prohibiting the combination of even semi-nude dancing and alcohol satisfied the second and third prongs of the Paramount Pictures test). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Millergreen2 sentences2015As we explained in Grady , however, this Court’s occasional statements suggesting that the 1983 Georgia Constitution “provides even broader protection” than the First Amendment, which originated in State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 671 ( 398 SE2d 547 ) (1990), have not been supported by “any discussion of the text, history, or case law regarding the protection of free speech provided in the 1983 or previous Georgia Constitutions.” Grady, 289 Ga. at 728-729 . 2015As we explained in Grady , however, this Court’s occasional statements suggesting that the 1983 Georgia Constitution “provides even broader protection” than the First Amendment, which originated in State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 671 ( 398 SE2d 547 ) (1990), have not been supported by “any discussion of the text, history, or case law regarding the protection of free speech provided in the 1983 or previous Georgia Constitutions.” Grady, 289 Ga. at 728-729 . | 2 | 2 |
Statesboro Publishing Co. v. City of Sylvaniagreen2 sentences2015But we see no need to reconsider our precedents on this point in this case, because as we explain below, even treating nude dancing as protected speech, Doraville’s regulations are constitutional. 12 Inverting Doraville’s argument that the Georgia Constitution provides less free speech protection than the First Amendment, see footnote 11 above, Oasis argues that the state Constitution provides more free speech protection than the federal Constitution, and in particular that the third part of the Paramount Pictures test should be replaced with the “least restrictive means” requirement adopted i 2015But we see no need to reconsider our precedents on this point in this case, because as we explain below, even treating nude dancing as protected speech, Doraville’s regulations are constitutional. 12 Inverting Doraville’s argument that the Georgia Constitution provides less free speech protection than the First Amendment, see footnote 11 above, Oasis argues that the state Constitution provides more free speech protection than the federal Constitution, and in particular that the third part of the Paramount Pictures test should be replaced with the “least restrictive means” requirement adopted i | 2 | 2 |
Gravely v. Bacongreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., Gravely, 263 Ga. at 205 ; Goldrush II, 267 Ga. at 692-693 . 2024See, e.g., Gravely, 263 Ga. at 205 ; Goldrush II, 267 Ga. at 692-693 . | 1 | 3 |
Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincentgreen2 sentences2024See also Maxim Cabaret, 304 Ga. at 193 (“The City’s prohibition of alcohol in nude dancing establishments thus meets the first prong of the Paramount Pictures test because it furthers the important government interests of attempting to preserve the quality of urban life, and reduc[ing] criminal activity and prevent[ing] the deterioration of neighborhoods.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Oasis Goodtime Emporium, 297 Ga. at 525 (addressing a challenge under the Georgia Constitution to a regulation prohibiting alcohol in sexually oriented businesses which the City enacted “minimize and cont 2024See also Maxim Cabaret, 304 Ga. at 193 (“The City’s prohibition of alcohol in nude dancing establishments thus meets the first prong of the Paramount Pictures test because it furthers the important government interests of attempting to preserve the quality of urban life, and reduc[ing] criminal activity and prevent[ing] the deterioration of neighborhoods.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Oasis Goodtime Emporium, 297 Ga. at 525 (addressing a challenge under the Georgia Constitution to a regulation prohibiting alcohol in sexually oriented businesses which the City enacted “minimize and cont | 1 | 1 |
United States v. O'Briengreen2 sentences2015Accordingly, we will apply the Paramount Pictures test. [13] 13 City of Erie (and Barnes) applied the three-part First Amendment test for reviewing content-neutral regulations that was developed in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 ( 88 SCt 1673 , 20 LE2d 672) (1968) — which is the test this Court adopted in Paramount Pictures for analysis of this sort of free speech issue under the Georgia Constitution. 2015Accordingly, we will apply the Paramount Pictures test. [13] 13 City of Erie (and Barnes) applied the three-part First Amendment test for reviewing content-neutral regulations that was developed in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 ( 88 SCt 1673 , 20 LE2d 672) (1968) — which is the test this Court adopted in Paramount Pictures for analysis of this sort of free speech issue under the Georgia Constitution. | 1 | 1 |
