Relator motion in Ohio

2008Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 203 . {¶ 21} In this mandamus action, relator contends that the commission abused its discretion when it denied her application for PTD compensation "upon the mistaken conclusion that relator could return to her former position of employment as a receptionist." (Relator's brief, at 4.) Relator argues that "former position of employment" is a term of art which applies to temporary total disability and whether an employee can return to the job they were performing at the time of their injury.

2008Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 203 . {¶ 21} In this mandamus action, relator argues that the commission abused its discretion in two respects: (1) the commission failed to consider all the medical evidence in the record, and (2) although the commission considered claimant's age, education, and prior work history, the commission ignored claimant's extensive driving skills and experience and that there is "an entire class of light driving jobs that Bristo is capable of doing." (Relator's brief, at 6.) {¶ 22} For the reasons that follow, it is this magistrate's decision that this court should deny r

2024Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-646 .] Elections—Prohibition—Mandamus—Disqualification of counsel—Relator, a village mayor, failed to show that she was entitled to writ of prohibition preventing respondent village from setting date for recall election or preventing respondent boards of elections from conducting that election— Relator failed to show that she was entitled to writ of mandamus ordering respondent boards of elections to remove recall election from ballot—Writs denied—Relator’s motion to disqualify counsel for respondent village denied.

2024Bd. of Elections, 2024-Ohio-646 .] Elections—Prohibition—Mandamus—Disqualification of counsel—Relator, a village mayor, failed to show that she was entitled to writ of prohibition preventing respondent village from setting date for recall election or preventing respondent boards of elections from conducting that election— Relator failed to show that she was entitled to writ of mandamus ordering respondent boards of elections to remove recall election from ballot—Writs denied—Relator’s motion to disqualify counsel for respondent village denied.

2019Bd. of Elections, 133 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2012-Ohio-4267 , 976 N.E.2d 890, ¶ 12 . {¶5} As counsel for Respondent points out in their combined answer and motion to dismiss, Respondent ruled on Relator’s motion on July 3, 2018, prior to the Relator’s petition being filed in this action.

2016Bd. of Elections, 133 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2012-Ohio-4267 , 976 N.E.2d 890, ¶ 12 . {¶3} As counsel for Respondent points out in their motion to dismiss, Respondent ruled on Relator’s motion during the pendency of this matter on June 23, 2016.

2019Bd. of Elections, 133 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2012-Ohio-4267 , 976 N.E.2d 890, ¶ 12 . {¶5} As counsel for Respondent points out in their combined answer and motion to dismiss, Respondent ruled on Relator’s motion on July 3, 2018, prior to the Relator’s petition being filed in this action.

2019Bd. of Elections, 133 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2012-Ohio-4267 , 976 N.E.2d 890, ¶ 12 . {¶5} As counsel for Respondent points out in their combined answer and motion to dismiss, Respondent ruled on Relator’s motion on July 3, 2018, prior to the Relator’s petition being filed in this action.

1979In Lynch, supra, the court stated that the statute controlling the provisional appointment of a person in the classified service provided that the nominee could be certified by the commission as being qualified only after a noncompetitive examination; and, in that the relator had1 been appointed as a clerk in the department of liquor control prior to his certification by the commission, the provisional appointment was not valid, and the relator could not claim the benefit of civil service protection.

1979In Alford, supra, this conrt, at page 226, stated the following: “In Lynch, supra, the court stated that the statute controlling the provisional appointment of a person in the classified service provided that the nominee could he certified by the commission as being qualified only after a noncompetitive examination; and, in that the relator had been appointed as a clerk in the department of liquor control prior to his certification by the commission, the provisional appointment was not valid, and the relator could not claim the benefit of civil service protection.

2025Jail, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-5280 .] Mandamus—Public-records requests—Statutory damages—Relator has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that he successfully transmitted his requests by either hand delivery or certified mail or that he authorized another person to act as his agent to submit his requests by email— Relator’s request for statutory damages denied—Relator’s motion for contempt and sanctions denied because he has not shown that respondents disobeyed or resisted this court’s limited writ.

