governmental interference exception in Pennsylvania

2026Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted; emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 98 (Pa. 2001) (concluding that the appellant did not satisfy the governmental interference exception, where he “failed to set forth any evidence as to when and how he discovered the Brady material that the Commonwealth allegedly withheld from him.

2026A Brady claim may meet the governmental interference exception if the petitioner proves that the failure to raise the claim was the result of governmental interference and “the information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008) Both exceptions required Benson to plead and prove due diligence in learning the information.

2026Brown sought allowance of appeal from this Court solely as to the Superior Court’s holding that Brown had failed to establish the newly discovered facts exception because 40 Commonwealth v. Brown, 308 A.3d 768 , 769 (Pa. 2023) (per curiam). 41 731 A.2d at 592 (“A claim which rests exclusively upon inadmissible hearsay is not of a type that would implicate the [newly discovered facts] exception to the timeliness requirement[.]”); see also Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1270 (citing Yarris for the proposition that “a claim based on inadmissible hearsay does not implicate” the newly di

2025See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2) (stating that any petition invoking a timeliness exception shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented); see also Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306, 309-10 (Pa. 2008) (explaining that section 9545(b)(2) “requires a petitioner to plead and prove that the information on which he relies could not have been obtained earlier, despite the exercise of due diligence”). -8- J-S16044-25 As explained above, Sims indicated in his PCRA petition that he intended to invoke the governmental interference exception to the PCRA’s one-year time b

2025“Although a Brady violation may fall within the governmental interference exception, the petitioner must plead and prove that the failure to previously raise these claims was the result of interference by government officials, and that the information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 953 A.2d 1248, 1253 (Pa. 2006).

2020Our High Court has previously noted that the “proper questions” with regard to this exception “are whether the government interfered with Appellant’s ability to present his claim and whether Appellant was duly diligent in seeking the facts on which his claims are based.” Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 345 (Pa. 2013); Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 953 A.2d 1248 (Pa. 2006) (noting “although a Brady claim may fall within the governmental interference exception, the petitioner must plead and prove that the failure to previously raise these claims was the result of interference by governmental o

2026The governmental interference exception, codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), which permits an otherwise untimely PCRA petition to be filed if it pleads and proves that “the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 955 (Pa. 2018) (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)).

2025“The governmental interference exception permits an otherwise untimely PCRA petition to be filed if it pleads and proves that the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Commonwealth v. Staton, 646 Pa. 284 , 293, 184 A.3d 949, 955 (2018) (internal citation omitted).

2026Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted; emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 98 (Pa. 2001) (concluding that the appellant did not satisfy the governmental interference exception, where he “failed to set forth any evidence as to when and how he discovered the Brady material that the Commonwealth allegedly withheld from him.

2024We begin by noting that our courts have held that “[i]t is well-settled a Brady violation may fall within the governmental interference exception.” -7- J-A15045-24 Commonwealth v. Natividad, 650 Pa. 328 , 356, 200 A.3d 11, 28 (2019) (quoting Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 566 Pa. 323 , 781 A.2d 94, 98 (2001)).

2025To avail himself of the governmental interference exception, a petitioner must show that: “(1) the failure to previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government officials[;] and (2) the petitioner could not have obtained the information earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 266 A.3d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2021).

2024In his second issue, Haggerty challenges the PCRA court’s finding that neither the governmental interference nor newly-discovered fact exceptions applied. “[T]o establish the governmental interference exception, a petitioner must plead and prove: (1) the failure to previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government officials, and (2) the petitioner could not have obtained the information earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 266 A.3d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2021).

2020In order to satisfy the governmental interference exception, Reeves had to plead and prove that his “failure to raise the claim [or claims] previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim [or claims] in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States . . .” Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 523 (Pa. 2006) (quoting 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)).

2020See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i) (A petitioner satisfies the governmental interference exception when “the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials[.]”); see also Chester, 895 A.2d at 523 .

2025Appellant insists that his petition, filed within one year of his return to Pennsylvania, should benefit from the application of the governmental interference exception to the PCRA time bar. -6- J-S42029-25 “The proper question with respect to [the government interference] timeliness exception is whether the government interfered with Appellant’s ability to present his claim and whether Appellant was duly diligent in seeking the facts on which his claims are based.” Commonwealth v. Chimenti, 218 A.3d 963, 975 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 658 Pa. 538 , 229 A.3d 565 (2020) (internal citation

2024See Commonwealth v. Chimenti, 218 A.3d 963, 975 (Pa. Super. 2019) (regarding the governmental interference exception, the “proper ____________________________________________ 3 Instead, Burch asks this Court to quash the present appeal as premature, “order the Clerk of Courts” to comply with all notice requirements, and then permit him to file a new notice of appeal within thirty days from the date of service of the 2010 order denying his first PCRA petition.

