third-party intervention doctrine in New Jersey

2015The doctrine has its roots in Burdeau v. McDowell, in which the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement applies only to government agents, not private actors. 256 U.S. 465 , 41 S.Ct. 574 , 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921).

2015The doctrine has its roots in Burdeau v. McDowell, in which the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement applies only to government agents, not private actors. 256 U.S. 465 , 41 S.Ct. 574 , 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921).

2002However, if the results of a private search are turned over to a police investigatory agency, that agency "may not exceed the scope of the private search unless it has the right to make an independent search." Walter, supra, 447 U.S. at 657 , 100 S.Ct. at 2402 , 65 L.Ed. 2d at 418 ; see also State v. Saez, 268 N.J.Super. 250, 271 , 633 A. 2d 551 (App.Div.1993) (D'Annunzio, J.A.D., dissenting) ("[W]here the government expands the private search, the third-party intervention exception no longer applies to the fruits of the expanded search"), rev'd on basis of dissent, 139 N.J. 279 , 653 A. 2d 11

2002However, if the results of a private search are turned over to a police investigatory agency, that agency "may not exceed the scope of the private search unless it has the right to make an independent search." Walter, supra, 447 U.S. at 657 , 100 S.Ct. at 2402 , 65 L.Ed. 2d at 418 ; see also State v. Saez, 268 N.J.Super. 250, 271 , 633 A. 2d 551 (App.Div.1993) (D'Annunzio, J.A.D., dissenting) ("[W]here the government expands the private search, the third-party intervention exception no longer applies to the fruits of the expanded search"), rev'd on basis of dissent, 139 N.J. 279 , 653 A. 2d 11

2025The [m]otion [j]udge also erred in characterizing the driveway, although encompassed within the concept of curtilage, as an implied invitation to "[t]he UPS [person], the Amazon [person]" and law enforcement to "walk up that driveway." The [j]udge failed to appreciate the limits of the third-party intervention doctrine as a deviation during a "walk up that driveway" to then affix a GPS device on a vehicle by law enforcement exceeds any implicit invitation to the public to walk up and knock at one's door, see State v. Wright, 221 N.J. 456 [,] . . . 477 (2015), Florida v. Jardines, [ 569 U.S. 1

2025The [m]otion [j]udge also erred in characterizing the driveway, although encompassed within the concept of curtilage, as an implied invitation to "[t]he UPS [person], the Amazon [person]" and law enforcement to "walk up that driveway." The [j]udge failed to appreciate the limits of the third-party intervention doctrine as a deviation during a "walk up that driveway" to then affix a GPS device on a vehicle by law enforcement exceeds any implicit invitation to the public to walk up and knock at one's door, see State v. Wright, 221 N.J. 456 [,] . . . 477 (2015), Florida v. Jardines, [ 569 U.S. 1

2017That decision focused on the extension of the third-party intervention doctrine to a situation involving a home, and our Court noted that “[t]he proper course under the State and Federal Constitutions” in that circumstance is to rely on the information provided by a third-party to apply for a search warrant and then, “[i]n the time it takes to get the warrant, ... secure the apartment or home from the outside, for a reasonable period of time, if reasonably necessary to avoid any tampering with or destruction of evidence.” Id at 478, 114 A.3d 340 (citing McArthur, supra, 531 U.S. at 334 , 121 S

2017That decision focused on the extension of the third-party intervention doctrine to a situation involving a home, and our Court noted that “[t]he proper course under the State and Federal Constitutions” in that circumstance is to rely on the information provided by a third-party to apply for a search warrant and then, “[i]n the time it takes to get the warrant, ... secure the apartment or home from the outside, for a reasonable period of time, if reasonably necessary to avoid any tampering with or destruction of evidence.” Id at 478, 114 A.3d 340 (citing McArthur, supra, 531 U.S. at 334 , 121 S

2015Id. at 575-87 , 71 A.3d 212 .

2015Id. at 575-87 , 71 A.3d 212 .

2015We granted Wright’s petition for certification limited to the following issue: “whether the third party intervention doctrine is applicable to permit police to search residential property without a warrant.” 217 N.J. 283 , 87 A.3d 770 (2014).

2015We granted Wright’s petition for certification limited to the following issue: “whether the third party intervention doctrine is applicable to permit police to search residential property without a warrant.” 217 N.J. 283 , 87 A.3d 770 (2014).

2015Consistent with Jacobsen, the Appellate Division in State v. Premone, 348 N.J.Super. 505, 513-14 , 792 A.2d 487 (App.Div. 2002), found that the third-party intervention doctrine did not apply because the police exceeded the scope of a private search.

