formal administrative hearing in Florida

2017As this court explained almost 30 years ago, a party has standing to initiate a formal administrative hearing pursuant to section 120.57 when it has a “substantial interest that is directly affected by proposed agency action. . . .” Florida Soc’y of Ophthalmology v. State Bd. of Optometry, 532 So. 2d 1279, 1284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

2017As this court explained almost 30 years ago, a party has standing to initiate a formal administrative hearing pursuant to section 120.57 when it has a “substantial interest that is directly affected by proposed agency action....” Florida Soc'y of Ophthalmology v. State Bd. of Optometry, 532 So.2d 1279, 1284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

2005See Spuza v. Dep't of Health, 838 So.2d 676, 678 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Mixon v. Dep't of *1123 State, Div. of Licensing, 686 So.2d 755, 756 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Hernandez v. Dep't of State, Div. of Licensing, 546 So.2d 1174, 1175 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).

2005See Spuza v. Dep’t of Health, 838 So.2d 676, 678 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Mixon v. Dep’t of State, Div. of Licensing, 686 So.2d 755, 756 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Hernandez v. Dep’t of State, Div. of Licensing, 546 So.2d 1174, 1175 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).

2005See Spuza v. Dep't of Health, 838 So.2d 676, 678 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Mixon v. Dep't of *1123 State, Div. of Licensing, 686 So.2d 755, 756 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Hernandez v. Dep't of State, Div. of Licensing, 546 So.2d 1174, 1175 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).

2005See Spuza v. Dep’t of Health, 838 So.2d 676, 678 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Mixon v. Dep’t of State, Div. of Licensing, 686 So.2d 755, 756 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Hernandez v. Dep’t of State, Div. of Licensing, 546 So.2d 1174, 1175 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).

2005See Spuza v. Dep't of Health, 838 So.2d 676, 678 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Mixon v. Dep't of *1123 State, Div. of Licensing, 686 So.2d 755, 756 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Hernandez v. Dep't of State, Div. of Licensing, 546 So.2d 1174, 1175 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).

2005See Spuza v. Dep’t of Health, 838 So.2d 676, 678 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Mixon v. Dep’t of State, Div. of Licensing, 686 So.2d 755, 756 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Hernandez v. Dep’t of State, Div. of Licensing, 546 So.2d 1174, 1175 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).

1996Such policy also fails to recognize the proper role of Section 120.57 hearings in the administrative process, i.e., such hearings are to aid in the formulation of final agency action and are not intended solely for review of action taken earlier and prehminarily.”); see also, Beverly Enters-Florida v. Department of HRS, 573 So.2d 19, 23 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“request for a formal administrative hearing commences a de novo proceeding intended to formulate agency action.”).

1996Such policy also fails to recognize the proper role of Section 120.57 hearings in the administrative process, i.e., such hearings are to aid in the formulation of final agency action and are not intended solely for review of action taken earlier and preliminarily."); see also, Beverly Enters.-Florida v. Department of HRS, 573 So.2d 19, 23 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) ("request for a formal administrative hearing commences a de novo proceeding intended to formulate agency action.").

2001DOT, in a final order, dismissed Maverick's petition and *492 denied its application for a state sign permit, ruling that Maverick does not have standing for a formal administrative hearing because it fails to meet the third-party standing requirements of Agrico Chemical Company v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 406 So.2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).

1989In order for a party to establish a substantial interest, the party must demonstrate that it will suffer injury in fact which is of sufficient immediacy to entitle it to receive a formal administrative hearing, and that the injury is of a type or nature which the administrative hearing is designed to protect. *553 Agrico Chemical Company v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 406 So.2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).

2019All the allegations in Asphalt Paving’s amended petition are assumed to be factually correct: “In determining whether a party has standing to seek a formal administrative hearing, the allegations contained in the party's petition must be taken as true.” Mid-Chattahoochee, 948 So. 2d at 796 ; see also Hospice of Palm Beach County, Inc. v. State, Agency for Health Care Admin., 876 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding that “[i]n determining whether [the appellant] had standing, the allegations contained in its petition must be taken as true”); Ybor III, Ltd. v. Florida Housing Finance Corp.,

2006Id.

2019All the allegations in Asphalt Paving’s amended petition are assumed to be factually correct: “In determining whether a party has standing to seek a formal administrative hearing, the allegations contained in the party's petition must be taken as true.” Mid-Chattahoochee, 948 So. 2d at 796 ; see also Hospice of Palm Beach County, Inc. v. State, Agency for Health Care Admin., 876 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding that “[i]n determining whether [the appellant] had standing, the allegations contained in its petition must be taken as true”); Ybor III, Ltd. v. Florida Housing Finance Corp.,

2006Id.

2019All the allegations in Asphalt Paving’s amended petition are assumed to be factually correct: “In determining whether a party has standing to seek a formal administrative hearing, the allegations contained in the party's petition must be taken as true.” Mid-Chattahoochee, 948 So. 2d at 796 ; see also Hospice of Palm Beach County, Inc. v. State, Agency for Health Care Admin., 876 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding that “[i]n determining whether [the appellant] had standing, the allegations contained in its petition must be taken as true”); Ybor III, Ltd. v. Florida Housing Finance Corp.,

2010Prot., 948 So.2d 794, 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“[i]n determining whether a party has standing to seek a formal administrative hearing, the allegations contained in the party’s petition must be taken as true”).