2023Republican Party Executive Commt. v. LaRose, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-1165 .] Attorney fees—Relator failed to show that secretary of state acted in bad faith in rejecting its recommendation to make reappointment to county board of elections—Relator’s motion for attorney fees denied.

2022Jones v. LaRose, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2445 .] Mandamus—Elections—In election cases, a relator must act with the utmost diligence—Relator’s claim that he has a clear legal right to have his declaration of candidacy and supporting petition accepted as timely by the board of elections is barred by doctrine of laches—Writ denied.

2020First, Ms. Byard references In re Adoption of Greer, 70 Ohio St.3d 293 , 638 N.E.2d 999 (1994), and concludes, “the 14- day limitation of ORC §3107.07(K) does not apply to the Relator’s objection.” (Response at p. 4) The Greer decision is not persuasive authority for the grounds of relief Ms. Byard alleges in her Complaint because, as noted above, Ms. Byard did not assert this particular argument as a basis for mandamus or prohibition relief. {¶13} In Greer, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the timing of a putative father’s objection to an adoption petition.

2020First, Ms. Byard references In re Adoption of Greer, 70 Ohio St.3d 293 , 638 N.E.2d 999 (1994), and concludes, “the 14- day limitation of ORC §3107.07(K) does not apply to the Relator’s objection.” (Response at p. 4) The Greer decision is not persuasive authority for the grounds of relief Ms. Byard alleges in her Complaint because, as noted above, Ms. Byard did not assert this particular argument as a basis for mandamus or prohibition relief. {¶13} In Greer, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the timing of a putative father’s objection to an adoption petition.

2019Police Dept., Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-4137 .] Mandamus—Public records—R.C. 149.43—Relator’s claim is moot because a custodian of a record satisfied its clear legal duty by mailing responsive documents to address provided by relator—Judgment denying writ of mandamus affirmed.

2018No. 07AP-79, 2007-Ohio-5020 , relator argues that Dr. Tosi's report was issued "significantly before Grace began working, and her subsequent decompensation as a result there." (Relator's brief at 7.) Relator asserts that Dr. Tosi's report is thus "so devoid of any contemporaneous information" that "fairness is simply not in play." (Relator's brief at 7.) {¶ 29} In an apparent reference to Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(C)(1)'s requirement that the medical examination supporting the PTD application be conducted within 24 months prior to the filing of the application, relator asserts that Dr. Tosi's re

2017State Fire Marshal v. Curl, 87 Ohio St.3d 568 , 2000-Ohio-248 , 722 N.E.2d 73 (2000). {¶ 4} In this case, our order requiring Respondent to grant Relator’s motion to vacate judicial sanction was issued over four months ago.

2017State Fire Marshal v. Curl, 87 Ohio St.3d 568 , 2000-Ohio-248 , 722 N.E.2d 73 (2000). {¶ 4} In this case, our order requiring Respondent to grant Relator’s motion to vacate judicial sanction was issued over four months ago.

2017State Fire Marshal v. Curl, 87 Ohio St.3d 568 , 2000-Ohio-248 , 722 N.E.2d 73 (2000). {¶ 4} In this case, our order requiring Respondent to grant Relator’s motion to vacate judicial sanction was issued over four months ago.

2016LAW & ANALYSIS Res Judicata {¶5} Respondents argue that Relator’s claim here is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because he previously filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Scioto County Common Pleas Court seeking a recalculation of his maximum expiration date. {¶6} In general, the res judicata doctrine provides that “a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of actio

2016LAW & ANALYSIS Res Judicata {¶5} Respondents argue that Relator’s claim here is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because he previously filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Scioto County Common Pleas Court seeking a recalculation of his maximum expiration date. {¶6} In general, the res judicata doctrine provides that “a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of actio

2015Seikbert v. Wilkinson (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 489, 491 , 633 N.E.2d 1128 . {¶9} Because the essence of Relator’s claim is that his plea agreement was breached, an adequate remedy at law exists precluding the issuance of the requested writs.

