8 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Collins v. Detroit Free Press, Incgreen2 sentences2017See id.4 Finally, although a party facing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and 2.116(C)(10) should generally be given an opportunity to amend his or her pleadings as provided by MCR 2.118, see MCR 2.116(I)(5), we conclude that any such 3 In light of our conclusion that the challenged statements in the article are substantially true, we need not address defendants’ alternative arguments that they are entitled to summary disposition on plaintiff’s defamation claim on the basis of the fair-reporting privilege of MCL 600.2911(3) or because plaintiff failed to sufficiently ple 2017See id.4 Finally, although a party facing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and 2.116(C)(10) should generally be given an opportunity to amend his or her pleadings as provided by MCR 2.118, see MCR 2.116(I)(5), we conclude that any such 3 In light of our conclusion that the challenged statements in the article are substantially true, we need not address defendants’ alternative arguments that they are entitled to summary disposition on plaintiff’s defamation claim on the basis of the fair-reporting privilege of MCL 600.2911(3) or because plaintiff failed to sufficiently ple | 2 | 2 |
Scripps v. Reillygreen1 sentence2020In this sense, “matter” is roughly synonymous with “content”—thus, it could be rewritten to say that the privilege did not “apply to a libel contained in any content added [to the published report] by any person concerned in the publication.” In this sense of the word “matter,” it is an uncountable noun, and we cannot grammatically speak of “one matter” or “one content” any more than we can speak of “one beef” or “one concrete.” Our case reports have many references to “libelous matter” in this sense of libelous published content.1 After 1988 PA 396 , this language now reads, “This privilege 1 | 1 | 1 |
Scripps v. Reillygreen1 sentence2020In this sense, “matter” is roughly synonymous with “content”—thus, it could be rewritten to say that the privilege did not “apply to a libel contained in any content added [to the published report] by any person concerned in the publication.” In this sense of the word “matter,” it is an uncountable noun, and we cannot grammatically speak of “one matter” or “one content” any more than we can speak of “one beef” or “one concrete.” Our case reports have many references to “libelous matter” in this sense of libelous published content.1 After 1988 PA 396 , this language now reads, “This privilege 1 | 1 | 1 |
Maclean v. Scrippsgreen1 sentence2020In this sense, “matter” is roughly synonymous with “content”—thus, it could be rewritten to say that the privilege did not “apply to a libel contained in any content added [to the published report] by any person concerned in the publication.” In this sense of the word “matter,” it is an uncountable noun, and we cannot grammatically speak of “one matter” or “one content” any more than we can speak of “one beef” or “one concrete.” Our case reports have many references to “libelous matter” in this sense of libelous published content.1 After 1988 PA 396 , this language now reads, “This privilege 1 | 1 | 1 |
Peoples v. Detroit Post & Tribune Co.green1 sentence2020In this sense, “matter” is roughly synonymous with “content”—thus, it could be rewritten to say that the privilege did not “apply to a libel contained in any content added [to the published report] by any person concerned in the publication.” In this sense of the word “matter,” it is an uncountable noun, and we cannot grammatically speak of “one matter” or “one content” any more than we can speak of “one beef” or “one concrete.” Our case reports have many references to “libelous matter” in this sense of libelous published content.1 After 1988 PA 396 , this language now reads, “This privilege 1 | 1 | 1 |