2015Consistent with Jacobsen, the Appellate Division in State v. Premone, 348 N.J.Super. 505, 513-14 , 792 A.2d 487 (App.Div. 2002), found that the third-party intervention doctrine did not apply because the police exceeded the scope of a private search.

2013See, e.g., United States v. Moffett, 885 F.Supp. 237 (N.D.Ala.1995) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where a landlord entered an unlocked commercial property into which a tenant had partially moved, found inside a briefcase containing counterfeit money, and turned the briefcase over to local police), aff'd, 89 F.3d 855 (11th Cir.1996); State v. Krajeski, 104 Wash.App. 377 , 16 F.3d 69 (2001) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where the defendant’s mother and landlords entered his apartment to retrieve his dog and thereafter reported to the police that they had seen a stolen bicycle w

2013E.g., State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40, 45 , 853 A.2d 903 (2004); State v. Hill, 115 N.J. 169, 173 , 557 A.2d 322 (1989); State v. Mollica, 114 N.J. 329, 355 , 554 A.2d 1315 (1989).

2013E.g., State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40, 45 , 853 A.2d 903 (2004); State v. Hill, 115 N.J. 169, 173 , 557 A.2d 322 (1989); State v. Mollica, 114 N.J. 329, 355 , 554 A.2d 1315 (1989).

2013E.g., State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40, 45 , 853 A.2d 903 (2004); State v. Hill, 115 N.J. 169, 173 , 557 A.2d 322 (1989); State v. Mollica, 114 N.J. 329, 355 , 554 A.2d 1315 (1989).

2013E.g., State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40, 45 , 853 A.2d 903 (2004); State v. Hill, 115 N.J. 169, 173 , 557 A.2d 322 (1989); State v. Mollica, 114 N.J. 329, 355 , 554 A.2d 1315 (1989).

2013See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497 (6th Cir.2003) (noting a distinct privacy expectation within the home that rendered the police search unconstitutional); United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir.) (finding that the third-party intervention exception did not apply to residences, reasoning that “[the defendant] had a legitimate and significant privacy interest in the contents of his motel room and this privacy interest was not breached in its entirety merely because the motel manager viewed some of those contents”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1281 , 117 S.Ct. 2467 , 138 L

2013See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497 (6th Cir.2003) (noting a distinct privacy expectation within the home that rendered the police search unconstitutional); United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir.) (finding that the third-party intervention exception did not apply to residences, reasoning that “[the defendant] had a legitimate and significant privacy interest in the contents of his motel room and this privacy interest was not breached in its entirety merely because the motel manager viewed some of those contents”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1281 , 117 S.Ct. 2467 , 138 L

2013E.g., State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40, 45 , 853 A.2d 903 (2004); State v. Hill, 115 N.J. 169, 173 , 557 A.2d 322 (1989); State v. Mollica, 114 N.J. 329, 355 , 554 A.2d 1315 (1989).

2013E.g., State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40, 45 , 853 A.2d 903 (2004); State v. Hill, 115 N.J. 169, 173 , 557 A.2d 322 (1989); State v. Mollica, 114 N.J. 329, 355 , 554 A.2d 1315 (1989).

2013See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497 (6th Cir.2003) (noting a distinct privacy expectation within the home that rendered the police search unconstitutional); United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir.) (finding that the third-party intervention exception did not apply to residences, reasoning that “[the defendant] had a legitimate and significant privacy interest in the contents of his motel room and this privacy interest was not breached in its entirety merely because the motel manager viewed some of those contents”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1281 , 117 S.Ct. 2467 , 138 L

2013See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497 (6th Cir.2003) (noting a distinct privacy expectation within the home that rendered the police search unconstitutional); United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir.) (finding that the third-party intervention exception did not apply to residences, reasoning that “[the defendant] had a legitimate and significant privacy interest in the contents of his motel room and this privacy interest was not breached in its entirety merely because the motel manager viewed some of those contents”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1281 , 117 S.Ct. 2467 , 138 L

2013For instance, in United States v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012 (5th Cir.1998), the Fifth Circuit considered a situation involving a defendant who had hired contractors to do roofing work at his home.

2013Id. at 1024 .

2013Both Judge D’Annunzio in Saez, 268 N.J.Super. at 271 , 633 A.2d 551 , and the trial judge in the present case, cited to the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Bomengo, 580 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 US. 1117, 99 S.Ct. 1022 , 59 L.Ed.2d 75 (1979), as authority for applying the third-party intervention doctrine to a landlord-tenant context.

2013This is illustrated by Bomengo, supra, where the lack of a warrant was excused—not because the landlord consented to the police entry—but instead because the third-party intervention doctrine allowed the police to examine what the landlord had already viewed in the course of his private observations of the leased premises. 580 F.2d at 176 .