2015Seikbert v. Wilkinson (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 489, 491 , 633 N.E.2d 1128 . {¶9} Because the essence of Relator’s claim is that his plea agreement was breached, an adequate remedy at law exists precluding the issuance of the requested writs.

2014Comm., 48 Ohio St.3d 25 (1990), that "[a] claimant's permanent inability to return to his former position of employment does not mean the claimant's medical condition will not improve." DaimlerChrysler at ¶ 14, quoting General American at 25. {¶ 53} Here, as earlier noted, relator suggests that an R.C. 4123.57(B) scheduled loss award is precluded until the industrial injury has reached MMI. {¶ 54} According to relator, the award is "premature." (Relator's brief, 8.) Citing Timmerman Truss, relator asserts that claimant "must no longer be in the recovery phase" and that claimant was still in th

2013Id. ¶{9} Although the trial court did not explicitly grant Relator’s motion in a separate entry admitting that it failed to fully address post-release control in its original sentencing entry, the court did issue a new sentencing entry fully addressing the matter of post-release control.

2011Court of Common Pleas (2010), 125 Ohio St.3d 402, 402 , 928 N.E.2d 722 , 723. {¶6 } In the instant case, Respondent argues he has not refused to issue a final, appealable order nor has he refused to rule on Relator’s motion.

2011Duncan v. DeWeese, 2011-Ohio-5194 .] Hoffman, P.J. {1} Relator filed a Petition for Writ of Procedendo requesting a writ to compel the trial court to rule on Relator’s motion for resentencing filed with the trial court on March 10, 2011.

2008Comm. (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 165 . {¶ 29} In his brief, relator sets out his issue as follows: "Is an individual entitled to living maintenance benefits to extend beyond a period of two years?" (Relator's brief, at 6.) *Page 13 {¶ 30} R.C. 4121.61 provides, in pertinent part: The administrator of workers' compensation, with the advice and consent of the workers' compensation oversight commission, shall adopt rules, take measures, and make expenditures as it deems necessary to aid claimants who have sustained compensable injuries * * * to return to work[.] * * * {¶ 31} R.C. 4121.63 provides for

2008Baldwin v. Reinbold , 2008-Ohio-837 which stands for the proposition that timely filed motions for post-conviction relief must contain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

2007Accordingly, the court determined "a teacher is entitled to temporary total disability compensation as a result of the allowed conditions of a claim if the teacher proves an intent to obtain employment during the summer and an intent to resume the teaching position after the summer recess." Id. at 485 . {¶ 7} Relator's objection asks us to ignore the specifc language of Crim requiring that a teacher prove an intent to obtain employment during the summer and an intent to resume the teaching position after the summer recess.

2006Comm. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 630 . ( Ramirez permanency is now equatable with the concept of MMI.) The Kaska court further noted that unlike "permanency," which is a precondition to receipt of permanent partial benefits, TTD "permanency" is a termination criteria. {¶ 49} It would necessarily follow from the Kaska court's analysis that a doctor's opinion as to a claimant's percentage of permanent partial disability cannot be deemed evidence that the claimant has reached MMI for purposes of TTD. {¶ 50} Apparently, relator interprets Kaska to hold that "when physicians examine expressly for the pu

2006However, we agree with the magistrate's analysis of those arguments, as well as her legal conclusions. {¶ 4} R.C. 4123.522 provides "a rebuttable presumption, sometimes called the `mailbox rule' that, once a notice is mailed, it is presumed to be received in due course." Weiss v. Ferro Corp. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 178 , 180 .

2006Comm. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 176 , 179 . {¶ 34} Here, relator argues that Dr. Howard's retrospective opinion fails to meet the Bowie standard because, allegedly, "nowhere in the report is there an indication that Dr. Howard expressly accepted the medical findings generated by examining physicians during the relevant period of time." (Relator's brief, at 6.) {¶ 35} Relator's argument suggests that Dr. Howard was required under Bowie to expressly accept the medical findings of the examining physicians.