weapon violation (Illinois) · Go Syfert
← Illinois issues

weapon violation in Illinois

8 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1918–2024 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Carodinegreen
illappct · 2007 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024To show actual possession, the State must show that the contraband was “in the immediate and exclusive control of [the] defendant” (People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326 , 360 10 No. 1-24-0768B (1992)), and the State may show actual possession through acts such as hiding or trying to dispose of the contraband (People v. Carodine, 374 Ill.

11
People v. Clodfeldergreen
illappct · 1988 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
2 sentences

2021Compare Sams, 2013 IL App (1st) 121431, ¶ 13 (ruling that the evidence was insufficient to establish constructive possession where the officers’ “testimony show[ed] only that defendant walked out of a house in which a gun was later found”), with People v. Clodfelder, 172 Ill.

2021Here, the State proved both defendant’s knowledge of the weapon and defendant’s immediate and exclusive control over the area where the weapon was found. ¶ 59 In concluding that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the weapon in violation of section 24-1.1(a), the majority compares People v. Sams, 2013 IL App (1st) 121431, ¶ 13 , with Clodfelder, 172 Ill.

11
People v. McIntyregreen
illappct · 2011 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021See, e.g., McIntyre, 2011 IL App (2d) 100889, ¶ 16 (ruling that the State did not prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of having violated section 24-1.1(a) under a theory of constructive possession when “regardless of defendant’s knowledge of the weapon ***, the State failed to prove that defendant had immediate and exclusive control over it”). ¶ 39 Our holding that defendant was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of unlawful possession of a weapon in violation of section 24-1.1(a) does not mean that it is lawful for a felon to constructively possess a firearm.

11
People v. Samsgreen
illappct · 2014 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
2 sentences

2021Compare Sams, 2013 IL App (1st) 121431, ¶ 13 (ruling that the evidence was insufficient to establish constructive possession where the officers’ “testimony show[ed] only that defendant walked out of a house in which a gun was later found”), with People v. Clodfelder, 172 Ill.

2021Here, the State proved both defendant’s knowledge of the weapon and defendant’s immediate and exclusive control over the area where the weapon was found. ¶ 59 In concluding that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the weapon in violation of section 24-1.1(a), the majority compares People v. Sams, 2013 IL App (1st) 121431, ¶ 13 , with Clodfelder, 172 Ill.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

CaseCitedYears
McCarthy v. Alphons Custodis Chimney Construction Co. neutral
ill · 1906
2 sentences

1926McCarthy v. Alphons Custodis Chimney Const. Co., 219 Ill. 616 .” And this holding was based upon Joseph T.

1918McCarthy v. Alphons Custodis Chimney Const. Co., 219 Ill. 616 .

21918–1926
People v. Frieberg green
ill · 1992
1 sentence

2024To show actual possession, the State must show that the contraband was “in the immediate and exclusive control of [the] defendant” (People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326 , 360 10 No. 1-24-0768B (1992)), and the State may show actual possession through acts such as hiding or trying to dispose of the contraband (People v. Carodine, 374 Ill.

12024–2024
People v. Miller green
illappct · 2024
1 sentence

2024Although the applicable standard of review in a pretrial detention appeal has been the source of considerable disagreement in the Illinois appellate court (see People v. Miller, 2024 IL App (1st) 240588, ¶ 27 ), we need not resolve which standard of review applies in this case, as the result would be the same under any standard. ¶ 19 As stated above, defendant first contends that the State failed to meet its burden by proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident or the presumption great that defendant committed the offense charged. ¶ 20 Defendant is charged with unlawful

12024–2024
People v. Ross green
ill · 2008
1 sentence

2021To that end, citing People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255 (2008), defendant asserts that “[t]he fact-finder must ignore any subjective beliefs about the nature of the weapon in its analysis of the sufficiency of” eyewitness testimony.

12021–2021
People v. Rangel green
illappct · 1987
1 sentence

2021Id. at 740 .

12021–2021
People v. Aguilar green
ill · 2013
2 sentences

2017However, there is a pending postconviction petition in the 2011 case, which alleges that the respondent’s armed habitual criminal conviction cannot stand because it was predicated in part on his 2008 conviction, which has been rendered a nullity by People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116 . ¶9 Upon receipt of these documents, we asked the parties to provide additional briefing pursuant to the following minute order: “The panel assigned to the above-captioned case has secured, sua sponte, (1) the indictment in case number 08-CF-910, reciting that the respondent in the instant case was charged with two

2017However, there is a pending postconviction petition in the 2011 case, which alleges that the respondent’s armed habitual criminal conviction cannot stand because it was predicated in part on his 2008 conviction, which has been rendered a nullity by People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116 . ¶9 Upon receipt of these documents, we asked the parties to provide additional briefing pursuant to the following minute order: “The panel assigned to the above-captioned case has secured, sua sponte, (1) the indictment in case number 08-CF-910, reciting that the respondent in the instant case was charged with two

12017–2017
People v. Conover green
ill · 1981
2 sentences

1991As such, those factors may not be used to enhance the sentence (People v. Saldivar (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 256 ; People v. Conover (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 400 ), since the legislature would already have taken them into account when it established penalties for the crimes (People v. Martin (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 453, 459-60 ; Conover, 84 Ill. 2d at 405 ).

1991As such, those factors may not be used to enhance the sentence (People v. Saldivar (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 256 ; People v. Conover (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 400 ), since the legislature would already have taken them into account when it established penalties for the crimes (People v. Martin (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 453, 459-60 ; Conover, 84 Ill. 2d at 405 ).

11991–1991
People v. Saldivar green
ill · 1986
1 sentence

1991As such, those factors may not be used to enhance the sentence (People v. Saldivar (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 256 ; People v. Conover (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 400 ), since the legislature would already have taken them into account when it established penalties for the crimes (People v. Martin (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 453, 459-60 ; Conover, 84 Ill. 2d at 405 ).

11991–1991
People v. Martin green
ill · 1988
1 sentence

1991As such, those factors may not be used to enhance the sentence (People v. Saldivar (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 256 ; People v. Conover (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 400 ), since the legislature would already have taken them into account when it established penalties for the crimes (People v. Martin (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 453, 459-60 ; Conover, 84 Ill. 2d at 405 ).

11991–1991
People of Illinois v. Haron green
ill · 1981
1 sentence

1982DOUBLE ENHANCEMENT Defendant initially argued that the armed-violence convictions were twice enhanced by virtue of the identical weapon in violation of the rationale of People v. Haron (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 261 .

11982–1982
People v. Pointer green
illappct · 1981
1 sentence

1982(People v. Pointer (1981), 93 Ill.

11982–1982

Where else courts name it

NY 19 (1891–2025) CA 16 (1945–2026) IA 9 (1974–2024) MO 9 (1940–2004) IL 8 (1918–2024) PA 8 (1937–2025) TX 8 (1912–2025) FL 6 (1953–2016) IN 6 (1902–2012) NJ 5 (1990–2019) WA 5 (1989–2016) GA 4 (1990–2024) OH 4 (1842–2018) OK 3 (1924–2016) NC 3 (1903–2025) MI 3 (1922–1991) CO 2 (2001–2014) NM 2 (2008–2009) CT 2 (2001–2014) WY 2 (1976–1983) VA 2 (1995–2008) DC 2 (1992–2012)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check