granting of a special exception in New York

2023"The classification of a particular use [of property] as a use permitted in a particular district subject to the granting of a special exception [*2]constitutes a legislative finding that if the special exception standards of the zoning ordinance are met [then] the use accords with the general plan of the ordinance and will not adversely affect the neighborhood" ( Matter of Robert Lee Realty Co. v Village of Spring Val. , 61 NY2d 892, 893 ; see Matter of Marcus v Planning Bd. of the Vil. of Wesley Hills , 199 AD3d 1007, 1008 ).

1986Moreover, a basic rule of law with respect to an application for a special exception is that the classification of a particular use as a permitted use in a particular district, subject to the granting of a special exception, constitutes a legislative finding that the use is in harmony with the general zoning plan, and will not adversely affect the neighborhood (see, Matter of Lee Realty Co. v Village of Spring Val., 61 NY2d 892 , supra; Matter of Pleasant Val.

1986Home Constr. v Van Wagner, 41 NY2d 1028 ; Matter of Gernatt Gravel Prods. v Town of Collins, supra).

1984Home Constr. v Van Wagner, 41 NY2d 1028 ; Matter of North Shore Steak House v Board of Appeals, 30 NY2d 238 ).

1979A special use permit, a term which has been used interchangeably with a special exception use or a conditional use, has been defined as follows: "The granting of a special exception * * * does not entail making an exception to the ordinance but rather permitting certain uses which the ordinance authorizes under stated conditions * * * [A] special exception is one allowable when the facts and conditions specified in the ordinance as those upon which the exception is permitted are found to exist” (Matter of Syosset Holding Corp. v Schlimm, 15 Misc 2d 10, 11 , mod on other grounds 4 AD2d 766 ).

1978A special use permit, a term which has been used interchangeably with a special exception use or a conditional use, has been defined as follows: "The granting of a special exception * * * does not entail making an exception to the ordinance but rather permitting certain uses which the ordinance authorizes under stated conditions * * * a special exception is one allowable when the facts and conditions speciñed in the ordinance as those upon which the exception is permitted are found to exist” (Matter of Syosset Holding Corp. v Schlimm, 15 Misc 2d 10, 11 , mod. on other grounds 4 AD2d 766 ).

1979A special use permit, a term which has been used interchangeably with a special exception use or a conditional use, has been defined as follows: "The granting of a special exception * * * does not entail making an exception to the ordinance but rather permitting certain uses which the ordinance authorizes under stated conditions * * * [A] special exception is one allowable when the facts and conditions specified in the ordinance as those upon which the exception is permitted are found to exist” (Matter of Syosset Holding Corp. v Schlimm, 15 Misc 2d 10, 11 , mod on other grounds 4 AD2d 766 ).

1978A special use permit, a term which has been used interchangeably with a special exception use or a conditional use, has been defined as follows: "The granting of a special exception * * * does not entail making an exception to the ordinance but rather permitting certain uses which the ordinance authorizes under stated conditions * * * a special exception is one allowable when the facts and conditions speciñed in the ordinance as those upon which the exception is permitted are found to exist” (Matter of Syosset Holding Corp. v Schlimm, 15 Misc 2d 10, 11 , mod. on other grounds 4 AD2d 766 ).

2023Thus, "[a] special use permit confers authority to use property in a manner that is permitted by a zoning ordinance under stated conditions, and such a permit is required to be granted unless reasonable grounds exist for its denial" ( Matter of 7-Eleven v Board of Trustees of Inc. Vil. of Mineola , 289 AD2d 250, 250 ; see Matter of North Shore Steak House v Board of Appeals of Inc. Vil. of Thomaston , 30 NY2d 238, 244 ; Matter of Marcus v Planning Bd. of the Vil. of Wesley Hills , 199 AD3d at 1008 ).

1990Onge v Donovan, 71 NY2d 507, 516 ; see also, Matter of Dexter v Town Bd., 36 NY2d 102 ).

1986Home Constr. v Van Wagner, 41 NY2d 1028 ; Matter of Gernatt Gravel Prods. v Town of Collins, supra).

1959Neither does it appear on the face of the complaint that the ordinance or the Village Law authorizes a variance of the application of the general restrictions imposed, or the granting of a special exception, which would permit the use of appellant’s property for a purpose for which it is reasonably adapted, and that consequently the ordinance may not be declared unconstitutional, insofar as it affects appellant’s property until an application has been made for such a variance or exception and denied (cf. People v. Calvar Corp., 286 N. Y. 419, 421 ; Town of Cortlandt v. McNally, 282 App. Div. 1

1959When issue is joined and the facts are established, it may appear that adequate relief may be obtained under the provisions of the ordinance or the Village Law (cf. Hammond v. Town of Caldwell, 282 App. Div. 798 ).

1959Neither does it appear on the face of the complaint that the ordinance or the Village Law authorizes a variance of the application of the general restrictions imposed, or the granting of a special exception, which would permit the use of appellant’s property for a purpose for which it is reasonably adapted, and that consequently the ordinance may not be declared unconstitutional, insofar as it affects appellant’s property until an application has been made for such a variance or exception and denied (cf. People v. Calvar Corp., 286 N. Y. 419, 421 ; Town of Cortlandt v. McNally, 282 App. Div. 1

1901(Rowell v. Janvrin, 151 N. Y. 60, 67 , and authorities there cited.).