Lewis v. Soulegreen1 sentence2020In this sense, “matter” is roughly synonymous with “content”—thus, it could be rewritten to say that the privilege did not “apply to a libel contained in any content added [to the published report] by any person concerned in the publication.” In this sense of the word “matter,” it is an uncountable noun, and we cannot grammatically speak of “one matter” or “one content” any more than we can speak of “one beef” or “one concrete.” Our case reports have many references to “libelous matter” in this sense of libelous published content.1 After 1988 PA 396 , this language now reads, “This privilege 1 | 1 | 1 |
Leonard v. Popegreen1 sentence2020In this sense, “matter” is roughly synonymous with “content”—thus, it could be rewritten to say that the privilege did not “apply to a libel contained in any content added [to the published report] by any person concerned in the publication.” In this sense of the word “matter,” it is an uncountable noun, and we cannot grammatically speak of “one matter” or “one content” any more than we can speak of “one beef” or “one concrete.” Our case reports have many references to “libelous matter” in this sense of libelous published content.1 After 1988 PA 396 , this language now reads, “This privilege 1 | 1 | 1 |
Bacon v. Michigan Central Railroadgreen1 sentence2020In this sense, “matter” is roughly synonymous with “content”—thus, it could be rewritten to say that the privilege did not “apply to a libel contained in any content added [to the published report] by any person concerned in the publication.” In this sense of the word “matter,” it is an uncountable noun, and we cannot grammatically speak of “one matter” or “one content” any more than we can speak of “one beef” or “one concrete.” Our case reports have many references to “libelous matter” in this sense of libelous published content.1 After 1988 PA 396 , this language now reads, “This privilege 1 | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Anonymous Joint Enterprisegreen1 sentence2020Such a claim requires proof of four elements: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an 10 unprivileged communication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by publication. [Smith v Anonymous Joint Enterprise, 487 Mich 102, 113 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted).] The issue before this Court is the second element of the defamation claim: whether defendant’s communications | 1 | 1 |
Ronnisch Construction Group, Inc v. Lofts on the Nine, LLCgreen2 sentences2018When a statute’s language is unambiguous, the Legislature must have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written. [Ronnisch Constr Group v Lofts on the Nine, LLC, 499 Mich 544, 552 ; 886 NW2d 113 (2016) (internal citations omitted).] Therefore, we first turn the language of the fair reporting privilege to determine whether defendants are entitled to protection thereunder. 2018When a statute’s language is unambiguous, the Legislature must have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written. [Ronnisch Constr Group v Lofts on the Nine, LLC, 499 Mich 544, 552 ; 886 NW2d 113 (2016) (internal citations omitted).] Therefore, we first turn the language of the fair reporting privilege to determine whether defendants are entitled to protection thereunder. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hawkins v. Mercy Health Services, Inc
green
2 sentences2023Courts look “to the sting of the article to determine its effect on the reader; if the literal truth produced the same effect, minor differences [are] deemed immaterial.” Hawkins v Mercy Health Servs, Inc, 230 Mich App 315, 332 ; 583 NW2d 725 (1998).4 4 Related to the substantial-truth doctrine is the fair-reporting privilege contained in MCL 600.2911(3), which the trial court relied on in this case. 2023Courts look “to the sting of the article to determine its effect on the reader; if the literal truth produced the same effect, minor differences [are] deemed immaterial.” Hawkins v Mercy Health Servs, Inc, 230 Mich App 315, 332 ; 583 NW2d 725 (1998).4 4 Related to the substantial-truth doctrine is the fair-reporting privilege contained in MCL 600.2911(3), which the trial court relied on in this case. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Park v. Detroit Free Press Co.
