defendant overcame presumption in New York

2014The defendant overcame the presumption that funds he deposited into the account of Clark Development, LLC (hereinafter CD, LLC), a company he formed during the marriage, were marital funds by presenting sufficient evidence that the source of the funds was separate property (see Tsigler v Kasymova, 73 AD3d 1159, 1160 [2010]).

2014The defendant overcame the presumption that funds he deposited into the account of Clark Development, LLC (hereinafter CD, LLC), a company he formed during the marriage, were marital funds by presenting sufficient evidence that the source of the funds was separate property (see Tsigler v Kasymova, 73 AD3d 1159, 1160 [2010]).

2014Moreover, although appreciation of, or increase in the value of, separate property is considered separate property, “except to the extent that such appreciation is due in part to the contributions or efforts of the other spouse” (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [1] [d] [3]), the plaintiff failed to carry her burden of establishing that CD, LLC, as the defendant’s separate property, appreciated in value during the parties’ marriage (see Patete v Rodriguez, 109 AD3d 595, 598 [2013]).

2014Moreover, although appreciation of, or increase in the value of, separate property is considered separate property, “except to the extent that such appreciation is due in part to the contributions or efforts of the other spouse” (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [1] [d] [3]), the plaintiff failed to carry her burden of establishing that CD, LLC, as the defendant’s separate property, appreciated in value during the parties’ marriage (see Patete v Rodriguez, 109 AD3d 595, 598 [2013]).

2013Considering, among other factors, the distribution of marital property, the duration of the marriage, the health of the parties, the present and future earning capacity of both parties, and the ability of the plaintiff to become self-supporting (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6]; Kelly v Kelly, 69 AD3d 577, 578-579 [2010]; Meccariello v Meccariello, 46 AD3d 640, 641-642 [2007]), the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff an award of spousal maintenance (see Dellafiora v Dellafiora, 38 AD3d 825, 826 [2007]; Almeda v Hopper, 2 AD3d 471 [2003]).

2013Considering, among other factors, the distribution of marital property, the duration of the marriage, the health of the parties, the present and future earning capacity of both parties, and the ability of the plaintiff to become self-supporting (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6]; Kelly v Kelly, 69 AD3d 577, 578-579 [2010]; Meccariello v Meccariello, 46 AD3d 640, 641-642 [2007]), the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff an award of spousal maintenance (see Dellafiora v Dellafiora, 38 AD3d 825, 826 [2007]; Almeda v Hopper, 2 AD3d 471 [2003]).

2013Here, the defendant overcame the presumption that he intended to commingle his funds by establishing that he deposited them in the parties’ joint account for only a few days, and then removed the funds and placed them into an account in his name only (see Banking Law § 675 [b]; Wade v Steinfeld, 15 AD3d at 391 ; McGarrity v McGarrity, 211 AD2d 669, 671 [1995]). “[T]he amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and every case must be determined on its own unique facts” (Wortman v Wortman, 11 AD3d 604, 606 [2004]; see DiBlasi v DiBlasi, 4

2013Here, the defendant overcame the presumption that he intended to commingle his funds by establishing that he deposited them in the parties’ joint account for only a few days, and then removed the funds and placed them into an account in his name only (see Banking Law § 675 [b]; Wade v Steinfeld, 15 AD3d at 391 ; McGarrity v McGarrity, 211 AD2d 669, 671 [1995]). “[T]he amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and every case must be determined on its own unique facts” (Wortman v Wortman, 11 AD3d 604, 606 [2004]; see DiBlasi v DiBlasi, 4

2013Here, the defendant overcame the presumption that he intended to commingle his funds by establishing that he deposited them in the parties’ joint account for only a few days, and then removed the funds and placed them into an account in his name only (see Banking Law § 675 [b]; Wade v Steinfeld, 15 AD3d at 391 ; McGarrity v McGarrity, 211 AD2d 669, 671 [1995]). “[T]he amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and every case must be determined on its own unique facts” (Wortman v Wortman, 11 AD3d 604, 606 [2004]; see DiBlasi v DiBlasi, 4

