8 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1973–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Arroyogreen2 sentences2013See Commonwealth's Brief at 63 (citing Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 555 Pa. 125 , 723 A.2d 162, 170 (1999)). 2013See Commonwealth's Brief at 63 (citing Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 555 Pa. 125 , 723 A.2d 162, 170 (1999)). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. O'SEAROgreen2 sentences2011See Commonwealth v. O’Searo, 466 Pa. 224 , 352 A.2d 30, 36-37 (1976) (rejecting challenge to instruction that the jury could infer malice or intent to kill from the use of a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the body and holding that the inference arising from the instruction is permissive, allowing the jury to either accept or reject it based on the attendant circumstances). 2011See Commonwealth v. O’Searo, 466 Pa. 224 , 352 A.2d 30, 36-37 (1976) (rejecting challenge to instruction that the jury could infer malice or intent to kill from the use of a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the body and holding that the inference arising from the instruction is permissive, allowing the jury to either accept or reject it based on the attendant circumstances). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Donahuegreen2 sentences2005The doctrine of chances was used to explain the accident exception in Commonwealth v. Donahue, 519 Pa. 532, 541-42, 543 , 549 A.2d 121, 126, 127 (1988) (emphasis in original), and states: “To prove intent, ... as a generic notion of criminal volition or willfulness,... [t]he argument here is purely from the point of view of the doctrine of chances — the instinctive recognition of that logical process which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is perceived that this element cannot explain them all.... [T]he mind applies this rough and in 2005The doctrine of chances was used to explain the accident exception in Commonwealth v. Donahue, 519 Pa. 532, 541-42, 543 , 549 A.2d 121, 126, 127 (1988) (emphasis in original), and states: “To prove intent, ... as a generic notion of criminal volition or willfulness,... [t]he argument here is purely from the point of view of the doctrine of chances — the instinctive recognition of that logical process which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is perceived that this element cannot explain them all.... [T]he mind applies this rough and in | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Russellgreen2 sentences1985See also Commonwealth v. Russell, 326 Pa.Super. 346 , 473 A.2d 1383 (1984) (citing Rineer). 1985See also Commonwealth v. Russell, 326 Pa.Super. 346 , 473 A.2d 1383 (1984) (citing Rineer). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Gilmangreen2 sentences1985See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gilman, 470 Pa. 179 , 368 A.2d 253 (1977); Commonwealth v. Long, 258 Pa.Super. 312 , 392 A.2d 810 (1978). [8] The Commonwealth maintains that because defense counsel failed to object to the absence of an instruction on character evidence at the close of the trial court's charge, this claim is waived under Commonwealth v. Rineer, 310 Pa.Super. 241 , 456 A.2d 591 (1983) (requiring a specific objection after the charge is read to the jury in order to preserve an issue, even where the jury instructions have been timely offered and refused). 1985See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gilman, 470 Pa. 179 , 368 A.2d 253 (1977); Commonwealth v. Long, 258 Pa.Super. 312 , 392 A.2d 810 (1978). [8] The Commonwealth maintains that because defense counsel failed to object to the absence of an instruction on character evidence at the close of the trial court's charge, this claim is waived under Commonwealth v. Rineer, 310 Pa.Super. 241 , 456 A.2d 591 (1983) (requiring a specific objection after the charge is read to the jury in order to preserve an issue, even where the jury instructions have been timely offered and refused). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Com. v. Merced, A.
green
1 sentence2025Merced, 308 A.3d at 1284 . -7- J-S42020-24 The Commonwealth maintains that the claim is moot, as the trial court amended its order on May 16, 2024, to strike the no contact provision. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth v. Rineer
green
2 sentences1985The Commonwealth maintains that because defense counsel failed to object to the absence of an instruction on character evidence at the close of the trial court’s charge, this claim is waived under Commonwealth v. Rineer, 310 Pa.Super. 241 , 456 A.2d 591 (1983) (requiring a specific objection after the charge is read to the jury in order to preserve an issue, even where the jury instructions have been timely offered and refused). 1985The Commonwealth maintains that because defense counsel failed to object to the absence of an instruction on character evidence at the close of the trial court’s charge, this claim is waived under Commonwealth v. Rineer, 310 Pa.Super. 241 , 456 A.2d 591 (1983) (requiring a specific objection after the charge is read to the jury in order to preserve an issue, even where the jury instructions have been timely offered and refused). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Commonwealth v. Brown
green
2 sentences1985However, in the recent en banc case of Commonwealth v. Brown, 342 Pa.Super. 249 , 492 A.2d 745 (1985), a majority of the court rejected this exact contention. 1985However, in the recent en banc case of Commonwealth v. Brown, 342 Pa.Super. 249 , 492 A.2d 745 (1985), a majority of the court rejected this exact contention. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Commonwealth v. Long
green
2 sentences1985See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gilman, 470 Pa. 179 , 368 A.2d 253 (1977); Commonwealth v. Long, 258 Pa.Super. 312 , 392 A.2d 810 (1978). [8] The Commonwealth maintains that because defense counsel failed to object to the absence of an instruction on character evidence at the close of the trial court's charge, this claim is waived under Commonwealth v. Rineer, 310 Pa.Super. 241 , 456 A.2d 591 (1983) (requiring a specific objection after the charge is read to the jury in order to preserve an issue, even where the jury instructions have been timely offered and refused). 1985See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gilman, 470 Pa. 179 , 368 A.2d 253 (1977); Commonwealth v. Long, 258 Pa.Super. 312 , 392 A.2d 810 (1978). [8] The Commonwealth maintains that because defense counsel failed to object to the absence of an instruction on character evidence at the close of the trial court's charge, this claim is waived under Commonwealth v. Rineer, 310 Pa.Super. 241 , 456 A.2d 591 (1983) (requiring a specific objection after the charge is read to the jury in order to preserve an issue, even where the jury instructions have been timely offered and refused). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Commonwealth v. Covil
green
2 sentences1981We rejected that argument in Commonwealth v. Covil, 474 Pa. 375 , 378 A.2d 841 (1977), where we stated: “. . . 1981We rejected that argument in Commonwealth v. Covil, 474 Pa. 375 , 378 A.2d 841 (1977), where we stated: “. . . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Commonwealth v. Marabel
green
2 sentences1973We held in Commonwealth v. Marabel, 445 Pa. 435, 441 , 283 A. 2d 285 (1971) that: “ ‘[Ojustody occurs if a suspect is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is being deprived or restricted of his freedom of action or movement under pressures of official authority. . . . [T]he custody requirement of Miranda does not depend on the subjective intent of the law enforcement officer-interrogator, but upon whether the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is placed, m a situation in which he rear sonably believes that his freedom of action or movem 1973We held in Commonwealth v. Marabel, 445 Pa. 435, 441 , 283 A. 2d 285 (1971) that: “ ‘[Ojustody occurs if a suspect is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is being deprived or restricted of his freedom of action or movement under pressures of official authority. . . . [T]he custody requirement of Miranda does not depend on the subjective intent of the law enforcement officer-interrogator, but upon whether the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is placed, m a situation in which he rear sonably believes that his freedom of action or movem | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.