Ambassador Books & Video, Inc. Allan Dunlap, Doing Business as United Arcade v. City of Little Rock, Arkansasgreen2 sentences1997Each council member averred that the studies were "relevant to the City of Marietta, the problems faced by the City of Marietta and the problems addressed by the Ordinance." Appellants Tudor and Cyprus Lounge assert that the trial court's finding, implicit in its application of the Paramount Pictures test, that the ordinance was content-neutral was erroneous in light of evidence that the mayor and several council members expressed a desire in published reports to eliminate nude dancing establishments from Marietta. "`[O]nly the clearest proof could suffice to establish the unconstitutionality 1997Each council member averred that the studies were "relevant to the City of Marietta, the problems faced by the City of Marietta and the problems addressed by the Ordinance." Appellants Tudor and Cyprus Lounge assert that the trial court's finding, implicit in its application of the Paramount Pictures test, that the ordinance was content-neutral was erroneous in light of evidence that the mayor and several council members expressed a desire in published reports to eliminate nude dancing establishments from Marietta. "`[O]nly the clearest proof could suffice to establish the unconstitutionality | 1 | 1 |
Flemming v. Nestorgreen2 sentences1997Each council member averred that the studies were "relevant to the City of Marietta, the problems faced by the City of Marietta and the problems addressed by the Ordinance." Appellants Tudor and Cyprus Lounge assert that the trial court's finding, implicit in its application of the Paramount Pictures test, that the ordinance was content-neutral was erroneous in light of evidence that the mayor and several council members expressed a desire in published reports to eliminate nude dancing establishments from Marietta. "`[O]nly the clearest proof could suffice to establish the unconstitutionality 1997Each council member averred that the studies were "relevant to the City of Marietta, the problems faced by the City of Marietta and the problems addressed by the Ordinance." Appellants Tudor and Cyprus Lounge assert that the trial court's finding, implicit in its application of the Paramount Pictures test, that the ordinance was content-neutral was erroneous in light of evidence that the mayor and several council members expressed a desire in published reports to eliminate nude dancing establishments from Marietta. "`[O]nly the clearest proof could suffice to establish the unconstitutionality | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Grady v. UNIFIED GOV'T OF ATHENS-CLARKE
green
2 sentences2015As we explained in Grady , however, this Court’s occasional statements suggesting that the 1983 Georgia Constitution “provides even broader protection” than the First Amendment, which originated in State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 671 ( 398 SE2d 547 ) (1990), have not been supported by “any discussion of the text, history, or case law regarding the protection of free speech provided in the 1983 or previous Georgia Constitutions.” Grady, 289 Ga. at 728-729 . 2015As we explained in Grady , however, this Court’s occasional statements suggesting that the 1983 Georgia Constitution “provides even broader protection” than the First Amendment, which originated in State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 671 ( 398 SE2d 547 ) (1990), have not been supported by “any discussion of the text, history, or case law regarding the protection of free speech provided in the 1983 or previous Georgia Constitutions.” Grady, 289 Ga. at 728-729 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015Accordingly, we will apply the Paramount Pictures test. 19 Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41 ( 106 SCt 925 , 89 LE2d 29) (1986), to show that the ordinance is designed to serve a government interest]. 2015Accordingly, we will apply the Paramount Pictures test. 19 Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41 ( 106 SCt 925 , 89 LE2d 29) (1986), to show that the ordinance is designed to serve a government interest]. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Chambers v. Peach County
green
2 sentences1997Since the ordinance amendment was content-neutral, we apply the tripartite Paramount Pictures test to determine whether the restriction imposed on expression passes constitutional muster: (1) Does the ordinance further an important governmental interest? (2) Is that interest unrelated to the suppression of speech? and (3) Is the legislation an incidental restriction of speech no greater than essential to further the important governmental interest? *357 Chambers v. Peach County, supra, 266 Ga. at 319 , 467 S.E.2d 519 . 1997Since the ordinance amendment was content-neutral, we apply the tripartite Paramount Pictures test to determine whether the restriction imposed on expression passes constitutional muster: (1) Does the ordinance further an important governmental interest? (2) Is that interest unrelated to the suppression of speech? and (3) Is the legislation an incidental restriction of speech no greater than essential to further the important governmental interest? *357 Chambers v. Peach County, supra, 266 Ga. at 319 , 467 S.E.2d 519 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.