title-object clause in Michigan

2019Prior to the law’s effective date, we said that the law violated this constitutional requirement, Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 PA 227 (Question 1), 396 Mich 123 (1976), but after the effective date we went on to offer answers to the remaining questions, Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 PA 227 (Questions 2-10), 396 Mich 465 (1975).

1983This 1975 law did not go into effect because the Political Reform Act, 1975 PA 227 , of which the lobby law was a part, was held to violate the title-object clause of the Michigan Constitution. 2 In the advisory opinion rendered on March 29, 1976, and reported in 396 Mich 123 , the Supreme Court held that statutes found unconstitutional for violation of the title-object clause 3 are not sever-able and, therefore, the whole act was void.

2019Prior to the law’s effective date, we said that the law violated this constitutional requirement, Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 PA 227 (Question 1), 396 Mich 123 (1976), but after the effective date we went on to offer answers to the remaining questions, Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 PA 227 (Questions 2-10), 396 Mich 465 (1975).

1983This 1975 law did not go into effect because the Political Reform Act, 1975 PA 227 , of which the lobby law was a part, was held to violate the title-object clause of the Michigan Constitution. 2 In the advisory opinion rendered on March 29, 1976, and reported in 396 Mich 123 , the Supreme Court held that statutes found unconstitutional for violation of the title-object clause 3 are not sever-able and, therefore, the whole act was void.

2005Also, our Supreme Court has stated in the context of a Title-Object Clause issue that “ ‘all possible presumptions should be afforded to find constitutionality.’” Id. at 690 , quoting Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294 , 389 Mich 441, 464 ; 208 NW2d 469 (1973).

2005Legislation does not violate the Title-Object Clause merely because “it contains more than one means of attaining its primary object....” Pohutski, supra at 691 .

1990Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294 , 389 Mich 441, 467 ; 208 NW2d 469 (1973), citing People v Carey, 382 Mich 285 ; 170 NW2d 145 (1969).

1990Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294 , 389 Mich 441, 467 ; 208 NW2d 469 (1973), citing People v Carey, 382 Mich 285 ; 170 NW2d 145 (1969).

2019Prior to the law’s effective date, we said that the law violated this constitutional requirement, Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 PA 227 (Question 1), 396 Mich 123 (1976), but after the effective date we went on to offer answers to the remaining questions, Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 PA 227 (Questions 2-10), 396 Mich 465 (1975).

2019Prior to the law’s effective date, we said that the law violated this constitutional requirement, Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 PA 227 (Question 1), 396 Mich 123 (1976), but after the effective date we went on to offer answers to the remaining questions, Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 PA 227 (Questions 2-10), 396 Mich 465 (1975).

2014“When assessing a title-object challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, all possible presumptions should be afforded to find constitutionality.” Lawnichak v Dep’t of Treasury, 214 Mich App 618, 620 ; 543 NW2d 359 (1995).

2014“When assessing a title-object challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, all possible presumptions should be afforded to find constitutionality.” Lawnichak v Dep’t of Treasury, 214 Mich App 618, 620 ; 543 NW2d 359 (1995).

1990The trial court relied on Kuhn v Dep’t of Treasury, 384 Mich 378 ; 183 NW2d 796 (1971), when it held that the purpose for which the revenues may be spent is another provision which is germane, auxiliary or incidental to the object of the act and again we must agree.

1990The trial court relied on Kuhn v Dep’t of Treasury, 384 Mich 378 ; 183 NW2d 796 (1971), when it held that the purpose for which the revenues may be spent is another provision which is germane, auxiliary or incidental to the object of the act and again we must agree.

1981"In Kriger, supra, the Supreme Court had earlier voided an act because its title did not indicate the scope of one of its sections, Le., a violation of the title-object rule.

1980In Kriger, supra, the Supreme Court had earlier voided an act because its title did not indicate the scope of one of its sections, i.e., a violation of the title-object rule.

1980Defendant’s reliance on People v Stanton, 400 Mich 192 ; 253 NW2d 650 (1977), is misplaced.

1980Defendant’s reliance on People v Stanton, 400 Mich 192 ; 253 NW2d 650 (1977), is misplaced.

2024Id.

2024See id.; Ray Twp , 226 Mich App at 731 .11 We conclude that the trial court did not err when it determined that Ordinance 2023-08 did not violate Marshall Charter, § 402(a).

1997Ann Arbor v Nat’l Center for Mfg Sciences, Inc, 204 Mich App 303, 309 ; 514 NW2d 224 (1994).

