advantage hearing in Illinois

1994App. 3d 31, 32 , 580 N.E.2d 903, 904 .) Our supreme court instructs us that "[t]he trial judge is ordinarily best situated to tailor a sentence or other disposition to the needs of the case.” (People v. Hicks (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 366, 375 , 462 N.E.2d 473, 477 .) The trial judge has the advantage of hearing and observing, during trial and during the hearing in aggravation and mitigation, those factors necessary to his determinations.

1994App. 3d 31, 32 , 580 N.E.2d 903, 904 .) Our supreme court instructs us that "[t]he trial judge is ordinarily best situated to tailor a sentence or other disposition to the needs of the case.” (People v. Hicks (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 366, 375 , 462 N.E.2d 473, 477 .) The trial judge has the advantage of hearing and observing, during trial and during the hearing in aggravation and mitigation, those factors necessary to his determinations.

1994(People v. Craig (1977), 47 Ill.

1994App. 3d 31, 32 , 580 N.E.2d 903, 904 .) Our supreme court instructs us that "[t]he trial judge is ordinarily best situated to tailor a sentence or other disposition to the needs of the case.” (People v. Hicks (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 366, 375 , 462 N.E.2d 473, 477 .) The trial judge has the advantage of hearing and observing, during trial and during the hearing in aggravation and mitigation, those factors necessary to his determinations.

1958This rule was recognized and well stated in the case of Floyd v. Smith’s Estate, 320 Ill.

1949(Fekete v. Fekete, 323 Ill. 468 .) The expression of this court in the case of In Re Will of Barrie, 393 Ill. 111 , and Fekete v. Fekete that the opinions of experts with reference to handwriting are at best weak, in view of the great opportunity for error and temptation to form opinions favorable to the party calling the witness, is clearly demonstrated by this case.

1949(Fekete v. Fekete, 323 Ill. 468 .) The expression of this court in the case of In Re Will of Barrie, 393 Ill. 111 , and Fekete v. Fekete that the opinions of experts with reference to handwriting are at best weak, in view of the great opportunity for error and temptation to form opinions favorable to the party calling the witness, is clearly demonstrated by this case.

1938(People v. Hammond, 356 Ill. 581 .) Respondent is entitled to the advantage of the presumption that he acted in good faith and with honest motives until the contrary is clearly established, and the court will not infer fraud on his part unless the facts and circumstances are inconsistent with an honest purpose and a pure intention.

1928Gordon v. Reynolds, 114 Ill. 118 , and other cases following the rule there announced are cited.

1925Co. v. Kirby, 225 U. S. 155 : “The broad purpose of the Commerce Act was to compel the establishment of reasonable rates and their uniform application.” And the court added what seems applicable here: “That purpose would be defeated if sanction be given to a special contract by which any such advantage is given to a particular shipper as that contracted for by the defendant in error.” There being no specific tariff in the published schedule in question, to cover the privilege of unloading and reloading as aforesaid, it would be tantamount to granting defendant a special privilege and favorable

1920(Hubbard v. Hubbard, 198 Ill. 621 .) The court had the advantage of hearing the testimony of the witnesses and of seeing their demeanor on the witness stand while testifying, and to substitute our judgment, if we had a different view of the case, for that of the circuit court is not permissible under the state of the evidence as we find it.

1905Hahl v. Brooks, 213 Ill. 134 .