fourth affirmative defense in Illinois

2016Equitable estoppel is an equitable doctrine “invoked to prevent fraud and injustice” (Carey v. City of Rockford, 134 Ill.

2016Equitable estoppel is an equitable doctrine “invoked to prevent fraud and injustice” (Carey v. City of Rockford, 134 Ill.

2014App. 3d 569, 573 (2011); Vanlandingham v. Ivanow, 246 Ill.

2014App. 3d 569, 573 (2011); Vanlandingham v. Ivanow, 246 Ill.

2014As such, the first three affirmative defenses were properly dismissed by the trial court. ¶ 62 Finally, the fourth affirmative defense asserted by Kulbarsh consists of statements that "[a]fter the written contract was voided" by the nonnegotiable check, Rohr Burg submitted checks that "cleared," such that Kulbarsh's "loan to the bank had been repaid, and the Rohr Burg check made payable to [Kulbarsh] for the funds that he had used to buy the vehicle had cleared." This affirmative defense states that after these payments, "title to the vehicle was sent by [American Eagle] Bank to Rohr Burg, and

2014As such, the first three affirmative defenses were properly dismissed by the trial court. ¶ 62 Finally, the fourth affirmative defense asserted by Kulbarsh consists of statements that “[a]fter the written contract was voided” by the nonnegotiable check, Rohr Burg submitted checks that “cleared,” such that Kulbarsh’s “loan to the bank had been repaid, and the Rohr Burg check made payable to [Kulbarsh] for the funds that he had used to buy the vehicle had cleared.” This affirmative defense states that after these payments, “title to the vehicle was sent by [American Eagle] Bank to Rohr Burg, and

2014A claim of lack of proximate cause neither concedes the truthfulness of the plaintiff's claim nor asserts a new matter to defeat the plaintiff's claim; instead, it attacks the sufficiency of that claim." Korando v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 159 Ill. 2d 335, 344 (1994). ¶ 64 Here, the contentions in the fourth affirmative defense do not assert a new matter to defeat Rohr Burg's apparent right to recover.

2014A claim of lack of proximate cause neither concedes the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s claim nor asserts a new matter to defeat the plaintiff’s claim; instead, it attacks the sufficiency of that claim.” Korando v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 159 Ill. 2d 335, 344 (1994). ¶ 64 Here, the contentions in the fourth affirmative defense do not assert a new matter to defeat Rohr Burg’s apparent right to recover.

2021See Cathay Bank v. Accetturo, 2016 IL App (1st) 152783, ¶ 2 (a notice provision with an acceleration clause in a mortgage is a condition precedent which a lender must comply with in order to have a right to file an action to recover possession of a secured property); Hartmann Realtors v. Biffar, 2014 IL App (5th) 130543, ¶ 20 (an affirmative defense gives color -3- 1-20-0541 to the plaintiff’s claim but asserts new matter which defeats the claim).

2021See Cathay Bank, 2016 IL App (1st) 152783, ¶ 2 (a notice provision with an acceleration clause in a mortgage is a condition precedent which a lender must comply with in order to have a right to file an action to recover possession of a secured property); Hartmann Realtors, 2014 IL App (5th) 130543, ¶ 20 (an affirmative defense gives color to the plaintiff’s claim but asserts new matter which defeats the claim).

2021See Cathay Bank v. Accetturo, 2016 IL App (1st) 152783, ¶ 2 (a notice provision with an acceleration clause in a mortgage is a condition precedent which a lender must comply with in order to have a right to file an action to recover possession of a secured property); Hartmann Realtors v. Biffar, 2014 IL App (5th) 130543, ¶ 20 (an affirmative defense gives color -3- 1-20-0541 to the plaintiff’s claim but asserts new matter which defeats the claim).

2021See Cathay Bank, 2016 IL App (1st) 152783, ¶ 2 (a notice provision with an acceleration clause in a mortgage is a condition precedent which a lender must comply with in order to have a right to file an action to recover possession of a secured property); Hartmann Realtors, 2014 IL App (5th) 130543, ¶ 20 (an affirmative defense gives color to the plaintiff’s claim but asserts new matter which defeats the claim).

1976This does not appear to raise a “jurisdictional” question, i.e., a question whether the FEPC has the power and authority to hear the “class of cases to which the particular case belongs” (see Pocahontas Mining Co. v. Industrial Com., 301 Ill. 462,474 (1922).