order discharging rule in Pennsylvania

1921This court has frequently held that an order discharging a rule for judgment for alleged insufficiency of an affidavit of defense will not be reversed in doubtful and uncertain cases but only in such as are very clear and free from doubt: Kidder Elevator Interlock Co. v. Muckle, 198 Pa. 388; Wilson v. Bryn Mawr Trust Co., 225 Pa. 143 .

1911An order discharging a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense will not be reversed, except where a pure question of law is raised and clear error has been committed: Wilson v. Trust Co., 225 Pa. 143 , and cases there cited.

1934An appellate court should not reverse an order discharging a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient *349 affidavit of defense unless the case is clear and free from doubt: Colonial Securities Co. v. Levy, 302 Pa. 329 , 153 A. 553 .

1934An appellate court should not reverse an order discharging a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient *349 affidavit of defense unless the case is clear and free from doubt: Colonial Securities Co. v. Levy, 302 Pa. 329 , 153 A. 553 .

1921This court has frequently held that an order discharging a rule for judgment for alleged insufficiency of an affidavit of defense will not be reversed in doubtful and uncertain cases but only in such as are very clear and free from doubt: Kidder Elevator Interlock Co. v. Muckle, 198 Pa. 388; Wilson v. Bryn Mawr Trust Co., 225 Pa. 143 .

1910Again, in Kidder Elevator Interlock Co. v. Muckle, 198 Pa. 388 , the Supreme Court said: “An order discharging a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense, will not be reversed by the Supreme Court in doubtful and uncertain cases but only such as are very clear and free from doubt.” This court has many times followed the same rule.

1958Breitweiser Company v. Scott, 33 Pa. Superior Ct. 627 .

1910“No appeal lies from an order discharging a rule to strike off a mechanic’s lien;” Breitweiser Co. v. Scott, 33 Pa. Superior Ct. 627 .

1957The effect of this section is the same as though the Legislature had said in terms, “There shall be no appeal from an order discharging such a rule for new trial”: Commonwealth v. Greason, 208 Pa. 126 , 57 A. 349 ; Commonwealth v. Cicere, 286 Pa. 296 , 133 A. 795 ; Commonwealth v. Del Vaccio, 303 Pa. 519 , 154 A. 789 .

1957The effect of this section is the same as though the Legislature had said in terms, “There shall be no appeal from an order discharging such a rule for new trial”: Commonwealth v. Greason, 208 Pa. 126 , 57 A. 349 ; Commonwealth v. Cicere, 286 Pa. 296 , 133 A. 795 ; Commonwealth v. Del Vaccio, 303 Pa. 519 , 154 A. 789 .

1957The effect of this section is the same as though the Legislature had said in terms, “There shall be no appeal from an order discharging such a rule for new trial”: Commonwealth v. Greason, 208 Pa. 126 , 57 A. 349 ; Commonwealth v. Cicere, 286 Pa. 296 , 133 A. 795 ; Commonwealth v. Del Vaccio, 303 Pa. 519 , 154 A. 789 .

1957The effect of this section is the same as though the Legislature had said in terms, “There shall be no appeal from an order discharging such a rule for new trial”: Commonwealth v. Greason, 208 Pa. 126 , 57 A. 349 ; Commonwealth v. Cicere, 286 Pa. 296 , 133 A. 795 ; Commonwealth v. Del Vaccio, 303 Pa. 519 , 154 A. 789 .

1946Miller et ux. v. Wayne Title and Trust Co., 150 Pa. Superior Ct. 536 , 29 A. 2d 206 ; Holladay v. Fidler, 158 Pa. Superior Ct. 100 , 43 A. 2d 919 .

1945Margaret K., Phillips, Notary Public, My com. expires May 11, ,1944.” The right, of appeal from an order discharging a rule for want of a. sufficient affidavit of defense is given by statute (April 18, 1874, P. L. 64, PS §1097), but we do not reverse on an appeal from the refusal to enter judgment unless it clearly appears that the court below erred: Sundheim v. Beaver County Building and Loan Association, 136 Pa. Superior Ct. 9 , 7 A. 2d 17 ; Miller et ux. v. Wayne Title and Trust Company, 150 Pa. Superior Ct. 536 , 29 A. 2d 206 .

1946Miller et ux. v. Wayne Title and Trust Co., 150 Pa. Superior Ct. 536 , 29 A. 2d 206 ; Holladay v. Fidler, 158 Pa. Superior Ct. 100 , 43 A. 2d 919 .