2013Here, the defendant overcame the presumption that he intended to commingle his funds by establishing that he deposited them in the parties’ joint account for only a few days, and then removed the funds and placed them into an account in his name only (see Banking Law § 675 [b]; Wade v Steinfeld, 15 AD3d at 391 ; McGarrity v McGarrity, 211 AD2d 669, 671 [1995]). “[T]he amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and every case must be determined on its own unique facts” (Wortman v Wortman, 11 AD3d 604, 606 [2004]; see DiBlasi v DiBlasi, 4

2013Considering, among other factors, the distribution of marital property, the duration of the marriage, the health of the parties, the present and future earning capacity of both parties, and the ability of the plaintiff to become self-supporting (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6]; Kelly v Kelly, 69 AD3d 577, 578-579 [2010]; Meccariello v Meccariello, 46 AD3d 640, 641-642 [2007]), the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff an award of spousal maintenance (see Dellafiora v Dellafiora, 38 AD3d 825, 826 [2007]; Almeda v Hopper, 2 AD3d 471 [2003]).

2013Considering, among other factors, the distribution of marital property, the duration of the marriage, the health of the parties, the present and future earning capacity of both parties, and the ability of the plaintiff to become self-supporting (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6]; Kelly v Kelly, 69 AD3d 577, 578-579 [2010]; Meccariello v Meccariello, 46 AD3d 640, 641-642 [2007]), the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff an award of spousal maintenance (see Dellafiora v Dellafiora, 38 AD3d 825, 826 [2007]; Almeda v Hopper, 2 AD3d 471 [2003]).

2013Here, the defendant overcame the presumption that he intended to commingle his funds by establishing that he deposited them in the parties’ joint account for only a few days, and then removed the funds and placed them into an account in his name only (see Banking Law § 675 [b]; Wade v Steinfeld, 15 AD3d at 391 ; McGarrity v McGarrity, 211 AD2d 669, 671 [1995]). “[T]he amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and every case must be determined on its own unique facts” (Wortman v Wortman, 11 AD3d 604, 606 [2004]; see DiBlasi v DiBlasi, 4

2013Here, the defendant overcame the presumption that he intended to commingle his funds by establishing that he deposited them in the parties’ joint account for only a few days, and then removed the funds and placed them into an account in his name only (see Banking Law § 675 [b]; Wade v Steinfeld, 15 AD3d at 391 ; McGarrity v McGarrity, 211 AD2d 669, 671 [1995]). “[T]he amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and every case must be determined on its own unique facts” (Wortman v Wortman, 11 AD3d 604, 606 [2004]; see DiBlasi v DiBlasi, 4

2013Here, the defendant overcame the presumption that he intended to commingle his funds by establishing that he deposited them in the parties’ joint account for only a few days, and then removed the funds and placed them into an account in his name only (see Banking Law § 675 [b]; Wade v Steinfeld, 15 AD3d at 391 ; McGarrity v McGarrity, 211 AD2d 669, 671 [1995]). “[T]he amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and every case must be determined on its own unique facts” (Wortman v Wortman, 11 AD3d 604, 606 [2004]; see DiBlasi v DiBlasi, 4

2013Here, the defendant overcame the presumption that he intended to commingle his funds by establishing that he deposited them in the parties’ joint account for only a few days, and then removed the funds and placed them into an account in his name only (see Banking Law § 675 [b]; Wade v Steinfeld, 15 AD3d at 391 ; McGarrity v McGarrity, 211 AD2d 669, 671 [1995]). “[T]he amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and every case must be determined on its own unique facts” (Wortman v Wortman, 11 AD3d 604, 606 [2004]; see DiBlasi v DiBlasi, 4

2013Considering, among other factors, the distribution of marital property, the duration of the marriage, the health of the parties, the present and future earning capacity of both parties, and the ability of the plaintiff to become self-supporting (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6]; Kelly v Kelly, 69 AD3d 577, 578-579 [2010]; Meccariello v Meccariello, 46 AD3d 640, 641-642 [2007]), the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff an award of spousal maintenance (see Dellafiora v Dellafiora, 38 AD3d 825, 826 [2007]; Almeda v Hopper, 2 AD3d 471 [2003]).