2026See 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9545(b)(1)(i) (governmental interference must violate United States or Pennsylvania Constitution or laws).” Commonwealth v. Rizvi, 166 A.3d 344 (Pa. Super. 2017) 5 (holding restrictions on access to prison resources does not qualify a petition for the governmental interference exception).

2024See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bankhead, 217 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa.Super. 2019) (stating: “[W]ithout an assertion of illegality on the part of government officers, restrictions on access to prison resources does not qualify a petition for the governmental interference exception”); Commonwealth v. Rizvi, 166 A.3d 344 (Pa.Super. 2017) (rejecting assertion of governmental interference exception to PCRA time-bar based on prison restrictions impairing ability to prepare pro se PCRA petition; petitioner failed to show that any of conditions of his incarceration were illegal as required to satisfy proffere

2025See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1095 (“[The a]ppellant fails to show any of the conditions of his incarceration were illegal, as required to meet the governmental interference exception to [the] PCRA’s timeliness requirement.”) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)).

2024Relevant here, “without an assertion of illegality on the part of government officials, restrictions on access to prison resources [do] not qualify a petition for the governmental interference exception.” Commonwealth v. Bankhead, 217 A.3d 1245 , 1248 (Pa.Super. 2019); see also Albrecht, 994 A.2d at 1095.

2024Lastly, as for Appellant’s assertion that the government interference exception applies, it is well-settled that, “[a]lthough a Brady violation may fall within the governmental interference exception, the petitioner must plead and prove that the failure to previously raise these claims was the result of interference by government officials, and that the information could not have - 11 - J-S31004-24 been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 194 A.3d 126, 133 (Pa.Super. 2018).

2023Furthermore, we consider: “Although a Brady violation may fall within the governmental interference exception, the petitioner must plead and prove that the failure to previously raise these claims was the result of interference by government officials, and that the information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Smith, 194 A.3d at 133 (citation omitted). - 10 - J-S33022-23 Appellant avers the PCRA court erred in finding his petition was untimely and in dismissing his petition without a hearing.

2026See Commonwealth v. Bankhead, 217 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating “without an assertion of illegality on the part of government officers, restrictions on access to prison resources does not qualify a petition for the governmental interference exception”).

2025See also Commonwealth v. Bankhead, 217 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa.Super. 2019) (stating “without an assertion of illegality on the part of government officers, restrictions on access to prison resources does not qualify a petition for the governmental interference exception”).

2020Additionally, Appellant’s related claim of counsel’s ineffectiveness does not satisfy the governmental interference exception to the PCRA time-bar. -9- J-S18028-20 See Commonwealth v. Pursell, 561 Pa. 214 , 749 A.2d 911 (2000) (explaining claims relating to ineffectiveness of counsel for failing to raise certain issues do not qualify for “governmental interference” exception to PCRA time-bar, as term “governmental officials” does not include defense counsel).

2020Additionally, Appellant’s related claim of counsel’s ineffectiveness does not satisfy the governmental interference exception to the PCRA time-bar. -9- J-S18028-20 See Commonwealth v. Pursell, 561 Pa. 214 , 749 A.2d 911 (2000) (explaining claims relating to ineffectiveness of counsel for failing to raise certain issues do not qualify for “governmental interference” exception to PCRA time-bar, as term “governmental officials” does not include defense counsel).

2026See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 721 (Pa. 2008) (concluding general, unsupported allegations the Commonwealth interfered with the presentation of a claim did not satisfy the burden of establishing a governmental interference exception); Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2014) (noting that “[a] petitioner must explain why he could not have learned the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence”).

2025Absent any discrete support “for these bare allegations,” Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 720 (Pa. 2008), Young has failed to satisfy his burden to prove either that the governmental interference exception, in fact, applies to his substantive claim or that a newly discovered fact relevant to his underlying assertion exists to surmount the PCRA’s time-bar.

