60 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1968–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Myersgreen2 sentences2014Id. at 710 (citing Commonwealth v. Myers, 392 A.2d 685, 687 (1978)). ____________________________________________ 5 Neither Myers nor Passmore explains why the court should consider voluntary manslaughter as a potential verdict in a degree of guilt hearing when the defendant enters a guilty plea to murder generally. 2006The purpose of the degree of guilt hearing is "to determine whether the homicide was murder of the first, second or third degree, or voluntary manslaughter." Commonwealth v. Myers, 481 Pa. 217 , 392 A.2d 685, 687 (1978). | 3 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Whitegreen2 sentences2007White, 910 A.2d at 662 (defendant's general plea to murder does not vitiate the Commonwealth's right to a jury trial at the degree of guilt hearing). 2007White, 910 A.2d at 662 (defendant’s general plea to murder does not vitiate the Commonwealth’s right to a jury trial at the degree of guilt hearing). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Fioregreen2 sentences2019Commonwealth v. Fiore, 780 A.2d 704, 711 (Pa. Super. 2001) (emphasis added).1 As noted above, Appellant contends that the PCRA court erred in concluding that this after-discovered evidence would not have changed the outcome of Appellant’s degree-of-guilt hearing. 2017Commonwealth v. Fiore, 780 A.2d 704, 711 (Pa. Super. 2001).2 We first consider Appellant’s contention that the PCRA court erred in concluding that this after-discovered evidence would not have changed the outcome of Appellant’s degree-of-guilt hearing. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Robinsongreen2 sentences1976In Commonwealth v. Robinson, 442 Pa. 512, 515, n. 2 , 276 A.2d 537, 539 (1971), we said: “We have concluded that the preferable practice, since it may narrow the issues on appeal or perhaps obviate an appeal entirely, is to file post trial motions in any first degree case where error is asserted, whether the conviction follows a full trial or only a degree of guilt hearing held after a plea of guilty.” In numerous cases we have enunciated and applied the rule that issues not raised in post-verdict motions are deemed waived and may not be raised on direct appeal. 1976In Commonwealth v. Robinson, 442 Pa. 512, 515, n. 2 , 276 A.2d 537, 539 (1971), we said: “We have concluded that the preferable practice, since it may narrow the issues on appeal or perhaps obviate an appeal entirely, is to file post trial motions in any first degree case where error is asserted, whether the conviction follows a full trial or only a degree of guilt hearing held after a plea of guilty.” In numerous cases we have enunciated and applied the rule that issues not raised in post-verdict motions are deemed waived and may not be raised on direct appeal. | 2 | 2 |
Douglas v. Californiagreen2 sentences1973See Commonwealth v. Willman, 434 Pa. 489 , 255 A. 2d 534 (1969). 3 The notes of testimony reveal that at no time after the degree of guilt hearing or prior to or after sentencing was appeUant informed of his appellate rights in accordance with Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 , 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963). 1973See Commonwealth v. Willman, 434 Pa. 489 , 255 A. 2d 534 (1969). 3 The notes of testimony reveal that at no time after the degree of guilt hearing or prior to or after sentencing was appeUant informed of his appellate rights in accordance with Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 , 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963). | 1 | 3 |
Com. v. Payne, R.green2 sentences2023Id. at 301-302 . 2020Id. at 300, 302 . | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Dickersongreen2 sentences1974Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 434, 438-439 , 83 S. Ct. 822 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963)." 429 F.2d at 795 . [1] In 1962 Murray Dickerson, Broaddus' codefendant, contested the legality of his "bring-up" order, Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 406 Pa. 102 , 176 A.2d 421 (1962), and one year later requested a writ of habeas corpus. 1974Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 434, 438-439 , 83 S. Ct. 822 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963)." 429 F.2d at 795 . [1] In 1962 Murray Dickerson, Broaddus' codefendant, contested the legality of his "bring-up" order, Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 406 Pa. 102 , 176 A.2d 421 (1962), and one year later requested a writ of habeas corpus. | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Cox, J., Aplt.green1 sentence2017To succeed on an after-discovered evidence claim, the “petitioner must prove that (1) the evidence has been discovered after trial and it could not have been obtained at or prior to trial through reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to impeach credibility; and (4) it would likely compel a different verdict.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221, 228 (Pa. 2016) (internal quotation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Flanagangreen1 sentence2015In addition to a defective plea colloquy, the plea court “erroneously advised Flanagan that accomplice theory renders an accomplice liable for ‘any crimes committed by any other accomplice regardless of whether a particular accomplice committed the particular crime about which we are talking.’ ” Id. at 493. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Reillygreen1 sentence2014Third-degree murder has been defined as a killing done with malice that was "neither intentional nor committed during the perpetration of a felony." Commonwealth v. Reilly, 549 A.2d 503, 510 (Pa.1988). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Fearsgreen1 sentence2013Compare Flor, 998 A.2d at 615 (sufficiency assessed on evidence introduced at penalty phase hearing) with Fears, 836 A.2d at 59 (assessed on evidence presented at suppression hearing and summarized by Commonwealth at plea colloquy). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Florgreen1 sentence2013Compare Flor, 998 A.2d at 615 (sufficiency assessed on evidence introduced at penalty phase hearing) with Fears, 836 A.2d at 59 (assessed on evidence presented at suppression hearing and summarized by Commonwealth at plea colloquy). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth ex rel. Kerekes v. Maroneygreen2 sentences2006See Maroney, 423 Pa. at 340 , 223 A.2d at 701 ; Commonwealth ex rel. 2006See Maroney, 423 Pa. at 340 , 223 A.2d at 701 ; Commonwealth ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Browngreen2 sentences2006This Court granted allowance of appeal on the question of "whether the Commonwealth is permitted to appeal an order denying recusal of a trial judge as an interlocutory order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), and if so, whether denial of the recusal motion was in error." Commonwealth v. White, 577 Pa. 316 , 845 A.2d 199, 200 (2004). 2006This Court granted allowance of appeal on the question of “whether the Commonwealth is permitted to appeal an order denying recusal of a trial judge as an interlocutory order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), and if so, whether denial of the recusal motion was in error.” Commonwealth v. White, 577 Pa. 316 , 845 A.2d 199, 200 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Tharpgreen2 sentences2006I, § 6 ("in criminal cases the Commonwealth shall have the same right to trial by jury as does the accused."); see also Commonwealth v. Tharp, 562 Pa. 231 , 754 A.2d 1251 (2000) (holding amendment to Article I, § 6, which affords Commonwealth same right to jury trial as accused, is constitutional), and it may request one at the degree of guilt hearing. 2006I, § 6 ("in criminal cases the Commonwealth shall have the same right to trial by jury as does the accused."); see also Commonwealth v. Tharp, 562 Pa. 231 , 754 A.2d 1251 (2000) (holding amendment to Article I, § 6, which affords Commonwealth same right to jury trial as accused, is constitutional), and it may request one at the degree of guilt hearing. | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Mitchellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Forbesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Tabbgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Petrakovichgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Gravesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Stokesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Prock v. District Court of Tulsa Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arsenault v. Massachusettsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fay v. Noiared | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Chambersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Chruscialgreen | 1 | 1 |
| New Mt. Calvary Baptist Church v. Draytongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Willmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1972However, the degree of guilt hearing was three years prior to effective date of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and one year before the effective date of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 1968This is exactly the situation before us in this appeal: the appellant does not challenge the validity of her guilty plea; nor does she claim that the allegedly coerced confessions induced her guilty plea; her only assignment for error is the correctness of admitting into evidence in the degree of guilt hearing statements which she claims were procured by the district attorney without complying with the standards in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). | 3 | 1968–1972 |
Commonwealth v. Passmore
green
2 sentences2024Passmore, 857 A.2d at 713 . 2014Id. at 710 (citing Commonwealth v. Myers, 392 A.2d 685, 687 (1978)). ____________________________________________ 5 Neither Myers nor Passmore explains why the court should consider voluntary manslaughter as a potential verdict in a degree of guilt hearing when the defendant enters a guilty plea to murder generally. | 2 | 2014–2024 |
Commonwealth v. Marsh
green
2 sentences1970Mr. Justice Roberts concurs in the result for the same reasons noted in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Marsh, 440 Pa. 590, 596 , 271 A. 2d 481 (1970). 1 The record reveals that careful consideration was given by the lower court to the circumstances surrounding the confession both at a pretrial suppression hearing and at the time of the introduction of the confession into evidence at the degree of guilt hearing conducted by a court on Vano. 1970Mr. Justice Roberts concurs in the result for the same reasons noted in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Marsh, 440 Pa. 590, 596 , 271 A. 2d 481 (1970). 1 The record reveals that careful consideration was given by the lower court to the circumstances surrounding the confession both at a pretrial suppression hearing and at the time of the introduction of the confession into evidence at the degree of guilt hearing conducted by a court on Vano. | 2 | 1970–1985 |
Commonwealth v. Baity
green
2 sentences1974Commonwealth v. Baity, 428 Pa. 306 , 237 A.2d 172 (1968); Commonwealth v. Garrett, 425 Pa. 594 , 229 A.2d 922 (1967). *373 The confession was read into the record at the degree of guilt hearing only after a stipulation by defense counsel and the Commonwealth that appellant’s ten page statement was voluntarily given. 1974Commonwealth v. Baity, 428 Pa. 306 , 237 A.2d 172 (1968); Commonwealth v. Garrett, 425 Pa. 594 , 229 A.2d 922 (1967). *373 The confession was read into the record at the degree of guilt hearing only after a stipulation by defense counsel and the Commonwealth that appellant’s ten page statement was voluntarily given. | 2 | 1968–1974 |
Saranchak v. Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
green
1 sentence2019Id. at 596 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Lofton
green
1 sentence2016The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that: "While we believe that a concession by counsel at a degree of guilt hearing that his client is guilty of first degree 9 murder should be offered only with the utmost of caution and only in those cases where the evidence to that effect is truly overwhelming, we cannot conclude on this record that [defendant's] counsel's strategy lacked any 'reasonable basis."' Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Commonwealth v. Lesko
