credit clause in New York

2012Respondent further distinguishes Phoenix Home ( 162 Misc 2d 142 [1994], supra) on the basis that the arguments made here were not made in that case, and in any event, it was “obviously an outcome-driven determination” (id. at 18 n 8).

1989The residence requirement was perceived as constitutional under August v Bronstein ( 369 F Supp 190 , affd 417 US 901 ), which upheld a comparable residency requirement in Civil Service Law § 85, so plaintiffs, who satisfied all conditions except the residency requirement, failed to apply for the credit or to challenge the residency requirement during the appropriate time.

1989After the United States Supreme Court specifically overruled August v Bronstein (supra) in striking down as unconstitutional the comparable residency requirement in Civil Service Law § 85 (Attorney-General of N. Y. v Soto-Lopez, 476 US 898, 912, n 9 ), plaintiffs commenced this action for a judgment declaring that the residency requirement of Education Law § 503 (10) is unconstitutional and an order allowing them to purchase the credit.

1989The residence requirement was perceived as constitutional under August v Bronstein ( 369 F Supp 190 , affd 417 US 901 ), which upheld a comparable residency requirement in Civil Service Law § 85, so plaintiffs, who satisfied all conditions except the residency requirement, failed to apply for the credit or to challenge the residency requirement during the appropriate time.

1987It is only when each branch of the profession performs its function properly that justice can be administered to the satisfaction of both the litigants and society and a body of decisions developed that will be a credit to the bar, the courts and the state’ ” (Matter of Cicio v City of New York, supra, at 40, quoting from Matter of Greenberg, 15 NJ 132, 137-138, 104 A2d 46, 49 ).

1983We trust that this case will serve as a warning that counsel are expected to live up to the full measure of their professional obligation (cf. Slater v Gallman, 38 NY2d 1 , supra).

1965The rule is the same in most other jurisdictions (Ann., Custody of Child-Jurisdiction, 4 ADR 2d 7 et seq.). 2 “ But ”, the court goes on to say, “ the existence of power in the court to ignore the Swiss decree and depart from principles of comity does not mean that the power should be exercised in the absence of extraordinary circumstances demonstrating that otherwise the children will suffer (Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N. Y. 429 ; Wicks v. Cox, 146 Tex. 489 ; see Matter of Sutera v. Sutera, 1 AD 2d 356 ; cf. Arpels v. Arpels, 9 AD 2d 336 ). * * * And the crux of the matter here is that only by wit

1965The rule is the same in most other jurisdictions (Ann., Custody of Child-Jurisdiction, 4 ADR 2d 7 et seq.). 2 “ But ”, the court goes on to say, “ the existence of power in the court to ignore the Swiss decree and depart from principles of comity does not mean that the power should be exercised in the absence of extraordinary circumstances demonstrating that otherwise the children will suffer (Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N. Y. 429 ; Wicks v. Cox, 146 Tex. 489 ; see Matter of Sutera v. Sutera, 1 AD 2d 356 ; cf. Arpels v. Arpels, 9 AD 2d 336 ). * * * And the crux of the matter here is that only by wit

1965The rule is the same in most other jurisdictions (Ann., Custody of Child-Jurisdiction, 4 ADR 2d 7 et seq.). 2 “ But ”, the court goes on to say, “ the existence of power in the court to ignore the Swiss decree and depart from principles of comity does not mean that the power should be exercised in the absence of extraordinary circumstances demonstrating that otherwise the children will suffer (Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N. Y. 429 ; Wicks v. Cox, 146 Tex. 489 ; see Matter of Sutera v. Sutera, 1 AD 2d 356 ; cf. Arpels v. Arpels, 9 AD 2d 336 ). * * * And the crux of the matter here is that only by wit

1956(See Matter of Gimprich v. Board of Educ. of City of N. Y., 306 N. Y. 401 .) The statute (Administrative Code of City of New York, § B20-4.0) provides that each teacher shall file with the'board a detailed statement of all prior teaching service, this being done according,to the rules of the board at time of entrance into service.

1924(Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, Inc., v. Frankel, 196 App. Div. 701 ; affd., without opinion, 234 N. Y. 580 .) The case of Peierls, Buhler & Co., Inc., v. Newburger ( 202 App. Div. 471 ), relied upon by the learned court at Special Term, is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar, for there the credit clause was as follows: “All terms and limits of credit specified therein were subject at all times before and after acceptance thereof to be changed or withdrawn by Peierls, Buhler & Co., Inc., to whom all bills were payable.” That clause expressly gave power to the sellers to withdraw all terms

1924(Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, Inc., v. Frankel, 196 App. Div. 701 ; affd., without opinion, 234 N. Y. 580 .) The case of Peierls, Buhler & Co., Inc., v. Newburger ( 202 App. Div. 471 ), relied upon by the learned court at Special Term, is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar, for there the credit clause was as follows: “All terms and limits of credit specified therein were subject at all times before and after acceptance thereof to be changed or withdrawn by Peierls, Buhler & Co., Inc., to whom all bills were payable.” That clause expressly gave power to the sellers to withdraw all terms

1924(Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, Inc., v. Frankel, 196 App. Div. 701 ; affd., without opinion, 234 N. Y. 580 .) The case of Peierls, Buhler & Co., Inc., v. Newburger ( 202 App. Div. 471 ), relied upon by the learned court at Special Term, is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar, for there the credit clause was as follows: “All terms and limits of credit specified therein were subject at all times before and after acceptance thereof to be changed or withdrawn by Peierls, Buhler & Co., Inc., to whom all bills were payable.” That clause expressly gave power to the sellers to withdraw all terms

1902Ransom v. Supervisors; 78 N. Y. 622 ), and yet to- the credit of the bar be it said that there is no record or even suggestion of the failure of counsel so- assigned to render zealous and satisfactory services, even though without reward or hope of reward.