2013Both Judge D’Annunzio in Saez, 268 N.J.Super. at 271 , 633 A.2d 551 , and the trial judge in the present case, cited to the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Bomengo, 580 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 US. 1117, 99 S.Ct. 1022 , 59 L.Ed.2d 75 (1979), as authority for applying the third-party intervention doctrine to a landlord-tenant context.

2013Both Judge D’Annunzio in Saez, 268 N.J.Super. at 271 , 633 A.2d 551 , and the trial judge in the present case, cited to the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Bomengo, 580 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 US. 1117, 99 S.Ct. 1022 , 59 L.Ed.2d 75 (1979), as authority for applying the third-party intervention doctrine to a landlord-tenant context.

2013Both Judge D’Annunzio in Saez, 268 N.J.Super. at 271 , 633 A.2d 551 , and the trial judge in the present case, cited to the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Bomengo, 580 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 US. 1117, 99 S.Ct. 1022 , 59 L.Ed.2d 75 (1979), as authority for applying the third-party intervention doctrine to a landlord-tenant context.

2013Both Judge D’Annunzio in Saez, 268 N.J.Super. at 271 , 633 A.2d 551 , and the trial judge in the present case, cited to the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Bomengo, 580 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 US. 1117, 99 S.Ct. 1022 , 59 L.Ed.2d 75 (1979), as authority for applying the third-party intervention doctrine to a landlord-tenant context.

2013See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497 (6th Cir.2003) (noting a distinct privacy expectation within the home that rendered the police search unconstitutional); United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir.) (finding that the third-party intervention exception did not apply to residences, reasoning that “[the defendant] had a legitimate and significant privacy interest in the contents of his motel room and this privacy interest was not breached in its entirety merely because the motel manager viewed some of those contents”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1281 , 117 S.Ct. 2467 , 138 L

2013See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497 (6th Cir.2003) (noting a distinct privacy expectation within the home that rendered the police search unconstitutional); United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir.) (finding that the third-party intervention exception did not apply to residences, reasoning that “[the defendant] had a legitimate and significant privacy interest in the contents of his motel room and this privacy interest was not breached in its entirety merely because the motel manager viewed some of those contents”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1281 , 117 S.Ct. 2467 , 138 L

2013See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497 (6th Cir.2003) (noting a distinct privacy expectation within the home that rendered the police search unconstitutional); United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir.) (finding that the third-party intervention exception did not apply to residences, reasoning that “[the defendant] had a legitimate and significant privacy interest in the contents of his motel room and this privacy interest was not breached in its entirety merely because the motel manager viewed some of those contents”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1281 , 117 S.Ct. 2467 , 138 L

2013See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497 (6th Cir.2003) (noting a distinct privacy expectation within the home that rendered the police search unconstitutional); United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir.) (finding that the third-party intervention exception did not apply to residences, reasoning that “[the defendant] had a legitimate and significant privacy interest in the contents of his motel room and this privacy interest was not breached in its entirety merely because the motel manager viewed some of those contents”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1281 , 117 S.Ct. 2467 , 138 L

2013See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497 (6th Cir.2003) (noting a distinct privacy expectation within the home that rendered the police search unconstitutional); United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir.) (finding that the third-party intervention exception did not apply to residences, reasoning that “[the defendant] had a legitimate and significant privacy interest in the contents of his motel room and this privacy interest was not breached in its entirety merely because the motel manager viewed some of those contents”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1281 , 117 S.Ct. 2467 , 138 L

2013See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497 (6th Cir.2003) (noting a distinct privacy expectation within the home that rendered the police search unconstitutional); United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir.) (finding that the third-party intervention exception did not apply to residences, reasoning that “[the defendant] had a legitimate and significant privacy interest in the contents of his motel room and this privacy interest was not breached in its entirety merely because the motel manager viewed some of those contents”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1281 , 117 S.Ct. 2467 , 138 L

2013See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497 (6th Cir.2003) (noting a distinct privacy expectation within the home that rendered the police search unconstitutional); United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir.) (finding that the third-party intervention exception did not apply to residences, reasoning that “[the defendant] had a legitimate and significant privacy interest in the contents of his motel room and this privacy interest was not breached in its entirety merely because the motel manager viewed some of those contents”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1281 , 117 S.Ct. 2467 , 138 L

2013See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497 (6th Cir.2003) (noting a distinct privacy expectation within the home that rendered the police search unconstitutional); United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir.) (finding that the third-party intervention exception did not apply to residences, reasoning that “[the defendant] had a legitimate and significant privacy interest in the contents of his motel room and this privacy interest was not breached in its entirety merely because the motel manager viewed some of those contents”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1281 , 117 S.Ct. 2467 , 138 L