2020Our High Court has previously noted that the “proper questions” with regard to this exception “are whether the government interfered with Appellant’s ability to present his claim and whether Appellant was duly diligent in seeking the facts on which his claims are based.” Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 345 (Pa. 2013); Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 953 A.2d 1248 (Pa. 2006) (noting “although a Brady claim may fall within the governmental interference exception, the petitioner must plead and prove that the failure to previously raise these claims was the result of interference by governmental o

2020See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 953 A.2d 1248, 1253 (Pa. 2006) (stating that when a petitioner invokes the governmental interference exception of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), the petitioner must demonstrate due diligence in obtaining the facts at issue); Commonwealth v. Edminston, 65 A.3d 339, 350 (Pa. 2013) (stating that the newly-discovered fact exception at 42 -6- J-S42032-20 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) also requires a petitioner to demonstrate due diligence in obtaining the facts at issue); Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 986 (Pa. 2011) (stating that judicial decisions are n

2025Our case law is clear, however, that “exceptions to the time bar must be pled in the PCRA petition, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). -4-

2015See Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 526-27 (Pa. Super. 2007) (where the PCRA petitioner invoked the governmental interference exception based upon a letter sent to the prosecutor fifteen years prior to the filing of the PCRA petition, alleging that this letter was improperly withheld from him, holding that the petitioner’s claim did not meet the exception, since the existence of the letter was fully discernable to the petitioner fifteen years prior).

2026See Commonwealth v. Natividad, 200 A.3d 11, 28 (Pa. 2019) (“It is well-settled a Brady violation may fall within the governmental interference exception.”).

2025See Commonwealth v. Natividad, 200 A.3d 11, 28 (Pa. 2019) (“It is well-settled a Brady violation may fall within the governmental interference exception.”).

2017See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(4) (“For purposes of this subchapter, ‘governmental officials' shall not include defense counsel, whether appointed or retained); Commonwealth v. Crews, 863 A.2d 498, 503 (Pa. 2004) (“It is well settled that the alleged ineffectiveness of all prior counsel, including the first PCRA counsel, does not fall within the governmental interference exception.”).

2015Commonwealth v. Crews, 863 A.2d 498, 501 (Pa. 2004). -7- J-S18043-15 In order to meet the statutory requirements of the governmental interference exception, “[the a]ppellant was required to plead and prove that his failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim [or claims] in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States….” Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 523 (Pa. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis in original).

2026The governmental interference exception invoked by Appellant requires the petitioner to prove that “the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i); see also Commonwealth v. Vinson, 249 A.3d 1197, 1205 (Pa. Super. 2021) (explaining that to establish the government interference exception under Section 9545(b)(1)(i), “a petitioner must plead and prove (1) the failure to pre

2026The governmental interference exception invoked by Appellant requires the petitioner to prove that “the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i); see also Commonwealth v. Vinson, 249 A.3d 1197, 1205 (Pa. Super. 2021) (explaining that to establish the government interference exception under Section 9545(b)(1)(i), “a petitioner must plead and prove (1) the failure to pre

2026Brown sought allowance of appeal from this Court solely as to the Superior Court’s holding that Brown had failed to establish the newly discovered facts exception because 40 Commonwealth v. Brown, 308 A.3d 768 , 769 (Pa. 2023) (per curiam). 41 731 A.2d at 592 (“A claim which rests exclusively upon inadmissible hearsay is not of a type that would implicate the [newly discovered facts] exception to the timeliness requirement[.]”); see also Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1270 (citing Yarris for the proposition that “a claim based on inadmissible hearsay does not implicate” the newly di

2023Yarris, supra. Thus, Handfield’s first issue warrants no relief. -8- J-S26020-23 In his second issue, Handfield claims the fact that the Commonwealth requested a holiday furlough for David Johnson, a Commonwealth witness, in return for Johnson’s preliminary hearing testimony against him, qualifies under the governmental interference exception at subsection 9545(b)(1)(i).

2025Petition, 11/12/24, at 1 (citing Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 936 A.2d 497, 498-501 (Pa. Super. 2007).

2024Perhaps it was because the error ____________________________________________ 5 Cf., e.g., In re Animal Outlook, 298 A.3d 37 (Pa. 2023) (per curiam) (“AND NOW, this 16th day of May, 2023, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, the Superior Court’s order is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED for the trial court to apply In re Ajaj, 288 A.3d 94 ([Pa.] 2023) [(abandoning prior standard of review for the disapproval of private criminal complaints and establishing a new one)].”). 6 The Commonwealth asserts in its brief that this Court’s erroneous application of the law arguably qualified

2025Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 833 A.2d 719, 725 (Pa. 2003). * In his July 17, 2024 petition, Appellant asserted that he met the governmental interference exception because this Court quashed his previous PCRA appeal for procedural defects due to Attorney Gual’s ineffectiveness.

