bearing a heavy presumption in New York

1993The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity” (Bantam Books v Sullivan, 372 US 58, 70 [1963], citing Near v Minnesota, 283 US 697 [1931]).

1969The United States Supreme Court has held that ‘ ‘ Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity ” (Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 70 ), and that while “ the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited ” (Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 716 ), “ the limitation is the exception; it is to be closely confined so as to preclude what may fairly be deemed licensing or censorship ” (Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436, 441 ).

1973The United States Supreme Court has frequently emphasized that “ a system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.” (Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U. S. 175, 181 ; Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58 ; Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 ; New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713 ).

1965S. 944 [March 15,1965]; Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U. S. 43 ), but the court did emphasize once again that “ ‘ [a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. ’ Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, [ 372 U. S. 58 ], at 70.” Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 57 , supra.) The reasoning of the Freedman case applies with equal force to the New York procedural scheme (Trans-Lux Distr.

2009(Carlson v California, 310 US 106 [1940].) “There is no doubt that as a general matter peaceful . . . leafletting [is an] expressive activity] involving ‘speech’ protected by the First Amendment.” (United States v Grace, 461 US 171, 176 [1983]; see also Martin v City of Struthers, 319 US 141 [1943]; SHAD Alliance v Smith Haven Mall, 66 NY2d 496 [1985].) “[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.” (Nebraska Press Assn. v Stuart, 427 US 539, 559 [1976]; see also John Doe, Inc. v Mukasey, 549 F3d 861 [2d Cir 2

2009(Carlson v California, 310 US 106 [1940].) “There is no doubt that as a general matter peaceful . . . leafletting [is an] expressive activity] involving ‘speech’ protected by the First Amendment.” (United States v Grace, 461 US 171, 176 [1983]; see also Martin v City of Struthers, 319 US 141 [1943]; SHAD Alliance v Smith Haven Mall, 66 NY2d 496 [1985].) “[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.” (Nebraska Press Assn. v Stuart, 427 US 539, 559 [1976]; see also John Doe, Inc. v Mukasey, 549 F3d 861 [2d Cir 2

2009(Beal v Stern, 184 F3d 117 [2d Cir 1999]; MacDonald v Safir, 206 F3d 183 [2d Cir 2000].) Such a determination, however, is not the end of the court’s inquiry into the constitu tional validity of the ordinance in question.

2009(Beal v Stern, 184 F3d 117 [2d Cir 1999]; MacDonald v Safir, 206 F3d 183 [2d Cir 2000].) Such a determination, however, is not the end of the court’s inquiry into the constitu tional validity of the ordinance in question.

2009(Carlson v California, 310 US 106 [1940].) “There is no doubt that as a general matter peaceful . . . leafletting [is an] expressive activity] involving ‘speech’ protected by the First Amendment.” (United States v Grace, 461 US 171, 176 [1983]; see also Martin v City of Struthers, 319 US 141 [1943]; SHAD Alliance v Smith Haven Mall, 66 NY2d 496 [1985].) “[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.” (Nebraska Press Assn. v Stuart, 427 US 539, 559 [1976]; see also John Doe, Inc. v Mukasey, 549 F3d 861 [2d Cir 2

2009(Carlson v California, 310 US 106 [1940].) “There is no doubt that as a general matter peaceful . . . leafletting [is an] expressive activity] involving ‘speech’ protected by the First Amendment.” (United States v Grace, 461 US 171, 176 [1983]; see also Martin v City of Struthers, 319 US 141 [1943]; SHAD Alliance v Smith Haven Mall, 66 NY2d 496 [1985].) “[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.” (Nebraska Press Assn. v Stuart, 427 US 539, 559 [1976]; see also John Doe, Inc. v Mukasey, 549 F3d 861 [2d Cir 2

1985The Supreme Court has stated that “[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity” (Bantam Books v Sullivan, 372 US 58, 70 ), and has justified this treatment of prior restraints on “a theory deeply etched in our law: a free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand” (Southeastern Promotions v Conrad, 420 US, at p 559 , supra [emphasis in original]).

1973In Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham ( 394 U. S. 147, 149 ), the court held that a city ordinance making it an offense to participate in any parade or procession or other public demonstration without first obtaining a permit from the city commission and authorizing the members of the commission to refuse a permit if required to by public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience ” was unconstitutional, since it subjected the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensin

1973The United States Supreme Court has frequently emphasized that “ a system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.” (Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U. S. 175, 181 ; Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58 ; Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 ; New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713 ).

1969The United States Supreme Court has held that ‘ ‘ Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity ” (Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 70 ), and that while “ the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited ” (Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 716 ), “ the limitation is the exception; it is to be closely confined so as to preclude what may fairly be deemed licensing or censorship ” (Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436, 441 ).

1965Corp. v. Board of Begents, 380 U. S. 259 , supra): the absence in our laws of “ adequate safeguards against undue inhibition of protected expression” (Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 60 , stopra) renders invalid the underlying requirement of prior submission to censorship.

1965S. 944 [March 15,1965]; Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U. S. 43 ), but the court did emphasize once again that “ ‘ [a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. ’ Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, [ 372 U. S. 58 ], at 70.” Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 57 , supra.) The reasoning of the Freedman case applies with equal force to the New York procedural scheme (Trans-Lux Distr.