Magee motion in Mississippi

2015Magee, 119 So.3d at 1055 (“Magee's motion to set aside the replevin was filed on February 24, 2009.

2015To establish that contractual right, CCB attached a copy 22 City of Belmont, 860 So. 2d at 295 (citing Brewer, 768 So. 2d at 922 ; Overstreet, 570 So. 2d at 1197 ; Grantham, 522 So. 2d at 220 ; Lester Eng’g Co., 504 So. 2d at 1187 ; Stanton & Assocs., Inc., 464 So. 2d at 505 ). 23 Magee, 119 So. 3d at 1055 (“Magee’s motion to set aside the replevin was filed on February 24, 2009.

2015“A defendant may waive arraignment, either expressly or impliedly, by proceeding to trial without objection, and one who has by his assent and conduct thus impliedly joined issue with the state on an affidavit or indictment, cannot, by objection to a later arraignment, avoid a conviction.” Spry v. State, 796 So.2d 229, 233 (¶ 12) (Miss.2001) (quoting Bufkin v. State, 134 Miss. 1, 16 , 98 So. 452, 454 (1923)).

2015“A defendant may waive arraignment, either expressly or impliedly, by proceeding to trial without objection, and one who has by his assent and conduct thus impliedly joined issue with the state on an affidavit or indictment, cannot, by objection to a later arraignment, avoid a conviction.” Spry v. State, 796 So.2d 229, 233 (¶ 12) (Miss.2001) (quoting Bufkin v. State, 134 Miss. 1, 16 , 98 So. 452, 454 (1923)).

2015“A defendant may waive arraignment, either expressly or impliedly, by proceeding to trial without objection, and one who has by his assent and conduct thus impliedly joined issue with the state on an affidavit or indictment, cannot, by objection to a later arraignment, avoid a conviction.” Spry v. State, 796 So.2d 229, 233 (¶ 12) (Miss.2001) (quoting Bufkin v. State, 134 Miss. 1, 16 , 98 So. 452, 454 (1923)).

2014In a recent case, Fluker v. State, 2013-CP-00608-COA, 2014 WL 2723882, at *4 (¶18) (Miss.

2014In a recent case, Fluker v. State, 2013-CP-00608-COA, — So.3d —,—(¶ 18), 2014 WL 2723882, at *4 (¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App.

2012Although the question is arguably leading, “[t]rial courts are given great discretion in permitting the use of such questions. ...” Tanner, 764 So.2d at 405 (¶ 58).

2011Byrom, 863 So.2d at 879 (¶¶ 155-56) (finding defendant’s argument that tracking dog was not qualified lacked merit because evidence showed the dog was highly qualified and his handler was well-trained and certified); see also Gavin v. State, 891 So.2d 907, 971 (Ala.Crim.App. 2003) (“For dog-tracking evidence to be admissible, the State must establish the following: the training and reliability of the dog, the qualifications of the person handling the dog, and the circumstances surrounding the tracking by the dog.”). ¶ 29.

2011Byrom, 863 So.2d at 879 (¶¶ 155-56) (finding defendant’s argument that tracking dog was not qualified lacked merit because evidence showed the dog was highly qualified and his handler was well-trained and certified); see also Gavin v. State, 891 So.2d 907, 971 (Ala.Crim.App. 2003) (“For dog-tracking evidence to be admissible, the State must establish the following: the training and reliability of the dog, the qualifications of the person handling the dog, and the circumstances surrounding the tracking by the dog.”). ¶ 29.

2005While Magee complains that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to request a mental evaluation of Magee's competence to stand trial, the record shows that, on January 24, 2002, the trial court granted Magee's motion to have Magee examined "for the purpose of evaluating, (a) whether or not he has a factual as well as rational understanding of the nature and object of the legal proceedings against him, and has the ability to reasonably assist his attorney in the preparation of his defense...." This language paraphrased the standard for assessing competence to stand trial, which is "whether the

1998Mr. Magee predicates the chancellor’s error in awarding Ms. Magee an attorney’s fee on her having been awarded assets “amounting to over $186,046,” which “included one-half of the proceeds from the sale of the house, one-half of the employment retirement program at Chevron, and in excess of one thousand dollars cash.” Magee cites Martin v. Martin, 566 So.2d 704 (Miss.1990), in which Magee asserts the Mississippi Supreme Court “pointed out that if a party is financially able to pay an attorney, the award of attorney fees is not appropriate.” He concludes his argument on the award of an attorney

1998Mr. Magee predicates the chancellor’s error in awarding Ms. Magee an attorney’s fee on her having been awarded assets “amounting to over $186,046,” which “included one-half of the proceeds from the sale of the house, one-half of the employment retirement program at Chevron, and in excess of one thousand dollars cash.” Magee cites Martin v. Martin, 566 So.2d 704 (Miss.1990), in which Magee asserts the Mississippi Supreme Court “pointed out that if a party is financially able to pay an attorney, the award of attorney fees is not appropriate.” He concludes his argument on the award of an attorney