constructive fraud doctrine in Illinois

2003Stathis , 295 Ill.

2003Stathis, 295 Ill.

1998Failure to cite any authority in support of an argument constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); Wasleff v. Dever , 194 Ill.

1998Failure to cite any authority in support of an argument constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal. 155 111. 2d R. 341(e)(7); Wasleff v. Dever, 194 Ill.

2025App. 3d at 652 . ¶ 24 The elements of a constructive fraud claim are: “(1) a fiduciary relationship; (2) a breach of the duties that are imposed as a matter of law because of that relationship; and (3) damages.” Kovac v. Barron, 2014 IL App (2d) 121100, ¶ 64 .

2025Accordingly, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the proximate cause element of plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim, and summary judgment in defendant’s favor on the claim was warranted. ¶ 43 Having concluded that summary judgment was properly entered in defendants’ favor on the breach of fiduciary duty claim, we necessarily conclude that summary judgment was likewise properly entered in defendants’ favor on the constructive fraud claim (see D’Attomo v. Baumbeck, 2015 IL App (2d) 140865 , ¶ 74 (to prove constructive fraud, a plaintiff must establish a fiduciary relationshi

2012Id.

1987Director of Finance v. YWCA (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 561 , 387 N.E.2d 305 , one of the two cases relied upon by the trial judge herein, but before doing so, a brief review of the history of the constructive fraud doctrine as it applies to real property assessments will serve to illustrate not only its origins but also its continued vitality. 1 Judicial abstention from reviewing the action of assessors has its roots in article IX, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution of 1870, which provided: “The general assembly shall provide such revenue as may be needed by levying a tax, by valuation, so that e

1987Director of Finance v. YWCA (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 561 , 387 N.E.2d 305 , one of the two cases relied upon by the trial judge herein, but before doing so, a brief review of the history of the constructive fraud doctrine as it applies to real property assessments will serve to illustrate not only its origins but also its continued vitality. 1 Judicial abstention from reviewing the action of assessors has its roots in article IX, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution of 1870, which provided: “The general assembly shall provide such revenue as may be needed by levying a tax, by valuation, so that e

1987For example, the principle again came under direct attack in La Salle National Bank v. County of Cook (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 318 , 312 N.E.2d 252 , in which the taxpayers argued that the change in the language of article IX of the 1970 Constitution, when compared with the revenue provision of the 1870 Constitution, eliminated the constructive fraud restriction on judicial review of the actions of the assessor.

1987For example, the principle again came under direct attack in La Salle National Bank v. County of Cook (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 318 , 312 N.E.2d 252 , in which the taxpayers argued that the change in the language of article IX of the 1970 Constitution, when compared with the revenue provision of the 1870 Constitution, eliminated the constructive fraud restriction on judicial review of the actions of the assessor.

1987(In re Application of Rosewell (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 311, 318 , 478 N.E.2d 343 ; People v. International Business Machines Corp. (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 287, 292-93 , 432 N.E.2d 867 .) It is abundantly clear, therefore, that the constructive fraud doctrine is not only alive but that it still retains its full pristine vigor.

1987(In re Application of Rosewell (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 311, 318 , 478 N.E.2d 343 ; People v. International Business Machines Corp. (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 287, 292-93 , 432 N.E.2d 867 .) It is abundantly clear, therefore, that the constructive fraud doctrine is not only alive but that it still retains its full pristine vigor.

1987(In re Application of Rosewell (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 311, 318 , 478 N.E.2d 343 ; People v. International Business Machines Corp. (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 287, 292-93 , 432 N.E.2d 867 .) It is abundantly clear, therefore, that the constructive fraud doctrine is not only alive but that it still retains its full pristine vigor.

1987(In re Application of Rosewell (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 311, 318 , 478 N.E.2d 343 ; People v. International Business Machines Corp. (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 287, 292-93 , 432 N.E.2d 867 .) It is abundantly clear, therefore, that the constructive fraud doctrine is not only alive but that it still retains its full pristine vigor.

1987For example, in Spencer & Gardner v. People (1873), 68 Ill. 510 , the court stated: “The assessor is the officer who has been provided by the legislature for fixing the valuation of property for the purpose of taxation.

1987To do so, would seem to be to arrogate the power of ascertaining the value of property for taxation, which ascertainment of value, the constitution declares, shall be by some person or persons designated by the General Assembly, and not otherwise.” ( 68 Ill. 510, 512 .) The adoption of our 1970 Constitution did nothing to abate questions concerning the continued viability of the constructive fraud doctrine.