artificial rule in New York

1998In this regard, it is worthy of note that the Hooks court, and to some degree the De Kalb court as well, treated the passage of title as merely one element to consider—albeit a significant one—in applying the “closely allied” test to arrive at the parties’ intentions (see, e.g., Matter of Hooks, supra, at 340-341; De Kalb Bank v Purdy, supra, 205 Ill App 3d, at 68-69, 562 NE2d, at 1226-1227 ).

1998In this regard, it is worthy of note that the Hooks court, and to some degree the De Kalb court as well, treated the passage of title as merely one element to consider—albeit a significant one—in applying the “closely allied” test to arrive at the parties’ intentions (see, e.g., Matter of Hooks, supra, at 340-341; De Kalb Bank v Purdy, supra, 205 Ill App 3d, at 68-69, 562 NE2d, at 1226-1227 ).

1981While the Rogers rule (People v Rogers, 48 NY2d 167 ) is rationally founded at the very least on the basis that undue advantage should not be taken of one in custody on an unrelated matter in which he has counsel, there is no rational basis for extending application of that rule to create an artificial presumption of continuing representation by counsel on crimes allegedly committed by that same individual subsequent to his release from custody.

1959(Matter of Woodward, 117 N. Y. 522, 525 .) In the absence of an indicated intent to the contrary the words and expressions found in a will are to be given their usual and ordinary meaning without enlargement and without restriction.

1936Surrogate Wingate in Matter of Katz ( 135 Misc. 861 ), said: “While the presumption of death has at times been referred to as one of law, the better opinion holds it to be a mixed presumption, with the factual element the more important.” (See editorial entitled “ Seven Years Absence — Presumption of Death” appearing in the New York Law Journal in three installments, on July 18, 19 and 20, 1932.) In Matter of Wagener ( 143 App. Div. 286 [1911]) Mr. Justice Miller said: “ That the rule was adopted * * ' * as a rule of necessity ” and that “ it is necessarily an artificial rule, depending for it

1936Surrogate Wingate in Matter of Katz ( 135 Misc. 861 ), said: “While the presumption of death has at times been referred to as one of law, the better opinion holds it to be a mixed presumption, with the factual element the more important.” (See editorial entitled “ Seven Years Absence — Presumption of Death” appearing in the New York Law Journal in three installments, on July 18, 19 and 20, 1932.) In Matter of Wagener ( 143 App. Div. 286 [1911]) Mr. Justice Miller said: “ That the rule was adopted * * ' * as a rule of necessity ” and that “ it is necessarily an artificial rule, depending for it

1930Further review of authorities is superfluous since they have already been commented upon at length both in Matter of Abrahams (supra) and Matter of Jackson (supra).

1930Further review of authorities is superfluous since they have already been commented upon at length both in Matter of Abrahams (supra) and Matter of Jackson (supra).

1917In Matter of Keeney ( 194 N. Y. 281 ; affd., sub nom.

1896Chase v. Insurance Co., 20 N. Y. 52 ; Stevens v. Insurance Co., 26 N. Y. 397 ; Day v. Insurance Co., 1 Daly, 13 ; Westfall v. Insurance Co., 2 Duer, 449 ; 1 Phil.

1896Chase v. Insurance Co., 20 N. Y. 52 ; Stevens v. Insurance Co., 26 N. Y. 397 ; Day v. Insurance Co., 1 Daly, 13 ; Westfall v. Insurance Co., 2 Duer, 449 ; 1 Phil.

1896Chase v. Insurance Co., 20 N. Y. 52 ; Stevens v. Insurance Co., 26 N. Y. 397 ; Day v. Insurance Co., 1 Daly, 13 ; Westfall v. Insurance Co., 2 Duer, 449 ; 1 Phil.

1896Chase v. Insurance Co., 20 N. Y. 52 ; Stevens v. Insurance Co., 26 N. Y. 397 ; Day v. Insurance Co., 1 Daly, 13 ; Westfall v. Insurance Co., 2 Duer, 449 ; 1 Phil.

1878(Coye v. Leach, 8 Metc., 371 ; Smith v. Croom, 7 Florida, 81, 180 ; Pell v. Ball, 1 Chevy [Eq.], 99 ; Robinson v. Gallier, 2 Wood C.