1997Ann Arbor v Nat’l Center for Mfg Sciences, Inc, 204 Mich App 303, 309 ; 514 NW2d 224 (1994).

1994A statute is presumed to be constitutional and it will not be declared unconstitutional unless clearly so, or so beyond a reasonable doubt. [Rohan v Detroit Racing Ass’n, 314 Mich 326, 341-342 ; 22 NW2d 433 (1946).] Construing identical language over a century ago, our Supreme Court explained the purpose of the title-object clause as follows: The history and purpose of this constitutional provision are too well understood to require any elucidation at our hands.

1994A statute is presumed to be constitutional and it will not be declared unconstitutional unless clearly so, or so beyond a reasonable doubt. [Rohan v Detroit Racing Ass’n, 314 Mich 326, 341-342 ; 22 NW2d 433 (1946).] Construing identical language over a century ago, our Supreme Court explained the purpose of the title-object clause as follows: The history and purpose of this constitutional provision are too well understood to require any elucidation at our hands.

1992Here we have a situation where we find there were no such fatal defects, but we are asked to nullify the act of the voters in adopting an amendment.” [Carman v Secretary of State, 384 Mich 443, 455 ; 185 NW2d 1 (1971).] Leininger was again cited as recently as Frey v Dep’t of Management & Budget, 429 Mich 315, 323 ; 414 NW2d 873 (1987), in a manner which, even if Kuhn vitiated Leininger , reaffirms the Leininger doctrine: "In Leininger ... we held that the title-object clause appearing in Const 1908, art 5, § 21 (now art 4, § 24) applied to initiated laws.” Therefore, an initiative petition mu

1992Here we have a situation where we find there were no such fatal defects, but we are asked to nullify the act of the voters in adopting an amendment.” [Carman v Secretary of State, 384 Mich 443, 455 ; 185 NW2d 1 (1971).] Leininger was again cited as recently as Frey v Dep’t of Management & Budget, 429 Mich 315, 323 ; 414 NW2d 873 (1987), in a manner which, even if Kuhn vitiated Leininger , reaffirms the Leininger doctrine: "In Leininger ... we held that the title-object clause appearing in Const 1908, art 5, § 21 (now art 4, § 24) applied to initiated laws.” Therefore, an initiative petition mu

1992Here we have a situation where we find there were no such fatal defects, but we are asked to nullify the act of the voters in adopting an amendment.” [Carman v Secretary of State, 384 Mich 443, 455 ; 185 NW2d 1 (1971).] Leininger was again cited as recently as Frey v Dep’t of Management & Budget, 429 Mich 315, 323 ; 414 NW2d 873 (1987), in a manner which, even if Kuhn vitiated Leininger , reaffirms the Leininger doctrine: "In Leininger ... we held that the title-object clause appearing in Const 1908, art 5, § 21 (now art 4, § 24) applied to initiated laws.” Therefore, an initiative petition mu

1992Here we have a situation where we find there were no such fatal defects, but we are asked to nullify the act of the voters in adopting an amendment.” [Carman v Secretary of State, 384 Mich 443, 455 ; 185 NW2d 1 (1971).] Leininger was again cited as recently as Frey v Dep’t of Management & Budget, 429 Mich 315, 323 ; 414 NW2d 873 (1987), in a manner which, even if Kuhn vitiated Leininger , reaffirms the Leininger doctrine: "In Leininger ... we held that the title-object clause appearing in Const 1908, art 5, § 21 (now art 4, § 24) applied to initiated laws.” Therefore, an initiative petition mu

1989No bill shall be altered or amended on its passage through either house so as to change its original purpose as determined by its total content and not alone by its title. [Const 1963, art 4, § 24.] Our Supreme Court in Kuhn v Dep’t of Treasury, 384 Mich 378, 387-388 ; 183 NW2d 796 (1971), observed: This Court has long and consistently said that art 4, § 24, and similar "one object” provisions in earlier constitutions, are to be construed reasonably "and not in so narrow and technical a sense as unnecessarily to embarrass legislation.” Ryerson v Utley (1868), 16 Mich 269, 277 , citing People,

1989No bill shall be altered or amended on its passage through either house so as to change its original purpose as determined by its total content and not alone by its title. [Const 1963, art 4, § 24.] Our Supreme Court in Kuhn v Dep’t of Treasury, 384 Mich 378, 387-388 ; 183 NW2d 796 (1971), observed: This Court has long and consistently said that art 4, § 24, and similar "one object” provisions in earlier constitutions, are to be construed reasonably "and not in so narrow and technical a sense as unnecessarily to embarrass legislation.” Ryerson v Utley (1868), 16 Mich 269, 277 , citing People,

1988Milton relied on People v Stanley, 344 Mich 530 ; 75 NW2d 39 (1956), where this Court had ruled that an amendment to the 1915 Judicature Act, providing that a writ of error to the Supreme Court shall issue as a matter of course following judgment in a criminal case involving the personal liberty of the appellant, violated the title-object clause. 24 This Court rejected Milton’s arguments and overruled Stanley .