green
1 sentence2020In this sense, “matter” is roughly synonymous with “content”—thus, it could be rewritten to say that the privilege did not “apply to a libel contained in any content added [to the published report] by any person concerned in the publication.” In this sense of the word “matter,” it is an uncountable noun, and we cannot grammatically speak of “one matter” or “one content” any more than we can speak of “one beef” or “one concrete.” Our case reports have many references to “libelous matter” in this sense of libelous published content.1 After 1988 PA 396 , this language now reads, “This privilege 1 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Book-Gilbert v. Greenleaf
green
2 sentences2016MCL 600.2911(3) carves out no exception for malice or for so-called “self-reporters.” See, generally, Book-Gilbert v Greenleaf, 302 Mich App 538, 541 ; 840 NW2d 743 (2013) (a court may not read into statutes language that the Legislature has seen fit to omit).7 The cases plaintiffs cite for the proposition that malice can vitiate the fair reporting privilege in MCL 600.2911(3) are simply not apposite. 2016MCL 600.2911(3) carves out no exception for malice or for so-called “self-reporters.” See, generally, Book-Gilbert v Greenleaf, 302 Mich App 538, 541 ; 840 NW2d 743 (2013) (a court may not read into statutes language that the Legislature has seen fit to omit).7 The cases plaintiffs cite for the proposition that malice can vitiate the fair reporting privilege in MCL 600.2911(3) are simply not apposite. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Northland Wheels Roller Skating Center, Inc v. Detroit Free Press, Inc
green
2 sentences2016The fair-reporting privilege applies “not only [to] the publication of public and official proceedings but also [to] the broadcast of matters of public record, of a governmental notice, announcement, written or recorded report or record generally available to the public, or act of a public body.” Northland Wheels, 213 Mich App at 326 . “[T]he statute makes it clear that [a] defendant’s motivation is irrelevant if a fair and true report is made of the proceeding.” Stablein v Schuster, 183 Mich App 477, 482 ; 455 NW2d 315 (1990); see also See also Bedford v Witte, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d 2016The fair-reporting privilege applies “not only [to] the publication of public and official proceedings but also [to] the broadcast of matters of public record, of a governmental notice, announcement, written or recorded report or record generally available to the public, or act of a public body.” Northland Wheels, 213 Mich App at 326 . “[T]he statute makes it clear that [a] defendant’s motivation is irrelevant if a fair and true report is made of the proceeding.” Stablein v Schuster, 183 Mich App 477, 482 ; 455 NW2d 315 (1990); see also See also Bedford v Witte, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Timmis v. Bennett
green
1 sentence2016MCL 600.2911(3) states, in relevant part: Damages shall not be awarded in a libel action for the publication or broadcast of a fair and true report of matters of public record, a public and official proceeding, or of a governmental notice, announcement, written or recorded report or record generally available to the public, or act or action of a public body, or for a heading of the report which is a fair and true headnote of the report.[5] In order for a report to be privileged under this statute, the report must be “fair and true . . . .” Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Stablein v. Schuster
green
2 sentences2016The fair-reporting privilege applies “not only [to] the publication of public and official proceedings but also [to] the broadcast of matters of public record, of a governmental notice, announcement, written or recorded report or record generally available to the public, or act of a public body.” Northland Wheels, 213 Mich App at 326 . “[T]he statute makes it clear that [a] defendant’s motivation is irrelevant if a fair and true report is made of the proceeding.” Stablein v Schuster, 183 Mich App 477, 482 ; 455 NW2d 315 (1990); see also See also Bedford v Witte, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d 2016The fair-reporting privilege applies “not only [to] the publication of public and official proceedings but also [to] the broadcast of matters of public record, of a governmental notice, announcement, written or recorded report or record generally available to the public, or act of a public body.” Northland Wheels, 213 Mich App at 326 . “[T]he statute makes it clear that [a] defendant’s motivation is irrelevant if a fair and true report is made of the proceeding.” Stablein v Schuster, 183 Mich App 477, 482 ; 455 NW2d 315 (1990); see also See also Bedford v Witte, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Royal Palace Homes, Inc v. Channel 7 of Detroit, Inc
green
1 sentence1995Rouch II, supra at 252; Royal Palace, supra. This case presents an issue of first impression because it requires this Court to determine the scope of the fair reporting privilege contained in MCL 600.2911(3); MSA 27A.2911(3), following its amendment in 1988 PA 396 , 4 which now states in pertinent part:_ *324 Damages ■ shall not be awarded in a libel action for the publication or broadcast of a fair and true report of matters of public record, a public and official proceeding, or of a governmental notice, announcement, written or recorded report or report generally available to the public, or | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.