WPA claim in Michigan

2023With respect to an about-to-report WPA claim, MCL 15.363(4) provides that “[a]n employee shall show by clear and convincing evidence that he or she or a person acting on his or her behalf was about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body.” (Emphasis added.) -11- In Wurtz v Beecher Metro Dist, 495 Mich 242, 251-252 ; 848 NW2d 121 (2014), our Supreme Court explained: Drawing from the statutory language, this Court has identified three elements that a plaintiff must

2023With respect to an about-to-report WPA claim, MCL 15.363(4) provides that “[a]n employee shall show by clear and convincing evidence that he or she or a person acting on his or her behalf was about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body.” (Emphasis added.) -11- In Wurtz v Beecher Metro Dist, 495 Mich 242, 251-252 ; 848 NW2d 121 (2014), our Supreme Court explained: Drawing from the statutory language, this Court has identified three elements that a plaintiff must

2022MCL 15.363 sets forth the limitations period for bringing a WPA claim: (1) A person who alleges a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief, or actual damages, or both within 90 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this act. [Emphasis added.] As explained by our Supreme Court in Millar v Construction Code Auth, 501 Mich 233, 240-241 ; 912 NW2d 521 (2018): . . . [I]n order for an actionable wrong under the WPA to have occurred, an employer must have done more than simply make a decision to discriminate against an employee.

2022MCL 15.363 sets forth the limitations period for bringing a WPA claim: (1) A person who alleges a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief, or actual damages, or both within 90 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this act. [Emphasis added.] As explained by our Supreme Court in Millar v Construction Code Auth, 501 Mich 233, 240-241 ; 912 NW2d 521 (2018): . . . [I]n order for an actionable wrong under the WPA to have occurred, an employer must have done more than simply make a decision to discriminate against an employee.

2020Relevant to the instant matter, this Court held that the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s second motion for attorney fees, “solely because it believed that the fees were for ‘subsequent judgment activity’ that was ‘not relevant and pertinent to this Whistleblower's Act’ ” was in error, as “[t]he mere fact that the fees were incurred for postjudgment activity does not make the attorney fees unrelated to the WPA claim, nor does that fact standing alone prohibit plaintiffs from recovering these attorney fees.” Cadwell v City of Highland Park, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued

2020Relevant to the instant matter, this Court held that the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s second motion for attorney fees, “solely because it believed that the fees were for ‘subsequent judgment activity’ that was ‘not relevant and pertinent to this Whistleblower's Act’ ” was in error, as “[t]he mere fact that the fees were incurred for postjudgment activity does not make the attorney fees unrelated to the WPA claim, nor does that fact standing alone prohibit plaintiffs from recovering these attorney fees.” Cadwell v City of Highland Park, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued

2023With respect to an about-to-report WPA claim, MCL 15.363(4) provides that “[a]n employee shall show by clear and convincing evidence that he or she or a person acting on his or her behalf was about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body.” (Emphasis added.) -11- In Wurtz v Beecher Metro Dist, 495 Mich 242, 251-252 ; 848 NW2d 121 (2014), our Supreme Court explained: Drawing from the statutory language, this Court has identified three elements that a plaintiff must

2023With respect to an about-to-report WPA claim, MCL 15.363(4) provides that “[a]n employee shall show by clear and convincing evidence that he or she or a person acting on his or her behalf was about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body.” (Emphasis added.) -11- In Wurtz v Beecher Metro Dist, 495 Mich 242, 251-252 ; 848 NW2d 121 (2014), our Supreme Court explained: Drawing from the statutory language, this Court has identified three elements that a plaintiff must

2025Turning to the WPA claim, MCL 15.362 provides that an “employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless the employee knows that the report is false,

2025Turning to the WPA claim, MCL 15.362 provides that an “employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless the employee knows that the report is false,

2022Because mandate those requirements, it is disavowed. [Whitman v City of Burton, 493 Mich 303, 306 ; 831 NW2d 223 (2013).] We therefore reject defendant’s contention that alleged bad faith by Robinson bars her WPA claim. -5- Robinson’s complaint was filed within 90 days of August 21, 2019, it was timely under MCL 15.363(1).

2022Because mandate those requirements, it is disavowed. [Whitman v City of Burton, 493 Mich 303, 306 ; 831 NW2d 223 (2013).] We therefore reject defendant’s contention that alleged bad faith by Robinson bars her WPA claim. -5- Robinson’s complaint was filed within 90 days of August 21, 2019, it was timely under MCL 15.363(1).

2025A. THE TOWNSHIP The trial court did not err by granting summary disposition to the Township of plaintiff’s WPA claim based on his November 2020 termination. “ ‘Protected activity’ under the WPA consists of (1) reporting to a public body a violation of a law, regulation, or rule; (2) being about to report such a violation to a public body; or (3) being asked by a public body to participate in an investigation.” Chandler, 456 Mich at 399 .

2025A. THE TOWNSHIP The trial court did not err by granting summary disposition to the Township of plaintiff’s WPA claim based on his November 2020 termination. “ ‘Protected activity’ under the WPA consists of (1) reporting to a public body a violation of a law, regulation, or rule; (2) being about to report such a violation to a public body; or (3) being asked by a public body to participate in an investigation.” Chandler, 456 Mich at 399 .