green
1 sentence2016Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Graham v. Florida
green
1 sentence2015J-S54023-15 In 2010, Buli filed a PCRA petition asserting that his sentence was illegal under Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (U.S. 2010). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Commonwealth v. Shaver
green
1 sentence2015A psychiatrist testified at the hearing that Shaver “acted under ‘extended provocation’ brought about by the stress, anger and hostility created by his marital problems and that this provocation reached a ‘crescendo’ on the day of the killing.” Shaver, supra at 745 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Blakely v. Washington green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Commonwealth v. Staush
neutral
2 sentences2006White's Brief, at 50-51 (citing Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 340 Pa. 33 , 16 A.2d 50 (1940); Commonwealth v. Staush, 256 Pa. 620 , 101 A. 72 (1917)). 2006White's Brief, at 50-51 (citing Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 340 Pa. 33 , 16 A.2d 50 (1940); Commonwealth v. Staush, 256 Pa. 620 , 101 A. 72 (1917)). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2006White also rejects the Commonwealth's reliance on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), for the proposition that a jury is required at a degree of guilt hearing. 2006White also rejects the Commonwealth's reliance on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), for the proposition that a jury is required at a degree of guilt hearing. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Ring v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2006White also rejects the Commonwealth's reliance on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), for the proposition that a jury is required at a degree of guilt hearing. 2006White also rejects the Commonwealth's reliance on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), for the proposition that a jury is required at a degree of guilt hearing. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Commonwealth v. White
green
2 sentences2006This Court granted allowance of appeal on the question of "whether the Commonwealth is permitted to appeal an order denying recusal of a trial judge as an interlocutory order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), and if so, whether denial of the recusal motion was in error." Commonwealth v. White, 577 Pa. 316 , 845 A.2d 199, 200 (2004). 2006This Court granted allowance of appeal on the question of “whether the Commonwealth is permitted to appeal an order denying recusal of a trial judge as an interlocutory order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), and if so, whether denial of the recusal motion was in error.” Commonwealth v. White, 577 Pa. 316 , 845 A.2d 199, 200 (2004). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Commonwealth v. White
green
2 sentences2006In considering whether the Commonwealth has a right to a jury at a degree of guilt hearing, the Superior Court first noted the procedural rule governing such hearings "affords a criminal defendant the option of having the trial judge, rather than a jury, determine her degree of guilt." Id., at 561 . 2006Accordingly, the court concluded a degree of guilt hearing was "a variation of a waiver trial and as such, it cannot trump the Commonwealth's constitutional right to demand a jury trial." Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Commonwealth v. Petrillo
green
2 sentences2006White's Brief, at 50-51 (citing Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 340 Pa. 33 , 16 A.2d 50 (1940); Commonwealth v. Staush, 256 Pa. 620 , 101 A. 72 (1917)). 2006White's Brief, at 50-51 (citing Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 340 Pa. 33 , 16 A.2d 50 (1940); Commonwealth v. Staush, 256 Pa. 620 , 101 A. 72 (1917)). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Commonwealth v. Stevens green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Commonwealth v. Ramos green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Commonwealth v. Halley green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Commonwealth v. Michael green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Commonwealth v. Swaney green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Commonwealth v. Ingram green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Commonwealth v. Basemore green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Commonwealth v. Miller green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Commonwealth v. Velasquez green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Commonwealth v. Mosley green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Commonwealth v. Minor green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Commonwealth v. Bastone green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Commonwealth v. Ammon green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Commonwealth v. Quinlan neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Commonwealth v. Agie green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Commonwealth v. Walters green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Commonwealth v. Marsh green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Furman v. Georgia green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Commonwealth v. Walker green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Commonwealth v. Musser green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| United States of America Ex Rel. Spencer Broaddus, E-9299 v. A. T. Rundle, Superintendent green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Commonwealth v. Garrett green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Commonwealth v. Vento green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Commonwealth v. Lee green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.