1945Margaret K., Phillips, Notary Public, My com. expires May 11, ,1944.” The right, of appeal from an order discharging a rule for want of a. sufficient affidavit of defense is given by statute (April 18, 1874, P. L. 64, PS §1097), but we do not reverse on an appeal from the refusal to enter judgment unless it clearly appears that the court below erred: Sundheim v. Beaver County Building and Loan Association, 136 Pa. Superior Ct. 9 , 7 A. 2d 17 ; Miller et ux. v. Wayne Title and Trust Company, 150 Pa. Superior Ct. 536 , 29 A. 2d 206 .

1934It has frequently been held by the Supreme Court and this court that, on an appeal from an order refusing to open a judgment, the appellate court will not reverse unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion in the conclusions reached on the facts presented or the law has been misapplied: Mielcuszny v. Rosol, 317 Pa. 91 , 176 A. 236 ; Peters v. Alter, 89 Pa. Superior Ct. 34 ; Cinnaminson Park Co. v. Laws, 63 Pa. Superior Ct. 189 ; Thermo Water Lift Co. v. Air Tight S. T.

1926We said in Peters v. Alter, App., 89 Pa. Superior Ct. 34 , in disposing of an appeal from a refusal to open a judgment entered upon a warrant of attorney, that it is proper to keep in mind that such an application is an equitable proceeding addressed to the discretion of the court; that the judge to whom it is addressed acts as a chancellor; and that appellate courts examine the record only to determine whether this discretion has been properly exercised (Kelber v. Plow Co., 146 Pa. 485 ; Toffolo v. Marino, 77 Pa. Superior Ct. 281 .) In Shannon v. Castner, 21 Pa. Superior Ct. 294 , this court

1933Where a doubt exists as to whether a summary judgment should be entered, this should be resolved in favor of refusing to enter it: Davis et al. v. Investment Land Co., 296 Pa. 449 ; 146 A. 119 ; Ottman et al. v. Nixon-Nirdlinger et al., 301 Pa. 234, 244 ; 151 A. 879 , and an order discharging a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense will not be reversed except in such cases as are clear and free from doubt: Colonial Securities Co. v. Levy et al.

1933Where a doubt exists as to whether a summary judgment should be entered, this should be resolved in favor of refusing to enter it: Davis et al. v. Investment Land Co., 296 Pa. 449 ; 146 A. 119 ; Ottman et al. v. Nixon-Nirdlinger et al., 301 Pa. 234, 244 ; 151 A. 879 , and an order discharging a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense will not be reversed except in such cases as are clear and free from doubt: Colonial Securities Co. v. Levy et al.

1933Where a doubt exists as to whether a summary judgment should be entered, this should be resolved in favor of refusing to enter it: Davis et al. v. Investment Land Co., 296 Pa. 449 ; 146 A. 119 ; Ottman et al. v. Nixon-Nirdlinger et al., 301 Pa. 234, 244 ; 151 A. 879 , and an order discharging a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense will not be reversed except in such cases as are clear and free from doubt: Colonial Securities Co. v. Levy et al.

1933Where a doubt exists as to whether a summary judgment should be entered, this should be resolved in favor of refusing to enter it: Davis et al. v. Investment Land Co., 296 Pa. 449 ; 146 A. 119 ; Ottman et al. v. Nixon-Nirdlinger et al., 301 Pa. 234, 244 ; 151 A. 879 , and an order discharging a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense will not be reversed except in such cases as are clear and free from doubt: Colonial Securities Co. v. Levy et al.

2020See Commonwealth v. Hill, 16 A.3d 484, 494 (Pa. 2011); Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1998).

2020We entered an order discharging the rule to show cause, but later placed the case on hold pending our en banc consideration of several cases implicating the Walker rule and the holding of Commonwealth v. Creese, 216 A.3d 1142 (Pa.Super. 2019).

2019In his brief filed with this Court, Appellant acknowledged Walker, its prospective requirement for separate notices of appeal from orders resolving issues arising on more than one lower court docket, and its direction that the failure to file separate notices of appeal “will result in quashal of the appeal.” Appellant’s Brief at 15, quoting Walker, 185 A.3d at 977 .

1985In affirming the order discharging the rule, we observed that “contempt of the investigators ... cannot by legislative fiat be transformed into a judicial judgment; due process must be observed.” Id.

1983We followed this reasoning in Quatrochi v. Gaiters, 251 Pa.Super. 115 , 380 A.2d 404 (1977), on similar facts.