2021Id. at 630-631 .

2021Id. at 630-631 .

2022In rejecting the WPA claim, the Court stated that there was “no indication in the record that plaintiff reported . . . her belief that [the operations manager] had already purchased the stove.” Id. at 9 (emphasis added).

2022In rejecting the WPA claim, the Court stated that there was “no indication in the record that plaintiff reported . . . her belief that [the operations manager] had already purchased the stove.” Id. at 9 (emphasis added).

2016As a result, because the WPA provides relief to [the plaintiff] for reporting his fellow employee’s illegal activity, his public policy claim is not sustainable. [Dudewicz v Norris-Schmid, Inc, 443 Mich 68, 78-80 ; 503 NW2d 645 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds, Brown v Detroit Mayor, 478 Mich 589 , 595 n 2; 734 NW2d 514 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added).] Although plaintiff argues that his public policy claim is distinct from his WPA claim and contends that the claims involve various complex factual allegations, a review of the complaint shows that the c

2016As a result, because the WPA provides relief to [the plaintiff] for reporting his fellow employee’s illegal activity, his public policy claim is not sustainable. [Dudewicz v Norris-Schmid, Inc, 443 Mich 68, 78-80 ; 503 NW2d 645 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds, Brown v Detroit Mayor, 478 Mich 589 , 595 n 2; 734 NW2d 514 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added).] Although plaintiff argues that his public policy claim is distinct from his WPA claim and contends that the claims involve various complex factual allegations, a review of the complaint shows that the c

2025See Suchodolski[ v Mich Consol Gas Co, 412 Mich 692, 694-695 ; 316 NW2d 710 (1982)] (noting that courts have “occasionally found sufficient legislative expression of policy to imply a cause of action for wrongful termination even in the absence of an explicit prohibition on retaliatory discharges”) (emphasis added). [Janetsky III, unpub op at 11.] 3 failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain her claims of false imprisonment 7 and assault and battery. 8 With regard to the WPA claim, the Court of Appeals applied the economic- 7 With regard to false imprisonment, the Court of Appeals majori

2025See Suchodolski[ v Mich Consol Gas Co, 412 Mich 692, 694-695 ; 316 NW2d 710 (1982)] (noting that courts have “occasionally found sufficient legislative expression of policy to imply a cause of action for wrongful termination even in the absence of an explicit prohibition on retaliatory discharges”) (emphasis added). [Janetsky III, unpub op at 11.] 3 failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain her claims of false imprisonment 7 and assault and battery. 8 With regard to the WPA claim, the Court of Appeals applied the economic- 7 With regard to false imprisonment, the Court of Appeals majori

2024See Lockwood v Twp of Ellington, 323 Mich App 392, 403-404 ; 917 NW2d 413 (2018) (reasoning that the 60- day period had never commenced because the minutes of a public meeting were neither approved nor made available to the public). -5- focused inquiry,” plaintiff’s claim under the OMA arises from the same “transactional setting” as plaintiff’s claim of a WPA violation alleged in the original complaint, namely, defendants’ decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment at the May 27, 2021 meeting.

2024See Lockwood v Twp of Ellington, 323 Mich App 392, 403-404 ; 917 NW2d 413 (2018) (reasoning that the 60- day period had never commenced because the minutes of a public meeting were neither approved nor made available to the public). -5- focused inquiry,” plaintiff’s claim under the OMA arises from the same “transactional setting” as plaintiff’s claim of a WPA violation alleged in the original complaint, namely, defendants’ decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment at the May 27, 2021 meeting.

2023As for the WPA claim, Judge Gleicher cited Mickey v Zeidler Tool & Die Co, 516 F3d 516, 525 (CA 6, 2008), and Taylor v Modern Engineering, Inc, 252 Mich App 655, 661 ; 653 NW2d 625 (2002), for the proposition that temporal proximity alone can suffice to establish causation in certain cases.

2023As for the WPA claim, Judge Gleicher cited Mickey v Zeidler Tool & Die Co, 516 F3d 516, 525 (CA 6, 2008), and Taylor v Modern Engineering, Inc, 252 Mich App 655, 661 ; 653 NW2d 625 (2002), for the proposition that temporal proximity alone can suffice to establish causation in certain cases.

2019“In order to facilitate appellate review, the trial court should briefly discuss its view of each of the factors above on the record and justify the relevance and use of any additional factors.” [Cadwell II, 324 Mich App at 655-656 , quoting Pirgu, 499 Mich at 281-282 .] In the instant appeal involving plaintiffs’ second motion for additional attorney fees, the trial court denied the motion solely because it believed that the fees were for “subsequent judgment activity” that was “not relevant and pertinent to this Whistleblower’s Act.” The mere fact that the fees were incurred for postjudgment

2019“In order to facilitate appellate review, the trial court should briefly discuss its view of each of the factors above on the record and justify the relevance and use of any additional factors.” [Cadwell II, 324 Mich App at 655-656 , quoting Pirgu, 499 Mich at 281-282 .] In the instant appeal involving plaintiffs’ second motion for additional attorney fees, the trial court denied the motion solely because it believed that the fees were for “subsequent judgment activity” that was “not relevant and pertinent to this Whistleblower’s Act.” The mere fact that the fees were incurred for postjudgment