2010Section 287.057(5)(f)6 exempts from the competitive bidding process set out in other parts of that section “[h]ealth services involving examination, diagnosis, treatment, prevention, medical consultation, or administration.” In the only reported decision addressing the issue, the Second District Court of Appeal has held that, if a *654 contract is exempt from the competitive bidding process by virtue of section 287.057(5)(f)6, a party that unsuccessfully attempted to secure the contract is not entitled to a formal administrative hearing, even if the contracting agency “elects to employ a compe

2009See Patz *921 v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 864 So.2d 79, 79-80 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (holding that because Patz did not file an Election of Rights form or otherwise request a formal hearing within the twenty-one day period, he waived his right to an administrative hearing); see also Aleong v. Fla. Dep’t. of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 963 So.2d 799, 801-02 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (upholding the Board of Veterinary Medicine’s order granting the Department of Business and Professional Regulation’s Motion for Waiver of Rights filed after Dr. Aleong failed to timely request a hearing to dispute the Department’

2009See Patz *921 v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 864 So.2d 79, 79-80 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (holding that because Patz did not file an Election of Rights form or otherwise request a formal hearing within the twenty-one day period, he waived his right to an administrative hearing); see also Aleong v. Fla. Dep’t. of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 963 So.2d 799, 801-02 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (upholding the Board of Veterinary Medicine’s order granting the Department of Business and Professional Regulation’s Motion for Waiver of Rights filed after Dr. Aleong failed to timely request a hearing to dispute the Department’

2009This hearing, however, is afforded to First Quality only if Alliance is an "agency" as defined in section 120.52(1), Florida Statutes (2007), [2] and section 287.012(1), Florida Statutes (2008). [3] See Coastal Fuels Mktg., Inc. v. Canaveral Port Auth., 962 So.2d 942 , 944 *1152 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); Fla. Dep't of Ins. v. Fla. Ass'n of Ins.

2009This hearing, however, is afforded to First Quality only if Alliance is an “agency” as defined in section 120.52(1), Florida Statutes (2007), 2 and section 287.012(1), Florida Statutes (2008). 3 See Coastal Fuels Mktg., Inc. v. Canaveral Port Auth., 962 So.2d 942, 944 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); Fla. Dep't of Ins. v. Fla. Ass’n of Ins.

2006Id.; see also Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 595 So.2d 186, 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (noting that the nature of the proposed proceeding was to determine whether the use of the property at issue as a juvenile facility would comply with section 253.023, Florida Statutes, the Conservation and Recreation Lands statute, and that the allegations of the petition for a formal administrative hearing, which alleged that utilization of the land in that manner would immediately preclude use of the facility as a recreation area and cause environmental

2006Regulation, 486 So.2d 642, 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (holding that the appellant, a local pollution control program pursuant to section 403.182, Florida Statutes, had standing to seek a formal administrative hearing to contest the issuance of a construction permit that authorized a utility company to modify its sewage treatment facility which modification would discharge effluent into a manmade box cut canal portion of Bonnett Creek, because it was clear that the appellant had an interest in the water quality of Bonnet Creek and that that interest was the type of interest that chapter 403 was de

2006Regulation, 486 So.2d 642, 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (holding that the appellant, a local pollution control program pursuant to section 403.182, Florida Statutes, had standing to seek a formal administrative hearing to contest the issuance of a construction permit that authorized a utility company to modify its sewage treatment facility which modification would discharge effluent into a manmade box cut canal portion of Bonnett Creek, because it was clear that the appellant had an interest in the water quality of Bonnet Creek and that that interest was the type of interest that chapter 403 was de

2002See Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Mowry, 794 So.2d 657 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). [3] Essentially, by concluding that the breath test results were not admissible in evidence in this formal administrative hearing, the circuit court ignored the statutory scheme and required a more stringent standard of proof than that required by statute.

2002See Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, Div. of Real Estate v. Toledo Realty, Inc., 549 So.2d 715 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).

2000Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, the administrative law judge concluded that NCI did not meet its burden of “demonstrating that the proposed agency action is ‘clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.’ ” See § 120.57(3)(f), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998); see also GTECH Corp. v. State, Dep’t of the Lottery, 737 So.2d 615, 619 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

1995Cloud, 550 So.2d 551 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989): Section 120.57(1) provides that a party is entitled to a formal administrative hearing when substantial interests of the party are determined by an agency.

1995Id. at 552-53 (citations omitted).

1989See also Sullivan v. Northwest Florida Water Management District, 490 So.2d 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

1989As noted in Capeletti Brothers, Inc. v. State Department of General Services, 432 So.2d 1359, 1363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), "APA hearing requirements are designed to give affected parties an opportunity to change the agency's mind." We find no persuasive support for the contentions here as to improper prejudgment beyond that inherent in the administrative process.