failure to make inquiry in New York

1990The court’s failure to make inquiry and obtain the informed consent of defendant denied defendant his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel (People v McDonald, 68 NY2d 1, 8 ; People v Mattison, 67 NY2d 462, 468-469 ).

1989The court’s failure to make inquiry and obtain the informed consent of defendant denied defendant his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel (People v McDonald, 68 NY2d 1, 8 ; People v Mattison, 67 NY2d 462, 468-469 ).

1990The court’s failure to make inquiry and obtain the informed consent of defendant denied defendant his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel (People v McDonald, 68 NY2d 1, 8 ; People v Mattison, 67 NY2d 462, 468-469 ).

1989The court’s failure to make inquiry and obtain the informed consent of defendant denied defendant his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel (People v McDonald, 68 NY2d 1, 8 ; People v Mattison, 67 NY2d 462, 468-469 ).

2010(Bauer v CS-Graces, LLC, supra.) It is of no moment that plaintiffs claim not to have understood the legal implications of the term “second mortgage.” Plaintiff Montana signed the stock purchase agreement while represented by counsel.

1999The requirement to make inquiry was established only by the Court of Appeals decision in Yolles (supra), the People contend, and because the reduction in the current case occurred before the Yolles decision, the court was not required to make inquiry.

1981And, even more so than on a disposition after trial, whose fuller record will have illumined the possibility of prejudice more adequately, post hoc rationalization of the harmlessness of a court’s failure to make inquiry when a plea is taken contains a substantial risk of unreliability (cf. People v Purdy, 53 NY2d 806 ; People v Rolston, 50 NY2d 1048 ; People v Grant, 45 NY2d 366, 377-380 ; cf. People v Hodge, 53 NY2d 313, 321 [right to counsel at preliminary hearing]; People v Jones, 47 NY2d 409, 417 [right to public trial]).

1981And, even more so than on a disposition after trial, whose fuller record will have illumined the possibility of prejudice more adequately, post hoc rationalization of the harmlessness of a court’s failure to make inquiry when a plea is taken contains a substantial risk of unreliability (cf. People v Purdy, 53 NY2d 806 ; People v Rolston, 50 NY2d 1048 ; People v Grant, 45 NY2d 366, 377-380 ; cf. People v Hodge, 53 NY2d 313, 321 [right to counsel at preliminary hearing]; People v Jones, 47 NY2d 409, 417 [right to public trial]).

1981And, even more so than on a disposition after trial, whose fuller record will have illumined the possibility of prejudice more adequately, post hoc rationalization of the harmlessness of a court’s failure to make inquiry when a plea is taken contains a substantial risk of unreliability (cf. People v Purdy, 53 NY2d 806 ; People v Rolston, 50 NY2d 1048 ; People v Grant, 45 NY2d 366, 377-380 ; cf. People v Hodge, 53 NY2d 313, 321 [right to counsel at preliminary hearing]; People v Jones, 47 NY2d 409, 417 [right to public trial]).

1916Co., 145 App. Div. 391 ; affd., 203 N. Y. 627 , it was held that the limitation is not available to carriers unless they inquire of passengers the value of their baggage, and that a failure to make such inquiry is a waiver of the benefits of the provision.

1916Co., 145 App. Div. 391 ; affd., 203 N. Y. 627 , it was held that the limitation is not available to carriers unless they inquire of passengers the value of their baggage, and that a failure to make such inquiry is a waiver of the benefits of the provision.

1915It also does not appear that the insured knew that she had such a disease.” He also cites Skinner v. Norman, 165 N. Y. 565, 569 , as authority for the further proposition “that it is possible to waive an unknown breach of the condition of a contract when the failure of knowledge is due to the fault of the party on whom it is sought to impose the waiver.” In the Skinner case, however, the fault of the party was a failure to make an inquiry about a particular subject concerning which both the assured and the insurer agreed that the insurer should make an investigation.

1908In Ten Eyck v. Witbeck (supra) the court, per Maynard, J., say : “ If the sum which the seller is willing to take is grossly disproportionate to the value of the thing which is the subject of the negotiation, it is strong proof of a defective title and sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry, and if the buyer neglects to diligently prosecute such inquiry, he may not be awarded the standing of a bona fide purchaser.” While I do not say that the proof in this ease requires a holding as matter of law that the defendant was not a purchaser in good faith, Í do think that in the absence of any