2013Considering, among other factors, the distribution of marital property, the duration of the marriage, the health of the parties, the present and future earning capacity of both parties, and the ability of the plaintiff to become self-supporting (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6]; Kelly v Kelly, 69 AD3d 577, 578-579 [2010]; Meccariello v Meccariello, 46 AD3d 640, 641-642 [2007]), the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff an award of spousal maintenance (see Dellafiora v Dellafiora, 38 AD3d 825, 826 [2007]; Almeda v Hopper, 2 AD3d 471 [2003]).

2013Here, the defendant overcame the presumption that he intended to commingle his funds by establishing that he deposited them in the parties’ joint account for only a few days, and then removed the funds and placed them into an account in his name only (see Banking Law § 675 [b]; Wade v Steinfeld, 15 AD3d at 391 ; McGarrity v McGarrity, 211 AD2d 669, 671 [1995]). “[T]he amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and every case must be determined on its own unique facts” (Wortman v Wortman, 11 AD3d 604, 606 [2004]; see DiBlasi v DiBlasi, 4

2013Here, the defendant overcame the presumption that he intended to commingle his funds by establishing that he deposited them in the parties’ joint account for only a few days, and then removed the funds and placed them into an account in his name only (see Banking Law § 675 [b]; Wade v Steinfeld, 15 AD3d at 391 ; McGarrity v McGarrity, 211 AD2d 669, 671 [1995]). “[T]he amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and every case must be determined on its own unique facts” (Wortman v Wortman, 11 AD3d 604, 606 [2004]; see DiBlasi v DiBlasi, 4

2020The defendant overcame the presumption that her separate property funds, which were commingled in a bank account with marital funds, constituted marital property, as she demonstrated that the funds had been deposited into the account with marital funds for only one day as a matter of convenience ( see Belilos v Rivera , 164 AD3d 1411 , 1412-1413; Chamberlain v Chamberlain , 24 AD3d 589, 593 ; Wade v Steinfeld , 15 AD3d 390, 391 ).

2013Here, the defendant overcame the presumption that he intended to commingle his funds by establishing that he deposited them in the parties’ joint account for only a few days, and then removed the funds and placed them into an account in his name only (see Banking Law § 675 [b]; Wade v Steinfeld, 15 AD3d at 391 ; McGarrity v McGarrity, 211 AD2d 669, 671 [1995]). “[T]he amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and every case must be determined on its own unique facts” (Wortman v Wortman, 11 AD3d 604, 606 [2004]; see DiBlasi v DiBlasi, 4

2005The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the defendant 30 percent of the value of the degrees and license constituting the enhanced earning capacity achieved by the plaintiff during the marriage, based upon his indirect contributions to the attainment of that enhanced earning capacity by paying all of the family’s living expenses while the plaintiff was a student and modifying his employment schedule in order to enable him to care for the parties’ older child, who was born during that period (see McSparron v McSparron, 87 NY2d 275, 280 [1995]; Miklos v Miklos, 9 AD3d

2005The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the defendant 30 percent of the value of the degrees and license constituting the enhanced earning capacity achieved by the plaintiff during the marriage, based upon his indirect contributions to the attainment of that enhanced earning capacity by paying all of the family’s living expenses while the plaintiff was a student and modifying his employment schedule in order to enable him to care for the parties’ older child, who was born during that period (see McSparron v McSparron, 87 NY2d 275, 280 [1995]; Miklos v Miklos, 9 AD3d

2005The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the defendant 30 percent of the value of the degrees and license constituting the enhanced earning capacity achieved by the plaintiff during the marriage, based upon his indirect contributions to the attainment of that enhanced earning capacity by paying all of the family’s living expenses while the plaintiff was a student and modifying his employment schedule in order to enable him to care for the parties’ older child, who was born during that period (see McSparron v McSparron, 87 NY2d 275, 280 [1995]; Miklos v Miklos, 9 AD3d

2005The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the defendant 30 percent of the value of the degrees and license constituting the enhanced earning capacity achieved by the plaintiff during the marriage, based upon his indirect contributions to the attainment of that enhanced earning capacity by paying all of the family’s living expenses while the plaintiff was a student and modifying his employment schedule in order to enable him to care for the parties’ older child, who was born during that period (see McSparron v McSparron, 87 NY2d 275, 280 [1995]; Miklos v Miklos, 9 AD3d