1983We followed this reasoning in Quatrochi v. Gaiters, 251 Pa.Super. 115 , 380 A.2d 404 (1977), on similar facts.

1983In Minetola v. Samacicio, 399 Pa. 351 , 160 A.2d 546 (1960), the Supreme Court affirmed an order discharging a rule to show cause why the judgment in an equity action should not be opened on the ground that the petitioner had failed to establish a valid defense on the merits. [1] The Court was careful to note, however, that the fact that the petitioner had not been a resident at the home of her parents where service was made for four months before the date of service "would tend to establish `equitable considerations which impress this Court with the need for relief,' even though the testimony

1983In Minetola v. Samacicio, 399 Pa. 351 , 160 A.2d 546 (1960), the Supreme Court affirmed an order discharging a rule to show cause why the judgment in an equity action should not be opened on the ground that the petitioner had failed to establish a valid defense on the merits. [1] The Court was careful to note, however, that the fact that the petitioner had not been a resident at the home of her parents where service was made for four months before the date of service "would tend to establish `equitable considerations which impress this Court with the need for relief,' even though the testimony

1978Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171 , 319 A.2d 174 (1974).

1978Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171 , 319 A.2d 174 (1974).

1969Packer v. John A. Owens, 164 Pa. 185 , 30 A. 314 (1894), generally no appeal lies from the refusal to stay or set aside an execution where the application is based on an allegation of facts outside the record.

1969Packer v. John A. Owens, 164 Pa. 185 , 30 A. 314 (1894), generally no appeal lies from the refusal to stay or set aside an execution where the application is based on an allegation of facts outside the record.

1969Although a determinative order relating to an execution is, in character, a judgment, and when of a final nature, is appealable, Foster v. Rubenstein, 383 Pa. 236 , 118 A. 2d 195 (1955) ; Opening of Parkway, 267 Pa. 219 , 110 A. 144 (1920), and an order which indefinitely stays a writ of possession in an ejectment proceeding is final and appealable, Marko v. Mendelowski, 344 Pa. 665 , 25 A. 2d 692 (1942), and under some circumstances, an order discharging a rule to set aside a writ of execution is a final order from which an appeal will lie, Long v. Lebanon National Bank, 211 Pa. 165 , 60 A. 5

1969Although a determinative order relating to an execution is, in character, a judgment, and when of a final nature, is appealable, Foster v. Rubenstein, 383 Pa. 236 , 118 A. 2d 195 (1955) ; Opening of Parkway, 267 Pa. 219 , 110 A. 144 (1920), and an order which indefinitely stays a writ of possession in an ejectment proceeding is final and appealable, Marko v. Mendelowski, 344 Pa. 665 , 25 A. 2d 692 (1942), and under some circumstances, an order discharging a rule to set aside a writ of execution is a final order from which an appeal will lie, Long v. Lebanon National Bank, 211 Pa. 165 , 60 A. 5

1969Although a determinative order relating to an execution is, in character, a judgment, and when of a final nature, is appealable, Foster v. Rubenstein, 383 Pa. 236 , 118 A. 2d 195 (1955) ; Opening of Parkway, 267 Pa. 219 , 110 A. 144 (1920), and an order which indefinitely stays a writ of possession in an ejectment proceeding is final and appealable, Marko v. Mendelowski, 344 Pa. 665 , 25 A. 2d 692 (1942), and under some circumstances, an order discharging a rule to set aside a writ of execution is a final order from which an appeal will lie, Long v. Lebanon National Bank, 211 Pa. 165 , 60 A. 5

1969Although a determinative order relating to an execution is, in character, a judgment, and when of a final nature, is appealable, Foster v. Rubenstein, 383 Pa. 236 , 118 A. 2d 195 (1955) ; Opening of Parkway, 267 Pa. 219 , 110 A. 144 (1920), and an order which indefinitely stays a writ of possession in an ejectment proceeding is final and appealable, Marko v. Mendelowski, 344 Pa. 665 , 25 A. 2d 692 (1942), and under some circumstances, an order discharging a rule to set aside a writ of execution is a final order from which an appeal will lie, Long v. Lebanon National Bank, 211 Pa. 165 , 60 A. 5

