motive instruction in Illinois

1975Defendant relies on People v. Manzella, 56 Ill.2d 187 , 306 N.E.2d 16 , where a motive instruction was given to the jury after the prosecutor had commented on motive during his final argument.

1975Defendant relies on People v. Manzella, 56 Ill.2d 187 , 306 N.E.2d 16 , where a motive instruction was given to the jury after the prosecutor had commented on motive during his final argument.

1981“Evidence of collateral crimes, i.e., crimes for which the defendant is not on trial, is inadmissible if relevant merely to establish the defendant’s propensity to commit crimes. [Citations.] Such evidence overpersuades the jury, which might convict the defendant only because it feels he or she is a bad person deserving punishment. * * * Our prior decisions have deemed other-crimes evidence admissible if relevant to demonstrate knowledge, intent, motive, design, plan or identification.” (People v. Lindgren (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 129,137 , 402 N.E.2d 238, 242 .) Although the evidence of collateral

1981“Evidence of collateral crimes, i.e., crimes for which the defendant is not on trial, is inadmissible if relevant merely to establish the defendant’s propensity to commit crimes. [Citations.] Such evidence overpersuades the jury, which might convict the defendant only because it feels he or she is a bad person deserving punishment. * * * Our prior decisions have deemed other-crimes evidence admissible if relevant to demonstrate knowledge, intent, motive, design, plan or identification.” (People v. Lindgren (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 129,137 , 402 N.E.2d 238, 242 .) Although the evidence of collateral

1980As held by the supreme court in People v. Underwood (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 124, 130 , 378 N.E.2d 513 , 516: ‘Enlightened trial practice does not permit counsel under the guise of trial strategy to sit idly by and permit instructions to be given the jury without specific objections and then be given the advantage of predicating error thereon by urging the error for the first time in a post trial motion.’ ” The defendant next makes three arguments relating to his failure to appear for trial for more than 13 months.

1980As held by the supreme court in People v. Underwood (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 124, 130 , 378 N.E.2d 513 , 516: ‘Enlightened trial practice does not permit counsel under the guise of trial strategy to sit idly by and permit instructions to be given the jury without specific objections and then be given the advantage of predicating error thereon by urging the error for the first time in a post trial motion.’ ” The defendant next makes three arguments relating to his failure to appear for trial for more than 13 months.

1979We’ll get even,” reversible error was engendered and thereafter compounded by the prosecutor in arguing motive to the jury, citing People v. Manzella (1973), 56 Ill. 2d 187 , 306 N.E.2d 16 , cert. denied (1974), 417 U.S. 933 , 41 L.

1975(People v. Enright (1912), 256 Ill. 221 , 99 N.E. 936 .) However, such error may be harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence against the defendant.

1975(People v. Enright (1912), 256 Ill. 221 , 99 N.E. 936 .) However, such error may be harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence against the defendant.

1937We held, in the case of People v. Chalmers & Williams Co. 328 Ill. 413 , that under the General Corporation act of 1919, the place designated in the articles of incorporation was, for the purposes of taxation, conclusively the “principal office or place of business” regardless of how much business the corporation might transact elsewhere and quoted with approval the following language from the case of Western Transportation Co. v. Scheu, 19 N. Y. 408 : “To avoid disputes as to the residence of corporations was the motive for the requirement to state the place of business.

1937We held, in the case of People v. Chalmers & Williams Co. 328 Ill. 413 , that under the General Corporation act of 1919, the place designated in the articles of incorporation was, for the purposes of taxation, conclusively the “principal office or place of business” regardless of how much business the corporation might transact elsewhere and quoted with approval the following language from the case of Western Transportation Co. v. Scheu, 19 N. Y. 408 : “To avoid disputes as to the residence of corporations was the motive for the requirement to state the place of business.