1988Milton relied on People v Stanley, 344 Mich 530 ; 75 NW2d 39 (1956), where this Court had ruled that an amendment to the 1915 Judicature Act, providing that a writ of error to the Supreme Court shall issue as a matter of course following judgment in a criminal case involving the personal liberty of the appellant, violated the title-object clause. 24 This Court rejected Milton’s arguments and overruled Stanley .

1987Leininger, supra, p 648 .

1987Leininger, supra, p 648 .

1987In Maki v East Tawas, 385 Mich 151 ; 188 NW2d 593 (1971), aff'g 18 Mich App 109 ; 170 NW2d 530 (1969), this Court affirmed a Court of Appeals determination that *338 the statutory grant of immunity to governmental agencies in § 7 of 1964 PA 170 offended the title-object clause of Const 1963, art 4, § 24.

1987In Maki v East Tawas, 385 Mich 151 ; 188 NW2d 593 (1971), aff'g 18 Mich App 109 ; 170 NW2d 530 (1969), this Court affirmed a Court of Appeals determination that *338 the statutory grant of immunity to governmental agencies in § 7 of 1964 PA 170 offended the title-object clause of Const 1963, art 4, § 24.

1985People v Wingo, 95 Mich App 101 ; 290 NW2d 93 (1980), lv den 410 Mich 880 (1981); People v Bellafant, 105 Mich App 788, 790 ; 307 NW2d 422 (1981); People v Cousins, 139 Mich App 583 ; 363 NW2d 285 (1984).

1985People v Wingo, 95 Mich App 101 ; 290 NW2d 93 (1980), lv den 410 Mich 880 (1981); People v Bellafant, 105 Mich App 788, 790 ; 307 NW2d 422 (1981); People v Cousins, 139 Mich App 583 ; 363 NW2d 285 (1984).

1985People v Bolling, 140 Mich App 606, 611 ; 364 NW2d 759 (1985).

1985People v Bolling, 140 Mich App 606, 611 ; 364 NW2d 759 (1985).

1985Defendant points out that in Tucich v Dearborn Indoor Racquet Club, 107 Mich App 398 ; 309 NW2d 615 (1981), lv den 413 Mich 914 (1982), this Court held that the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act should not be applied retroactively.

1985Defendant points out that in Tucich v Dearborn Indoor Racquet Club, 107 Mich App 398 ; 309 NW2d 615 (1981), lv den 413 Mich 914 (1982), this Court held that the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act should not be applied retroactively.

1985People v Wingo, 95 Mich App 101 ; 290 NW2d 93 (1980), lv den 410 Mich 880 (1981); People v Bellafant, 105 Mich App 788, 790 ; 307 NW2d 422 (1981); People v Cousins, 139 Mich App 583 ; 363 NW2d 285 (1984).

1985People v Wingo, 95 Mich App 101 ; 290 NW2d 93 (1980), lv den 410 Mich 880 (1981); People v Bellafant, 105 Mich App 788, 790 ; 307 NW2d 422 (1981); People v Cousins, 139 Mich App 583 ; 363 NW2d 285 (1984).

1985In Vernor v Secretary of State, 179 Mich 157, 168-169 ; 146 NW 338 (1914), this Court held that a license fee that raises more money than is needed to administer that program — the registration and identification of motor vehicles — is a tax rather than a fee, and, as such, it violates the title-object requirement of the Michigan Constitution because the title of the enacting statute did not identify it as a tax.

1985In Vernor v Secretary of State, 179 Mich 157, 168-169 ; 146 NW 338 (1914), this Court held that a license fee that raises more money than is needed to administer that program — the registration and identification of motor vehicles — is a tax rather than a fee, and, as such, it violates the title-object requirement of the Michigan Constitution because the title of the enacting statute did not identify it as a tax.