1969Although a determinative order relating to an execution is, in character, a judgment, and when of a final nature, is appealable, Foster v. Rubenstein, 383 Pa. 236 , 118 A. 2d 195 (1955) ; Opening of Parkway, 267 Pa. 219 , 110 A. 144 (1920), and an order which indefinitely stays a writ of possession in an ejectment proceeding is final and appealable, Marko v. Mendelowski, 344 Pa. 665 , 25 A. 2d 692 (1942), and under some circumstances, an order discharging a rule to set aside a writ of execution is a final order from which an appeal will lie, Long v. Lebanon National Bank, 211 Pa. 165 , 60 A. 5

1969Although a determinative order relating to an execution is, in character, a judgment, and when of a final nature, is appealable, Foster v. Rubenstein, 383 Pa. 236 , 118 A. 2d 195 (1955) ; Opening of Parkway, 267 Pa. 219 , 110 A. 144 (1920), and an order which indefinitely stays a writ of possession in an ejectment proceeding is final and appealable, Marko v. Mendelowski, 344 Pa. 665 , 25 A. 2d 692 (1942), and under some circumstances, an order discharging a rule to set aside a writ of execution is a final order from which an appeal will lie, Long v. Lebanon National Bank, 211 Pa. 165 , 60 A. 5

1969Although a determinative order relating to an execution is, in character, a judgment, and when of a final nature, is appealable, Foster v. Rubenstein, 383 Pa. 236 , 118 A. 2d 195 (1955) ; Opening of Parkway, 267 Pa. 219 , 110 A. 144 (1920), and an order which indefinitely stays a writ of possession in an ejectment proceeding is final and appealable, Marko v. Mendelowski, 344 Pa. 665 , 25 A. 2d 692 (1942), and under some circumstances, an order discharging a rule to set aside a writ of execution is a final order from which an appeal will lie, Long v. Lebanon National Bank, 211 Pa. 165 , 60 A. 5

1969Although a determinative order relating to an execution is, in character, a judgment, and when of a final nature, is appealable, Foster v. Rubenstein, 383 Pa. 236 , 118 A. 2d 195 (1955) ; Opening of Parkway, 267 Pa. 219 , 110 A. 144 (1920), and an order which indefinitely stays a writ of possession in an ejectment proceeding is final and appealable, Marko v. Mendelowski, 344 Pa. 665 , 25 A. 2d 692 (1942), and under some circumstances, an order discharging a rule to set aside a writ of execution is a final order from which an appeal will lie, Long v. Lebanon National Bank, 211 Pa. 165 , 60 A. 5

1964The case of Donaldson v. Bielski, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 320 , 14 A. 2d 859 (1940), was decided under the Act of July 9, 1897, P. L. 237, 12 PS §911, which, by its terms, applied only in the event of an attack upon the validity of a judgment by confession “upon which an execution has been or shall hereafter be issued . . .

1964The case of Donaldson v. Bielski, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 320 , 14 A. 2d 859 (1940), was decided under the Act of July 9, 1897, P. L. 237, 12 PS §911, which, by its terms, applied only in the event of an attack upon the validity of a judgment by confession “upon which an execution has been or shall hereafter be issued . . .

1957The law is clear that where a statute expressly provides that there shall be no appeal, the scope of appellate review is limited to the question of jurisdiction and the regularity of the proceeding; the merits of the controversy cannot be considered even though the interpretation given to the facts or the law by the court below may have been erroneous: Kaufman Construction Company v. Holcomb et al., 357 Pa. 514 , 55 A. 2d 534 , and the many cases cited therein.

1957The law is clear that where a statute expressly provides that there shall be no appeal, the scope of appellate review is limited to the question of jurisdiction and the regularity of the proceeding; the merits of the controversy cannot be considered even though the interpretation given to the facts or the law by the court below may have been erroneous: Kaufman Construction Company v. Holcomb et al., 357 Pa. 514 , 55 A. 2d 534 , and the many cases cited therein.

1957The effect of this section is the same as though the Legislature had said in terms, “There shall be no appeal from an order discharging such a rule for new trial”: Commonwealth v. Greason, 208 Pa. 126 , 57 A. 349 ; Commonwealth v. Cicere, 286 Pa. 296 , 133 A. 795 ; Commonwealth v. Del Vaccio, 303 Pa. 519 , 154 A. 789 .

1957The effect of this section is the same as though the Legislature had said in terms, “There shall be no appeal from an order discharging such a rule for new trial”: Commonwealth v. Greason, 208 Pa. 126 , 57 A. 349 ; Commonwealth v. Cicere, 286 Pa. 296 , 133 A. 795 ; Commonwealth v. Del Vaccio, 303 Pa. 519 , 154 A. 789 .