2020Defense counsel is not considered a government official for purposes of the governmental interference exception, and in fact, is expressly excluded from the definition of “governmental officials.” See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(4); see also Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 833 A.2d 719, 725 (Pa. 2003).

2018“Although a properly plead Brady claim may fall within the governmental interference exception, Commonwealth v. Beasley, 559 Pa. 604 , 741 A.2d 1258, 1261 (1999), a petition invoking the exception must be filed within [sixty] days of the date the claim could have been filed pursuant to section 9545(b)(2).” Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 98 (Pa. 2001) (one citation omitted).

2018“Although a properly plead Brady claim may fall within the governmental interference exception, Commonwealth v. Beasley, 559 Pa. 604 , 741 A.2d 1258, 1261 (1999), a petition invoking the exception must be filed within [sixty] days of the date the claim could have been filed pursuant to section 9545(b)(2).” Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 98 (Pa. 2001) (one citation omitted).

2026Thus, Taggart cannot not establish any newly-discovered “fact.” Taggart next asserts he met the governmental interference exception to the PCRA’s time bar because the Commonwealth committed a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

2026Regarding the governmental interference exception, Evans claims he can establish this exception because the Commonwealth committed a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

2024Commonwealth v. Williams, 105 A.3d 1234 (Pa. Super. 2014).

2017Thus, he was not present at trial to hear the allegedly perjured testimony, although his court-appointed attorney, Richard Hark, Esquire, was. -6- J-S88041-16 Although a Brady violation may fall within the governmental interference exception, the merits of a Brady claim need not be addressed until it is established that the instant petition was timely filed. [Commonwealth] v. Williams, 105 A.3d 1234, 1240 (Pa. 2014).

2026Commonwealth v. Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 678 (Pa. 2017). -4- J-S15037-26 Here, our review of Appellant’s PCRA petition, filed August 30, 2022, purports to raise the governmental interference exception.

2025“The PCRA petitioner bears the burden of proving the applicability of one of the exceptions.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 678 (Pa. 2017). -5- J-S22015-25 On appeal, Davis argues that he has satisfied the governmental interference exception.

2026Girvan claims these factors contributed to his lack of awareness of timeliness and tolling issues “until after considerable due diligence.” Id.

2021See Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999) (explaining that, “[a]lthough legality of sentence is always subject to review within the PCRA, claims must first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the exceptions thereto”). -6- J-S48011-20 interference with the jury, and her claims regarding the District Attorney’s Office and Police Department are simply based off newspaper articles that have no relation to her case. [Leach] fails to avail herself of the governmental interference exception by failing to show any conduct on the part of the court or prosecution which prevented her fr

2024In his Rule 907 Response, Appellant ____________________________________________ 1 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988). -2- J-S12010-24 invoked the governmental interference exception to the PCRA time-bar, and averred that the Commonwealth engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, the trial court judge influenced the jury, and the forensic analyst’s testimony was inadmissible.

2021See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (providing that “government officials” do not include defense counsel). ____________________________________________ 3 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). -7- J-S48011-20 For all of these reasons, the PCRA court correctly concluded that Leach could not establish the governmental interference exception to the PCRA’s time bar.

2026See Abu-Jamal, supra at 228 (“Although a Brady violation may fall within the governmental interference exception, the petitioner must plead and prove the failure to previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government officials, and the information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence.”)(emphasis added); See also Stokes, supra. If it were the case that an appellant presenting a well-pled Brady claim could satisfy the due diligence requirement of any exception to the PCRA by pointing to the Commonwealth’s outstanding obligation to produce ma

2022To the extent that Appellant’s petition invoked the governmental interference exception or the newly-discovered fact exception to the PCRA timeliness requirements, a discussion of “the merits of an underlying Brady -4- J-A05041-22 claim is not relevant to resolving a timeliness issue under either § 9545(b)(1)(i) or (ii).” Commonwealth. v. Stokes, 598 Pa. 574, 580 , 959 A.2d 306, 310 (2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Abu–Jamal, 596 Pa. 219, 268 , 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (2008)).

2024In his Rule 907 Response, Appellant ____________________________________________ 1 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988). -2- J-S12010-24 invoked the governmental interference exception to the PCRA time-bar, and averred that the Commonwealth engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, the trial court judge influenced the jury, and the forensic analyst’s testimony was inadmissible.

2021See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (providing that “government officials” do not include defense counsel). ____________________________________________ 3 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). -7- J-S48011-20 For all of these reasons, the PCRA court correctly concluded that Leach could not establish the governmental interference exception to the PCRA’s time bar.