balancing of three factors (New York) · Go Syfert
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balancing of three factors in New York

8 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2007 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

CaseFollowedCited
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen
scotus · 1976 · cited in 8 New York opinions naming this issue, 1982–2007
2 sentences

2007The determination concerning “what process is constitutionally due . . . [is] based on the balancing of three factors: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure” (Matter of Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2562, IAFF, AFL-CIO v City of Cohoes, 94 NY2d 686, 691-692 [2000]; see Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 334-335 [1976]; LaRossa, Axenfeld & Mitchell v Abrams, 62 NY2d 583, 588 [1984]).

2000All that remains to be determined then, is what process is constitutionally due those appellants, based on the balancing of three factors: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure (see, Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335 ; see also, Gilbert v Homar, 520 US 924, 931-932 ).

28
Santosky v. Kramergreen
scotus · 1982 · cited in 3 New York opinions naming this issue, 1984–1991
2 sentences

1991A determination as to the nature of the process that is due requires a balancing of three factors: "the private interests affected by the proceeding; the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure” (Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 754 ; see, Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335 ; see also, Matter of Medicon Diagnostic Labs. v Perales, 74 NY2d 539, 546 ).

1985That test involves a balancing of three factors: “the private interests affected by the proceeding; the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure” (Santosky v Kramer, supra, p 754; see also, Addington v Texas, 441 US 418, 425 ; Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335 ).

13
Addington v. Texasgreen
scotus · 1979 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 1982–1985
2 sentences

1985That test involves a balancing of three factors: “the private interests affected by the proceeding; the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure” (Santosky v Kramer, supra, p 754; see also, Addington v Texas, 441 US 418, 425 ; Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335 ).

1982The test to determine what process is constitutionally due involves the balancing of three factors: “the private interests affected by the proceeding; the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure” (Santosky v Kramer, supra, p_, p 1394; Addington v Texas, 441 US 418, 425 ; Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335 ).

12
Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes v. City of Cohoesgreen
ny · 2000 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007The determination concerning “what process is constitutionally due . . . [is] based on the balancing of three factors: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure” (Matter of Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2562, IAFF, AFL-CIO v City of Cohoes, 94 NY2d 686, 691-692 [2000]; see Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 334-335 [1976]; LaRossa, Axenfeld & Mitchell v Abrams, 62 NY2d 583, 588 [1984]).

11
LaRossa, Axenfeld & Mitchell v. Abramsgreen
ny · 1984 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007The determination concerning “what process is constitutionally due . . . [is] based on the balancing of three factors: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure” (Matter of Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2562, IAFF, AFL-CIO v City of Cohoes, 94 NY2d 686, 691-692 [2000]; see Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 334-335 [1976]; LaRossa, Axenfeld & Mitchell v Abrams, 62 NY2d 583, 588 [1984]).

11
Gilbert v. Homargreen
scotus · 1997 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
1 sentence

2000All that remains to be determined then, is what process is constitutionally due those appellants, based on the balancing of three factors: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure (see, Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335 ; see also, Gilbert v Homar, 520 US 924, 931-932 ).

11
MATTER OF LEE TT. v. Dowlinggreen
· 1996 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
1 sentence

1997Evaluation of the constitutional sufficiency of administrative procedures involves the balancing of three factors: (1) the nature of the private interest affected by the State’s action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation and the effect of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the governmental interest (see, Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319 ; see also, Matter of Lee TT. v Dowling, supra).

11
Medicon Diagnostic Laboratories, Inc. v. Peralesgreen
ny · 1989 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
1 sentence

1991A determination as to the nature of the process that is due requires a balancing of three factors: "the private interests affected by the proceeding; the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure” (Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 754 ; see, Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335 ; see also, Matter of Medicon Diagnostic Labs. v Perales, 74 NY2d 539, 546 ).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

CaseCitedYears
Hurwitz v. Perales green
ny · 1993
1 sentence

2000Balancing those factors, although an administrative hearing may ultimately be required before section 207-a payments are terminated (see, Matter of Goglia v Sardino, supra), recipients are not entitled to a hearing — as claimed by appellants here — prior to the issuance of a report for light duty order (see, Matter of Hurwitz v Perales, 81 NY2d 182, 187 ).

12000–2000
In re Christine H. green
nyfamct · 1982
1 sentence

1985In a detailed analysis of the foregoing test in the context of a New York child abuse proceeding, the court in Matter of Christine H. (supra) concluded that the present statutory burden established in Family Court Act § 1046 (b) was inadequate to meet minimal due process requirements under Santosky (supra).

11985–1985
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft green
scotus · 1978
2 sentences

1983Determination of that question requires a balancing of three factors: (1) the private interest affected, (2) the possibility of error in the procedure used and the probable value of other or additional procedural safeguards, and (3) the interest protected by the "State action" taken and the burdens that other or additional safeguards would impose ( Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v Craft , 436 US 1, 17 ; Mathews v Eldridge , 424 US 319, 334-335 ).

1983Determination of that question requires a balancing of three factors: (1) the private interest affected, (2) the possibility of error in the procedure used and the probable value of other or additional procedural safeguards, and (3) the interest protected by the “State action” taken and the burdens that other or additional safeguards would impose (Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v Craft, 436 US 1, 17 ; Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 334-335 ).

11983–1983

Where else courts name it

IN 99 (1981–2026) TX 14 (1997–2015) NY 8 (1982–2007) MD 4 (1984–2015) HI 3 (2025–2026) NJ 3 (2011–2021) IL 3 (2006–2006) CA 3 (1993–2020) IA 2 (1994–2012) NH 2 (1988–2011) WA 2 (1998–2014) UT 2 (1997–2014) ME 2 (1999–2008)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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