8 New York opinions name it 2 courts 2010–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Santiagogreen2 sentences2024Footnote 15: As one New York jurist has suggested, Holmes throws the constitutionality of permitting consideration of the prosecution's corroboration completely into doubt ( People v Santiago , 75 AD3d 163, 177 [1st Dept 2010] [McGuire, J., concurring], revd , 17 NY3d at 673 [holding, pre- McCullough , that the prosecution's corroborating evidence was not "sufficient to obviate the second stage of the LeGrand analysis"]). 2024Footnote 15: As one New York jurist has suggested, Holmes throws the constitutionality of permitting consideration of the prosecution's corroboration completely into doubt ( People v Santiago , 75 AD3d 163, 177 [1st Dept 2010] [McGuire, J., concurring], revd , 17 NY3d at 673 [holding, pre- McCullough , that the prosecution's corroborating evidence was not "sufficient to obviate the second stage of the LeGrand analysis"]). | 3 | 6 |
People v. LeGrandgreen2 sentences2015Although “the case turns on the accuracy of [the] eyewitness identification[ ]” (People v LeGrand, 8 NY3d 449, 452 [2007]), we conclude that the identification of defendant by the eyewitness was corroborated by the reliable testimony of the accomplice, and thus we disagree with the majority that an analysis of the factors in the second stage of the LeGrand analysis is necessary (see generally People v Santiago, 17 NY3d 661, 669 [2011]). 2015Although “the case turns on the accuracy of [the] eyewitness identification[ ]” (People v LeGrand, 8 NY3d 449, 452 [2007]), we conclude that the identification of defendant by the eyewitness was corroborated by the reliable testimony of the accomplice, and thus we disagree with the majority that an analysis of the factors in the second stage of the LeGrand analysis is necessary (see generally People v Santiago, 17 NY3d 661, 669 [2011]). | 2 | 4 |
People v. Santiagogreen2 sentences2024Footnote 15: As one New York jurist has suggested, Holmes throws the constitutionality of permitting consideration of the prosecution's corroboration completely into doubt ( People v Santiago , 75 AD3d 163, 177 [1st Dept 2010] [McGuire, J., concurring], revd , 17 NY3d at 673 [holding, pre- McCullough , that the prosecution's corroborating evidence was not "sufficient to obviate the second stage of the LeGrand analysis"]). 2024Footnote 15: As one New York jurist has suggested, Holmes throws the constitutionality of permitting consideration of the prosecution's corroboration completely into doubt ( People v Santiago , 75 AD3d 163, 177 [1st Dept 2010] [McGuire, J., concurring], revd , 17 NY3d at 673 [holding, pre- McCullough , that the prosecution's corroborating evidence was not "sufficient to obviate the second stage of the LeGrand analysis"]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Muhammad
green
2 sentences2015With respect to the second stage of the analysis, we conclude that the proposed testimony “satisfies the general criteria for the admissibility of expert proof” (Muhammad, 17 NY3d at 546 ), i.e., it is “ ‘(1) relevant to the witness’s identification of defendant, (2) based on principles that are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community, (3) proffered by a qualified expert and (4) on a topic beyond the ken of the average juror’ ” (Santiago, 17 NY3d at 669 , quoting LeGrand, 8 NY3d at 452 ). 2015With respect to the second stage of the analysis, we conclude that the proposed testimony “satisfies the general criteria for the admissibility of expert proof” (Muhammad, 17 NY3d at 546 ), i.e., it is “ ‘(1) relevant to the witness’s identification of defendant, (2) based on principles that are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community, (3) proffered by a qualified expert and (4) on a topic beyond the ken of the average juror’ ” (Santiago, 17 NY3d at 669 , quoting LeGrand, 8 NY3d at 452 ). | 3 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Abney
green
2 sentences2011And defendant was not a stranger to either [eyewitness].” ( 13 NY3d at 269 .) Whether a victim’s or other eyewitness’s identification of a defendant is sufficiently corroborated by other eyewitness identifications, so that the trial court need not proceed to the second stage of the LeGrand analysis, is dependent on the circumstances of the case. 2011And defendant was not a stranger to either [eyewitness].” ( 13 NY3d at 269 .) Whether a victim’s or other eyewitness’s identification of a defendant is sufficiently corroborated by other eyewitness identifications, so that the trial court need not proceed to the second stage of the LeGrand analysis, is dependent on the circumstances of the case. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.